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ABSTRACT 
 
Tribal Banditry in Ottoman Ayntab (1690-1730) 
Soyudoğan, Muhsin. 
M.A., Department of History. 
Supervisior: Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel. 
 
This thesis attempts to understand the tribal banditry through a micro historical 
analsysis, which focuses on the tribal banditry in Ayntab region during the late 
seveneteenth and early eighteenth century. Though it focuses on a specific region, it 
tries to contribute to the discussion on banditry and also tries to develop a model for 
analyzing banditry in the Ottoman Empire. The novelty of this model is that it is 
more likely to consider different factors, like social organization, which is mainly 
shaped by the group perception of the actor, and social, economical, and political 
motivators, in understanding banditry. Moreover, this study offers an approach that 
sees the banditry as not sporadic events but a long lasting phenomenon in the 
Ottoman history. Thus, it reflects banditry as embodied socio-political conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Tribes, social and political banditry, social power, social organization, 
kinship system, Ayntab, the Otoman Empire.  
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ÖZET 
 
Osmanlı Ayntab’ında Aşiret Eşkiyalığı (1690-1730) 
 
Soyudoğan, Muhsin. 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü. 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oktay Özel. 
 
Bu tez, bir mikro tarih çalışması örneği olarak, 17. yüzyıl sonu ve 18. yüzyıl 
başlarında Ayntab çevresindeki aşiret eşkiyalıklarını anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Her 
ne kadar belli bir bölgeye odaklansa da, çalışma eşkiyalık etrafında dönen bazı 
tartışmalara katkı sağlamayı; ayrıca Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki eşkiyalığı anlamak 
için bir model geliştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu modeldeki yenilik, eşkiyalığı 
anlamak için, temelde eylemi yapanın grup algısı tarafından şekillenen, sosyal 
organizasyon ile ekonomik, sosyal ve politik güdüleyiciler gibi değişik faktörleri göz 
önünde bulundurmasıyla alakalıdır. Bunun yanında, çalışma Osmanlı tarihindeki 
eşkyalığı münferit olaylar olarak değil, onları uzun bir zaman dilimine yayılmış bir 
olgu olarak anlamayı hedefleyen bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Böylece eşkiyalık sosyo-
politik çatışmaların somutlaşmış bir şekli olarak yansıtılır.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Aşiretler, sosyal ve politik eşkiyalık, sosyal güç, sosyal organizasyon, 
soy sistemi, Ayntab, Osmanlı İmaparatorluğu.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings are restless, purposive, 
and rational, striving to increase their 
enjoyment of the good things of life 
and capable of choosing and pursuing 
appropriate means for doing so. 
Michael Mann1 
I.1 The Concept 
I.1.1 What is ‘Banditry’? 
There are two problems in defining the concept ‘banditry’: the problem of 
detaching banditry from other outlaw actions and the discourse of banditry in the 
historical documents, which shall be used in this study. In order to avoid confusion it 
is necessary to draw the limits of the concept. Richard Slatta’s definition of banditry 
appears reasonable to start with: “Banditry is taking property by force or the threat of 
force, often done by a group, usually of men.”2 This action-based definition however 
is insufficient to grasp the concept fully. According to this definition, it is the action 
of actor -“taking property by force or the threat of force”-that determines the banditry 
as an identity of the actor. However, the identity (banditry) of the actor can also 
determine whether the action is banditry or not. Let me explain this point with an 
example. As we learn from David M. Hart Arab bandits kidnapped females for 
                                                 
1 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. 
(London: Cambridge University, 1986), p. 4. 
2 Richard W. Slatta, “Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Social Bandit: A Critique and Revision.” (A 
Contracorriente, 2004), p. 22. 
 2   
different purposes, such as, using them for sexual needs and selling them.3 Here, it is 
obvious that kidnapping is an action that can be treated as banditry. Can one, thus, 
conclude the same thing if s/he pulls out the word ‘bandits’ from Hart’s statement? It 
is difficult to answer this question positively, since what is called ‘kız kaçırma’ (girl 
abduction) is still concurrent sociological phenomenon in Turkey, particularly in 
rural communities where there are strict social rules about marriage. A case recorded 
in Ayntab judicial records (sijils) dated November 19, 1716 is a good example in 
point: A certain Ömer decides to give his daughter Hatice in marriage with his 
nephew (most probably his sister’s son). But his brother’s son Ali entered Ömer’s 
home with three fellows (those three men registered as bandits) and carry off Hatice 
by force to solemnize marriage before an imam (Muslim prayer). However, villagers 
rescued the girl.4 This example is a reflection of a patriarchal community. According 
to customs prevalent in that region, the priority of marriage to one’s daughter is a 
right for his brothers’ sons.5  In this case it is obvious that that crude behavior of Ali 
is adequate to social contract even if it was not in conformity with shari’a (Islamic 
law); therefore, it cannot be seen as banditry. If in the definition of banditry the actor 
is as important as the event then we can allege a process through which actor is given 
the identity of banditry. How can we describe this process? The process comprises 
both committing crime, which is labeled as banditry, and escaping from or resisting 
to the justice or punishment. Only if the guilty person could manage to do this and be 
outlaw, s/he can be accepted as bandit. The process itself then contributes to the 
reproduction of banditry. Therefore sporadic events, like Ali’s case mentioned above, 
can hardly be labeled as banditry.  
                                                 
3 David M. Hart, Banditry in Islam: Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the West Frontier. 
(Whitstable, Kent: Whitstable Litho Ltd., 1987), p. 15.  
4 ACR 67, p. 44. 
5 This custom can still be observed. Even sometimes only if father’s brother’s son declares to not 
marry his cousin girl is given in marriage with anybody else.   
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I am avare that this point can be objected since it is not always an easy task to 
see this process in a historical study. However, it is important for separating banditry 
from a bulk of similar criminal events that take place in daily life. At this point it is 
necessary to point out that crimes committed in cities especially in small towns such 
as Ayntab, cannot simply be labeled as banditry, since the city could only offer a 
limited space for escaping or hide out. Once the city criminal was identified it was 
not that difficult for officers to bring him/her before the court or eliminate. This is 
why fleeing to countryside was something that made those criminals go with the title 
‘bandit’. Countryside usually offered good niches to bandits to make themselves the 
forefront actor in the conflict with state executors. In each decision, whether they 
would flee or fight or surrender to justice or make an agreement with executors, they 
became main determinant, not the executors. Executors could only demand or 
threaten. At this point, other people saw bandits as brave heroes. The most of dirges 
and lyrics produced by mobs for those outlaws revolves around these braveness and 
heroic qualities.   
Once outlaws were identified as bandits, not only rural space but also social 
organization in countryside facilitated the consolidation of this identity. Hence, their 
actions that violated laws can be seen as banditry by researcher. Indeed, such a way 
of defining banditry can lead to stereotypes; however we deliberately ignore such 
stereotypes to conceptualize a range of actions from simple robbery to the conflict 
between social groups and from rebellions to separatist movements under the 
heading of ‘banditry’. 
If one accepts such a dual view of banditry, the form of actions should also be 
questioned. It is true that bandits in general used force or threat of force to take 
property. However, this does not say much about the social dimension of banditry. 
 4   
Bandits construct complex relations with other people. Hart in his discussion of 
Jbala (North western Morocco) gangs talks about a social figure known as kamman. 
This figure gives shelter to bandits and sells their spoils to especially old owners of 
property. In turn he gets a lion share. According to Hart, “kammans emerged as real 
bandit leaders”6. Throughout my research I came across many cases that bandits had 
relation with city dwellers. We will turn back to these points in the following 
discussions. Here I would like to emphasize that bandits must not be considered only 
with their targets; their relations with their supporters are also important. We can, 
therefore, conclude that what makes the one bandit is not only the criminal action 
itself but also the process of being outlaw. In that process, it is certain that, s/he may 
fulfill what can be expected from a bandit, but during the stagnant periods their 
supporters give them any support voluntarily. Even such a voluntary generosity 
cannot change their identity. 
The third component of Slatta’s definition of ‘banditry’ is about whether they 
are single persons or they form groups. Almost all bandits are somehow are members 
of bandit groups. Even single bandits most of the time flock together with a band or 
another single bandit. In this study, as shall bee seen, we will talk about tribal bandit 
groups formed sometimes by more than a thousand armed men. Such huge quantity 
appeared during battles with state armies or another bandit army. I say army, since 
such big groups are something more than simple bandit groups. Karen Barkey who 
emphasizes mainly bandit levendsof late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
Anatolia (we will discuss the topic later) claims that bandits were imitating the 
organization of the Ottoman Army.7 It can be said this was quite normal since 
                                                 
6 Hart, Banditry in Islam. p. 16. 
7 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Toute to State Centralization. (Ithaca & 
London: 1994), p. 198. 
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levends were generally old mercenaries. I think such an organization can be claimed 
for huge tribal bands, which had the ability to defeat state armies as well.  
On the other hand, these huge bodies divided in to small groups during raids 
and robbery. They generally formed groups consisted of around 40-50 men. 
Moreover, there were also opportunist small groups formed by three or four men 
who attacked when occasion arises. Most probably those small groups were not 
really outlaw bandits but simple thieves who after strike turn back to their homes.  
Lastly, as Slatta points out, those bands were formed generally by men. It is not 
usual to see female bandits in history; however Gillian Spraggs talks about female 
highway robbers.8 Though, I haven’t come across any examples of female bandits 
except for cooperation between females and bandits, Lucy Garnett points out the 
Ottoman female bandits in the last period of the Empire: 
Various instances are on record of women, Greek and Bulgarian, having 
also adopted the hard and perilous life of brigands. Dressed in masculine 
garb, they for years successfully concealed their sex from comrades, and 
took part in all their exploits. About thirty years ago a Greek woman of 
Lower Macedonia, under the name of Spanό (“the Beardless”) Vangheli, 
was for a considerable time at the head of a notorious band of freebooters, 
and held out stubbornly long after the majority of the brigand bands in her 
district had given in their submission…The wives of Bulgarian brigands 
have also often accompanied their husbands to the mountains in man’s 
attire, fared like the rest of outlaws, and often shared their fate; and love of 
adventure seems occasionally to have led unmarried women of this race to 
adopt this calling, which is by no means in greater disrepute among the 
Bulgarian than among the Greek peasants.9    
 
It is not difficult to estimate that the same manner was also prevailing among Muslim 
tribes. Maybe women did not take part in the ordinary bandit activities but most 
probably they were active in the tribal conflicts, which also will be handled as 
banditry in this study.   
                                                 
8 Gillian Spraggs, Cutpurses, Highwaymen, Burglars: The Professional Thief 1558-1660. (Bristiol: 
Stuart Press, 1997), p. 10. Eric Hobsbawm also talks about Bavarian woman robber Schattinger. See 
Hobsbawm, Bandits. (United States: Delacorate, 1969), p. 32. 
9 Lucy M. J. Garnett, Turkish Life in town and Country. (New York & London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1904), pp. 306-7. 
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I.1.2 The Good Banditry and the Bad Banditry 
Eric Hobsbawm rejects to use such a comprehensive definition discussed so far. 
According to him historians and sociologists cannot use such a crude definition: 
For the law, anyone belonging to a group of men who attack and rob with 
violence is a bandit, from those who snatch pay-rolls at an urban street 
corner to organized insurgents or guerillas who happen not to be officially 
recognized as such.10  
 
Instead of that definition he prefers to use “social banditry”11 which represents “some 
kind of robbers”.12 The main criterion of his definition is the peasants’ perception of 
the banditry. According to him social bandits:  
…are not regarded as simple criminal by public opinion…they are peasant 
outlaws whom the lord and the state regard as criminals, but who remain within 
peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, 
avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any 
case as men to be admired, helped and supported.13  
 
This approach of Hobsbawm to banditry inspired a bulk of studies in different parts 
of the world. Even though his approach was widely accepted, recent studies have 
developed a revisionist critique of it.14 The first critique was raised against his 
method of study. Hobsbawm uses ballads, which, he thinks, were formed by 
peasants for their champions. Anton Blok claims these ballads much reflect myths 
and legends about bandits. These myths are much more related to middle class rather 
                                                 
10 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 13.  
11 Hobsbawm devoted his masterpiece, Bandits, to this concept but the root of the ‘social banditry’ can 
be found in his article “The Social Bandit” (Chapter II) in his book Primitive Rebels: Studies in 
Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and the 20th Centuries. (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1959). 
12 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 13. 
13 ibid. p. 13. 
14 Richard W. Slatta’s “Bandits and Rural Social History: A Comment on Joseph” (Latin American 
Review, Vol. 26, No. 1:145-151; 1991) is a helpful article to see a general review of such revisionist 
critiques. See also Anton Blok, “The Peasant and Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered.” 
(Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14(4): 494-503; 1972). The extended version of this 
article published in Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, (Cambridge: Polity, 2001); and David M. Hart, 
Banditry in Islam: Case Studies from Morocco, Algeria and the West Frontier. (Wisbech, 
Cambridgeshire, England: Middle East And North African Studies Press, 1987).  
 7   
than peasants.15 Though this may have a certain degree of truth in certain cases but 
some cases say something different about ballads. In the district I am living the 
dirges (ağıt in Turkish) wailed for last three bandits, who were active in the 1950s, 
generally inspired by the dirges that were keened by their relatives when they were 
killed. Of them the last bandit, Osman, who was not killed but died in 1990s, also 
have a ballad. It is not known who first time sung the ballad for him, but one might 
assume that it was sung by a troubadour (aşık).  
However, it is hard to say that these ballads reflect a common perception in the 
cases of other two bandits who were wailed dirges by their families. Once these 
sentimental ballads become pervasive, generally through the people who come for 
visit of condolence disseminate them; people feel deep sorrow for them irrespective 
of their degree of relations. Therefore, it will be wrong to infer the sociality of 
banditry with base on ballads. In the case of Osman, on the other hand, we cannot be 
sure whether the troubadour really knew him, since, in fact, Osman was a very cruel 
bandit who was used by local lord (agha) against peasants; and we do not see this in 
the ballad wailed for him. Nevertheless, his fame spread through other regions with 
the spread of tape cassettes.16 What one can conclude from this example is that what 
remains from Osman is just an ideal type, which barely has truth in it.  
In his response to such critiques Hobsbawm claims there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
bandits in public opinion, therefore banditry can be seen as a kind of social protest. 
And he continues that myth cannot be separated from reality.17 Though this might be 
                                                 
15 Anton Blok, “The Peasant and Brigand.” p. 500. 
16 I have a personal experience of this case thorough my grandfather. Several years ago, my 
grandfather went to Urfa. A man met with him and somehow he found out that my grandfather was 
living in the neighbor village of Osman. To his astonishment he asked my grandfather whether had 
seen Osman with his own eyes. That man had never seen Osman and only knows him through ballads. 
I do not intend to devalue ballads for a research like this; I just would like to emphasize their limits as 
a raw material for such inquiries.  
17 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Social Bandits: Reply.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 14/4 
(September 1972), pp. 503-4. 
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true, the problem here is about his methodology. Ballads can, of course, say many 
things, but it is equally true that there are limits to generalizations that one can 
develop on them. A bandit can be both good and bad; however, it is difficult to see 
such duality in the one ballad. Hobsbawm himself accepts that “a man may be social 
bandit on his native mountains, a mere robber on the plains.”18 As a matter of fact, 
such a case evidently means ‘the group opinion’ rather than public opinion suggested 
by Hobsbawm. In this study I would like to emphasize such group opinions with 
examining tribes. 
According to Hobsbawm this type of banditry “is one of the universal social 
phenomena known to history, and one of the most amazingly uniform.”19 To him, 
such universality is not something about importation of such a culture of banditry 
from one culture to another, but rather about similar universal conditions in which 
peasants face with the same problems.20 The danger here is that when talking about 
the universality of ‘social banditry’, this also means, by definition, acceptance of a 
universal form of peasantry. What Hobsbawm calls ‘traditional peasant societies’ 
which “are based on agriculture (including pastoral economies), and consist largely 
of peasants and landless labourers ruled, oppressed and exploited by someone else - 
lords, towns, governments, lawyers, or even banks”21 is the fundamental producer of 
‘social banditry’.  He then generalizes: 
Socially it seems to occur in all types of human society which lie between 
the evolutionary phase of tribal and kinship organization, and modern 
capitalist and industrial society, but including the phases of disintegrating 
kinship society and the transition to agrarian capitalism.22  
 
                                                 
18 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 14. 
19 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 14. In his book Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and the 20th Centuries he describes social banditry as “a universal and virtually 
unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic protest against oppression and poverty.” p. 5.  
20 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 14. 
21 ibid. p. 15.  
22 ibid. p. 14. 
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The ‘universality of social banditry’ that Hobsbawm points out requires a 
closer examination. As a matter of fact, what Hobsbawm says can simply be 
epitomized simply as such that: social banditry can be seen wherever banditry in 
general is seen. Hobsbawm proposes that since there is no internal stratification in 
kinship and tribal societies we cannot talk about social banditry but raiding.23 In fact, 
in such a case it is hard to talk about neither banditry nor raiding. What Hobsbawm 
proposes by tribal and kinship society is what Marxists conceptualize as Primitive 
Communal Societies. Indeed, in such societies banditry cannot be expected since, 
theoretically, there is no so much economic and social differentiation between their 
members. This is what this study also suggests: banditry is hardly can bee seen in the 
Ottoman tribes − in which we can expect social banditry if we approach the issue 
from point of view of Hobsbawm, since there was stratification among their 
members − but it is for sure raiding or banditry, in general, can be see between them. 
He passes over the matter of ‘banditry between tribes’ with overemphasizing 
‘raiding’ thus he concludes that there is no social banditry in Bedouin communities.24 
David M. Hart, on the other hand, disproves this point with giving the example of the 
famous bandit of Morocco ′Ali l-Bu Frahi (′Ali the Six Fingered) who he thinks was 
a social bandit.25  
No matter whether they are right or wrong, such overgeneralizations by 
Hobsbawm say less about banditry than what they ignore. If one looks at not in-
group but between-groups relations s/he can say more about banditry. Colin Tudge 
draws our attention to the symbolic similarity between bandit and Neanderthal in 
                                                 
23 ibid. p. 14. 
24 ibid. p. 14. 
25 “From Hobsbawm’s point of view the Robin Hood syndrome was certainly present in ′Ali’s story. 
′Ali evidently never molested the poor. Wealthy caravaneers or traders certainly from his 
depredations, but unless met with resistance his robberies were bloodless…when wedding took place, 
he would even appear with a gift for the bridegroom.” Hart, Banditry in Islam. p. 10.   
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clash between Homo Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons, which is estimated to have 
happened throughout 5,000 years period between 40,000 and 35,000 years ago.26 
This idea is important not because that we take it for granted but because it points out 
the clash between social groups in which it is almost impossible to talk about 
inequality and stratification. Such a clash can take the form of banditry as we see 
later from the examples in the Ottoman society. Therefore, instead of a universal 
peasant society, we look for banditry in a society that was divided into groups 
through ethnic, socio-cultural, religious, economic and even professional lines. 
Living roughly in the same economic structure or system does not alter such group 
differences. What Hobsbawm calls ‘public opinion’, at that sense, cannot be thought 
without such divisions. As Slatta says “What united people behind outlaw gangs 
more often were kinship, friendship, and region- not class.”27 That is what I shall try 
to emphasize by tribal banditry.  
On the other hand, modern agrarian systems are also problematic and this is the 
other limit of social banditry. As Hobsbawm cogently points out, “combination of 
economic development, efficient communication, and public administration, deprives 
any kind of banditry…”28 As it is seen here, what he formulated as a society for 
social banditry is exactly the one in which banditry takes place. His main purpose is 
to separate the good banditry (from the point of view of the peasants) from the bad 
one. However such a dichotomy cannot always be observed in that clarity.29 This 
obscurity leads a fallacy. That is, what in fact Hobsbawm depicts is banditry, but not 
social banditry.  
                                                 
26 Colin Tudge, Neanderthals, Bandits and Farmers: How Agriculture Really Began. (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), pp. 26-8. 
27 Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History” p. 147. 
28 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 15. 
29 Hobsbawm is also aware of such an obscurity: “Of course in practice such distinctions are often less 
clear than in theory.”  Ibid. p. 14. 
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Hobsbawm’s concept of ‘social banditry’ inspired several works concerning the 
Ottoman banditry as well. Mehmet Bayrak’s book Eşkiyalık ve Eşkıya Türküleri is 
not only a valuable collection of ballads but also is a good application of 
Hobsbawm’s romantic approach.30 Another one used the same approach in the 
Ottoman context is Sabri Yetkin.31 On the other hand, in her work on celalis of the 
turn of seventeenth century, Karen Barkey prefers to see banditry from a critical 
point of view. She emphasizes the relations of bandits with ruling elite and the state 
rather than the peasants. She depicts those bandits not only as those who had 
relations with state but also the ones who created barriers to peasants’ uprisings. She 
goes further and concludes that through the state’s soft and artful policies bandits’ 
threats for the state contributed to the state centralization in the seventeenth 
century.32 Though I prefer to use Barkey’s more realistic approach, her 
overgeneralizations are also not far from creating similar fallacies.  
First of all, I have serious doubt abut her methodology that compares 
centralization of the Ottoman state with other European states. The structural 
differences between the Ottoman and European systems are well explained by 
Immanuel Wallerstein.  With Wallerstein’s words, in the period 1450-1640 
Northwest Europe became the core; the northern Spain and Italian city-states formed 
the semi-periphery, Northeast Europe and Iberian America were periphery of the 
‘capitalist world economy’.33 However, he emphasizes the expansion period of 1750-
                                                 
30 Mehmet Bayrak, Eşkiyalık ve Eşkiya Türküleri. (Ankara: Yorum, 1985). 
31 Sabri Yetkin, Ege’de Eşkıyalar (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996). 
32 According to Barkey “Even the pervasive banditry was less often crushed by force than it was 
managed by widespread bargaining. (p. 2.)…Banditry provided a fundamentally new context within 
which the Ottoman state proceeded with some of its most important functions, territorial consolidation 
and administrative control. (p. 8.)” Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. 
33 Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for 
Comparative Analysis.” in The Essential Wallerstein. p. 93. 
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1873 when the Ottoman Empire articulated to the world-economy.34 More 
optimistically it can be said that only some parts of the Ottoman Empire began to 
articulate to the Capitalist World-Economy in between late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.35 When Barkey compares these entities she does not seem to be aware that 
she compares capitalism or mercantilism with feudalism, Asian mode of production 
or anything else that can be attributable to the Ottoman system. In that sense, her 
question, “Why did Ottoman peasants not engage in rebellious activity on their own 
or alliance with other groups?”36 remains inappropriate. On the one hand, she tries to 
emphasize the peculiarity of the Ottoman route to centralization; and on the other, 
she compares Europe and the Ottoman by the same concepts. This is rather simplistic 
usage of peasantry as a unit of analysis in such comparisons. As Hobsbawm simply 
established his concept of social banditry on peasantry, Barkey does the same on the 
same ground. However, it is hard to reach such a general conclusion that the 
Ottoman peasantry did not engage in rebellious activities? This is rather 
misunderstanding of the banditry in the Ottoman Empire. While Hobsbawm 
constructs his stereotypic category of ‘social banditry’, Barkey seems to have a 
prejudice against bandits. She has a tendency to see all of them as levends (irregular 
mercenaries) and/or suhtes (students of religious school). She is right in depicting 
them as more anti than pro-public. However, if she had looked at the period more 
carefully, she could have easily seen the peasants positioning themselves next to, 
even acting behalf of, those bandit groups. This not to say, that they were social 
bandits, but one can at least talk about the social dimensions in the acts of some of 
                                                 
34 Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions 
for Research” (original paper presented in the First International Congress on the Social and 
Economic History of Turkey in Hacettepe University in 1977), p. 4. 
35 Murat Çizakça, “Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World-Economy.” Review 8/3  
(1985): 353-377. 
36 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. p. 11. 
 13   
those groups. The best example in this respect is Cennetoğlu who had been a tımar-
holder, and was supported by people in return for protection against the oppression 
of beglerbegi (governor of province) and his men.37 The second one is Canpolatoğlu 
Ali Pasha, whose rebellion in the first half of the seventeenth century created one of 
the greatest problems at that period. She underlines his anti-soical dimension too; 
however, as simple bandits without public support, they could not have succeeded in 
anything and could not have challenged the Ottoman Forces. Since the Canpolatoğlu 
affair can also be analyzed under tribal banditry, I will come back to this case later 
on.  
As a result, she overemphasizes on the issue of bargaining and in every case 
reflects the state as having total control over the procedure so her image of the state 
is a powerful one that successfully manipulated banditry. To the contrary, I argue 
that the bandits who often rebelled against the state, therefore labeled as bandits, 
were more determinants of the process, since they were often in a position to reject 
the offer by the state. Even though the state tried to dissuade Gürcü Nebi, for 
example, from banditry he was persistent about his idea to challenge the Ottoman 
administration in Istanbul.38 In Canpolatoğlu’s case the province of Aleppo was not 
granted to him but he captured that position by force. It is interesting to see that, the 
state remained silent and demanded only his loyalty. Though he declared his loyalty 
he immediately began to bargain with the state on providing soldiers in return for 
                                                 
37 According to Çağatay Uluçay, even though the state propagated that Cennetoğlu was beguiling 
people, he was supported by people and he defended them against state authorities. Çağatay Uluçay, 
XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. (İstanbul: Manisa Halkevi, 1944), pp. 31-2. 
However, to Barkey, Cennetoğlu declared himself as tımar holder and fought in the name of tımar 
holders. Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. p. 225. She also cites from Uluçay’s same work, but she 
interestingly reflects the same bandit as a pro-tımar holder. On the contrary, Uluçay says that those 
tımar-holders complained about Cennetoğlu to the state. Uluçay, Ibid. p. 33. 
38 Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 55. 
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more privileges.39 Only after Kuyucu Murat at seriously defeated him he fell back 
upon Kalanderoğlu and eventually fled to İstanbul to be pardoned by the sultan and 
appointed as new governor to another province.40 At this point Barkey concludes 
that: 
A consideration of the final outcome reveals even more subterfuge on the 
part of the state; the arrangement with Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha became 
part of a policy by which the grand vizier accorded himself more time in 
preparation for war against the bandit. A patrimonial regime that ensured 
undivided control by either eliminating potential rivals or securing loyalty 
by incorporation into the household had to develop a strong tendency for 
deal making and brokerage.41      
 
Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha was killed a year later as the governor of Tımaşver province. 
What this reveals is he did remain truly loyal to the state or, as it will be seen later, 
the state might not be so a unified entity. Bandits’ holding offices in the state 
bureocracy does not always mean that such bandits strengthen the state power. On 
the contrary, in his article “Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman 
Administration”, Halil İnalcık clarifies how the state representatives became 
centrifugal powers.42 As a matter of fact, yhe bandis who the state pacified were not 
all but their leaders. It was not difficult for the bandit followers to remain intact and 
eventually reemerge under a new leadership. A good example of this was 
Kalenderoğlu who rebelled together with Karayazıcı against the state in the last 
decade of the sixteenth century. When the state eliminated Karayazıcı, he appeared 
as a new and even a stronger leader. Similarly, the followers of Cennetoğlu, after he 
was killed in 1625, continued their activities under the leadership of İlyas Pasha, yet 
                                                 
39 William J. Griswold, Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan, 1591-1611. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 
2002), pp. 92-4. 
40 Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 18. 
41 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. p. 191. 
42 Halil İnalcık, “Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Administration.” In Studies in 
Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, London & Amsterdam: 
Feffer & Simons, 1970.) 
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another Ottoman governor. As it shall be seen later one can follow this kind of 
continuity more clearly in tribal banditry. 
Moreover, many of these rebel leaders resumed their banditries shortly after 
they were granted a pardon by the sultan. Kalenderoğlu, for example, he began his 
illegal activities once more only a year after receiving the position of governorship. 
Similarly, Gürcü Nebi was forgiven and bestowed a sizeable tax-farm somewhere at 
Niğde district. However, this did not stop him from reprising of banditry.43 Barkey is 
right in emphasizing that the ideal of circle of justice was an important composite of 
political culture of the Ottoman Empire.44 However, in the seventeenth century, the 
state was unsuccessful to uphold the idea of justice effectively. The role of banditry 
in that ineffectiveness cannot be fully understood unless its long lasting history is 
taken into consideration. It can be argued that banditry, both in and out of the state 
bureaucracy, contributed significantly to the gradual erosion of the state power. It is 
equally true that banditry contributed the state centralization, but it happened in the 
early twentieth century when they joined the nationalist forces to eventually fight 
against invading armies and separatist non-Muslims in Anatolia not in the 
seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire.   
 
I.1.3 Banditry in the Ottoman Sources 
Ottomans used the terms haydut (derived from haiduk or vice versa), türedi, 
harami or haramzade and şaki (pl. eşkiya) for bandit. In the primary sources 
examined in this study the common term used for bandit was şaki and eşkıya as it is 
case even today. This Arabic root of the word originally means to be miserable, 
unhappy, and wretched or to make one miserable, unhappy and wretched. The 
                                                 
43 Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. pp. 12-55. 
44 Karen Barkey, ibid., p. 27. 
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sources often refer to people who involve in şekavet; the act that produces 
unhappiness, misery etc., and this is what bandits do. Would it be possible therefore 
to think bandit as the miserable person who creates misery? Such a definition is apt 
to the assertion that economically degraded people is more inclined to banditry. 
Hobsbawm’s answer to the question “who becomes a bandit?” is that they are ‘rural 
surplus population’ and ‘marginal people’ who are not fully integrated to rural 
society.45 Similarly, Karen Barkey also underlines that they were poor people who 
were usually behind the banditry in the Ottoman Empire in the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.46 That is a reasonable assumption; however, it is only the one 
side of the mirror. What can we say about people of whom the banditry is almost an 
inseparable part of their lives? John S. Koliopoulos, who describes the bandits in 
Greece, points out that, bandits were born to banditry.47 The same can also be applied 
to tribal banditry in the Ottoman Empire. Disloyalty of tribes or the conflicts among 
themselves that is often referred to as banditry was far beyond economic reasons.  
In the Ottoman registers, the similar behaviors of state officials in the 
countryside were termed differently from those of ordinary people. What these 
dignitaries did in generally named as oppression, hostility, and injustice (zulüm and 
te’addî)48 rather than banditry (şekavet). In order their actions to be reckoned as 
banditry, they had to give up their official positions and became part of ordinary 
people. This also reveals the Ottoman perception of the main socio-political 
differentiation between military class (Askeri) and public (Reaya-taxpayers).  
                                                 
45 Hobsbawm, Bandits. pp. 25-7.  
46 See Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. The similar point was underlined by Sabri Yetkin for late 
Ottoman banditry in Ege’de Eşkıyalar. p. 9. 
47 John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-
1912. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), p. 239. 
48 Ahmet Akgündüz, Osmanlı Hukukunda Zulüm Kavramı, (Ankara: Birey ve Toplum, 1985), p. 9. 
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Based on the Ottoman sources we can now have closer look at different types 
of banditry. 
 
Thief Bandits: What Ottomans called sarik (thief) or sarik eşkiyası (thief 
bandits) was used for a single person or small gangs who burgle a house or rob a 
person, mostly, in residential areas like villages, towns and cities. These people were 
generally working at night: they choose desolate street for robbing a person or burgle 
a house when its owner was not at home or somehow was not aware of situation. 
When they come face to face with their victims they usually did not hesitate to use 
force. Generally, people labeled as such were accused of walking up and down the 
streets at nights with war tools/fatal tools (alet-i harb)49 and/or being with women or 
prostitutes in an immoral way.50 Barkey shows such examples to prove how bandits 
can be so horrible: “Hundreds of court documents attest that bandits…paraded 
around with prostitutes, and even violated mosques with insults and disruption.”51 
Barkey here refers, most probably, to the thieves. Though they were recorded as 
bandits in most of the documents, they should be accepted as what Hobsbawm calls 
‘simple criminals’. The common usage of the term ‘banditry’ with a negative 
connotation in public often ended up accusing a person of in any simple misbehavior. 
It would be highly problematic for us to claim that drinking wine or parading around 
with prostitutes (if they were really prostitutes) is banditry. One should not forget 
that people who found such activities immoral often and easily lodged a complaint 
against such people, calling them bandits or women with them as prostitutes.  
                                                 
49 With this term we understand any kind of dagger, sword, bow or firearms like pistols and rifles. As 
far as understood from the sources everybody was not allowed to carry those tools in everyday life. 
Because of that, people who carried them were labeled as bandits or vagabonds.   
50 In a case people from the same neighborhood in the city of Ayntab blamed a woman called Ayşe for 
having intercourse with bandits always in day and night. ACR 61, p. 83.   
51 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. p. 145. 
 18   
As already mentioned before, I intend not to consider such criminals in 
residential areas as bandits. However, the essential difference between these and 
bandits often becomes obscure in rural areas. These thieves were also engaged in 
highway robbery as big bandit groups. But they appear not have been as courageous 
as bandits. Their main targets were usually single travelers or groups consisted of 
several people. Like their counterpart in cities, they also attack people in desolated 
areas in quiet times. They could burgle their neighbor’s house in their own villages 
or steal their animals without hesitation.     
Highway Robbery: Ebusuud Efendi, (1490 1574), the şeyhulislam of the 
Ottoman Empire between 1545 and 1574, explains the understanding of Islam of 
highway robbery as: 
Even if they attempt to cut the roads in the city with weapons they will be 
accepted as highway robbers. If they attempt to kill people out of the city 
with stones or woods, where the protection cannot be possible, or at night 
in the city, they will also be accepted as highway robbers.52    
 
In the Ottoman documents this kind of banditry was recorded as katt’-ı tarik eşkiyası 
(road cutting bandits, highway robbers) or simply kutta-i tarik (highwayman). This 
Arabic word refers to banditry more precisely. At any rate, in the Ottoman 
documents this word is often used to mean banditry. Kutta-i tariks were these who 
attack any target with economic value moving on roads such as a caravan, a 
tradesman, a traveler, a convoy of pilgrims, or a military convoy that carry 
provisions for army. They were generally choosing strategic points on the road, like 
mountain passes, deep valleys etc., to attack. Relatively powerful bandit groups, also 
attack on plains. Contrary to thieves, they did not usually use violence unless faced a 
serious resistance.     
                                                 
52 M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi'nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı 
Hayatı: Fetava-yı Ebussu'ud Efendi. (İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 1998), p. 240. 
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Rebellion and Rampage: It can be argued that rebellion (ihtilal) is different 
from banditry; but I include these two forms in the same category because of two 
reasons. Firstly, since we often see the tribes rebelling and doing banditry in the 
Ottoman Empire draw attention to the relation between rebellion and banditry. These 
two terms become meaningful that tribes were often seen by the state as the source of 
disorder and disobedience. Secondly, in many cases, rebellions were preceded by 
banditry. Therefore banditry became a method in rebellion. Mustafa Cezar in his 
book Osmanli Tarihinde Levendler gives some examples of how those two types of 
events went together: Şahkulu firstly began with brigandage and murdering people. 
He later began to burn and destroy (Rebellion) everything. Zünun Baba, who was 
another leader of a rebellion, firstly killed the son of Mustafa Bey, the sanjaqbegi of 
Bozok, the judge, and his deputy (naib) in 1516, and then went on to loot their 
properties. Kalender, yet another rebel, also began with highway robbery and 
murdering.53 As we shall see later, especially Zünun Baba’s case is very much alike 
banditry of the Okçu İzeddinli tribe, the main focus of this study. They also killed 
state officials and began to resist to be punished.  
In the sources some activities different in essence than banditry, such as, the 
quarrel between tribes, their raids and looting activities, also called şekavet, can be 
conceptualize under the term rampage. Those activities also were seen by the state as 
making misery. As we will see later on such acts usually took place when nomadic 
tribes were on their way of seasonal migration. Indeed, banditry, in general and 
especially rampage cannot be understood without group identity, which both shaped 
and was shaped by social structure which we discuss in chapter 2.     
                                                 
53 Mustafa Cezar, Osmanli Tarihinde Levendler. (İstanbul: İstanbul Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1965), 
pp. 88-92. 
 20   
In fact these three types of activities explain well the tribal banditry in the 
Ottoman Empire, which took mainly the form of highway robbery and raiding. These 
bandits can be considered as ‘anti-social’ since the main targets were peasants. On 
the other hand, they can also be regarded social bandit as well, since they resisted 
against state representatives for the sake of a group. By group I do not mean the 
bandit group I rather refer to other members of tribes. However, in the eye of 
Ottoman officials the whole tribe could be bandit group. This is because of the strong 
relationship between members of the tribe. Whether or not this satisfies Hobsbawm 
to consider their banditry as social is another matter. 
To sum up, here by banditry we understand group conflicts and group 
resistance against the state. Without considering the nature of their relations with 
each other and with the state, one cannot fully understand its social dimension. 
Approaching the matter with the dichotomy of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ does of 
course not provide us a proper framework. Bandits can be good for a portion of the 
society and bad for another, according to changing and often conflicting interests. In 
this work I will attempt to melt down different types of social activities in the 
concept of banditry. 
 
I.2 The Context 
When studying banditry in the Ottoman Empire one must keep in mind that 
banditry was a continuous process which at least began with the fifteenth century, 
became chronic in the sixteenth century, and continued till the end of the Empire. 
Though the banditry was an ordinary phenomenon in pre-modern states, by banditry, 
I generally refer to the movements that at some point caught the attention of the state. 
In other word, I deal particularly with the banditry only in its form when became a 
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serious issue for law and order in the Empire. Karen Barkey proposes that banditry 
contributed to state centralization in the Ottoman Empire. However it seems that it is 
too premature to come to such a conclusion. As we all know, Barkey, like many 
others, focuses on the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century celâli rebellions. 
This study, which takes the period between 1691 and 1731, therefore complements 
the picture she provides. However, the main reason in choosing 1691 is to see the 
effects of the Ottoman policy of resettlement of tribes, which is generally known to 
have been gained a new momentum in 1691. On the other hand the year 1731 has no 
specific importance for this study. As it shall be seen later, the banditry continued 
after that year almost without any break.  
The study is inspired initially by the works of Cemil Cahit Güzelbey who, with 
Hulusi Yetkin, published some selected texts from Ayntab Court Records between 
volumes that contain the period between 1729 and 1909.54 When I read these texts, 
widespread social disorder, especially led by tribes, drew my attention to the 
banditry. Then I decided to find out the reason behind it. Since some texts refer to the 
resettlement of tribes I decided to take 1691 as the starting point. Thus, I analyzed 
the Ayntab court records contain from 1691 to 1731. Though the main focus of the 
study is the Ayntab region between 1691 and 1731, I would like to offer a model to 
explain Ottoman banditry; therefore, we will have to go back and forth in time.  
In this study I examine tribes and tribal banditry in the Ayntab region. Ayntab 
was one of the four sub-provinces (sanjaq) that constituted the province (eyalet) of 
Maraş in the Ottoman Empire in this period. As in other sanjaqs the sanjaq of 
Ayntab was also governed by sanjaq begi, and in its central town or city (Ayntab) 
there were a judge (kadı) and a deputy (naib). The area of kadı’s jurisdiction formed 
                                                 
54 Cemil C. Güzelbey, Gaziantep Şer’î Mahkeme Sicilleri, (four volumes). The first three volumes 
published in 1966 and the last volume published with Hulusi Yetkin, in 1970.  
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the judicial-administrative unit called kaza. In some sanjaqs there could be more than 
one judicial center but in the Ayntab sanjaq the Ayntab city was the only such a 
center, which consists of three nahiyes, namely, Ayntab, Tılbaşer and Burç. Nahiye 
was a district, which contained a center town or village and the villages around it.  
I prefer to use the term region instead of sanjaq since the main sources that we 
used in this work contains information beyond that administrative unit. Since the 
court records reflect well the natural networks of relations the limitations of these 
records does not pose any difficulty in a problem-based historical analysis like this 
one. The main actors of this study, the tribes, lived mainly in neighboring sanjaqs of 
Ayntab. However, the court records of Ayntab are still invaluable sources for 
examining them. The region in question then contains an area crudely west-east 
direction from eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to River Euphrates, and north-
south direction from the Taurus Mountains to the northern Syria. It therefore contains 
the sanjaqs of Kilis and Antakya; the Nahiyes of Rumkala and Birecik sanjaqs 
situated the west of Euphrates and an important part of Marash sanjaq. 
There are several reasons for the choice of this particular region for the study. 
If we draw crude sociological picture of this region both ethno-lingual and ethno-
religious structures become apparent. Especially in the northern parts Turcomans 
were active as were Kurds in Kilis district and Arabs in southern regions. Sometimes 
we see that Yezidis were also participated in banditry. Therefore this region was 
highly cosmopolitan, therefore, provides us with a suitable case to examine social 
tensions and different sort of relations between various groups. Especially after the 
resettlement, began in 1691, of northern Turcoman tribes in the Eyalet of Rakka and 
sanjaqs of Hama and Humus and Çukurova region this cosmopolitan structure 
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become much more clear since many of fled people searched for shelter in this area 
where the one of closest places to all those regions of resettlements. 
Ayntab was on the cross point of several important north-south and east-west 
roads. The flow of goods on these roads was whetting bandits’ appetite. In order not 
to pay the custom duties in Aleppo the traders who come from the east began to shift 
their roads to Ayntab region in the period under review. On the other hand, in the 
same period, long wars with Persia contributed to the resurgence of the capacity of 
those roads since provisions sent to army through these roads. On the other hand, 
during the same warfare extra taxes levied the tax burden of ordinaries increased. All 
of these factors positively contributed to the banditry. 
 
I.3 The Sources 
 
The research will be based mainly on Ayntab Court Records (Gaziantep 
Şeri’yye Sicilleri). Though, these texts are mostly known as Court Records, the word 
‘court’ can create confusion. Abdulaziz Bayındır rightly offers to substitute ‘records 
of events’ (zapt-ı vekayi) for Court Records.55 As a matter of fact, these records were 
not only about events but also contain any information related to a specific kadı 
province. Therefore, I prefer to use as kadı records. Historians sometimes exaggerate 
the role of kadı as a judge. This fact plays an important role in Barkey’s thesis that 
banditry contributed to the centralization of the Ottoman. 
The institution and the judges each had negative effects on the ability of 
peasants to forge alliances with rural groups. The court system as 
established throughout the Ottoman lands was the main alternative for 
direct contact with the state, and complaint to the state, about local 
conditions. Ottoman peasants made frequent use of the courts, which 
functioned to deflect anger away from local tax-collecting patrons and 
acted as a safety valve for the Ottoman state. Peasants as well as nomads 
                                                 
55 Quoted from Nasi Aslan, “Milli Arşivimiz İçerisinde Şeri’yye Sicilleri: Eğitim ve Terminoloji 
Problemi” (an essay presented in conference I. Milli Arşiv Şurası. Ankara: April 20-21, 1998), p. 1. 
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in rural society used local courts as a recourse against those who abused 
their livelihood and privileges. Especially for the peasant, the court was 
the main foundation of mediation between himself and the tımar holder. It 
also weakened the tie between landholder and peasant, hampering their 
potential efforts at alliances.56         
 
The problem with Barkey’s interpretation is that she assumes that the kadıship 
operated perfectly, fulfilling all the functions theoretically ascribed to it. True, when 
compare to France the Ottoman peasants were more free to use courts to defend their 
rights57 but it must not be forgotten that the Ottoman courts were not the courts of 
modern France either. I am leaving aside the widespread corruption associated with 
the Ottoman court system throughout the history of the Empire.58 As Boğaç Ergene 
rightly puts: 
The main problem with this position is that it is a logical deduction and 
not a historical observation, and it will remain so until these historians 
accomplish the difficult tasks of not only demonstrating that the courts in 
Anatolia satisfied most of their clients by dispensing justice fairly, but also 
of proving that this satisfaction generated a continuous popular support for 
the regime.59       
 
The problem of satisfaction cannot be more than a speculation since it can hardly be 
deduced from court records.    
Here, main aim is not to discuss this in detail but to question the limits of court 
records, therefore also questioning the reliability of my work. One should always 
keep in mind that many serious disputes were solved not in the kadı courts but divans 
(council) of local governors (beglerbegi) or by decrees sent by the government to the 
provincial authorities. Many bandits were judged and punished by those governors 
without asking any advice from kadıs. By kadı here I do not mention those in divans, 
                                                 
56 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. p. 103. 
57 Ibid., pp. 104-5. 
58 Çağatay Uluçay ironically points out that suhtes later on would be kadıs and naibs. Uluçay, XVII. 
Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 30. Suhtes were students of religious schools 
(Medrese). From the mid-sixteenth century on they became one of the main figures either as beggars 
or bandits in Anatolian countryside and contributed greatly to the deterioration of law and order. 
59 Boğaç Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice 
and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu, 1652-1744. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 3. 
 25   
if there were any attending them. As we shall see later the governors (beylerbeyi) of 
Rakka, Maraş, and Aleppo in many cases just sent order to any official, who were 
expected to obey, in Ayntab sub-province. We have found out many cases of 
discontent of people from such decrees sent by the government or governors rather 
than from court records. Anyhow we can see this process from the kadı registers. The 
important question whether or not the peasants really and precisely used those 
channels to solve their problems. From my own experience in reading a bulk of these 
sources in detail, I can say that the problems, which were not reflected in these 
registers, are far more than those recorded. First of all, an important portion of those 
records was about the people of city dwellers than those in rural. Statistically 
speaking, one would have expected that the cases about rural population in these 
registers far exceeded these of city dweller. This is not the case at all particularly 
cases about death and inheritance.  
The other point that we learn from the cases of banditry is that the litigants did 
nor or could not go to the court immediately after s/he was robbed. When their 
properties were stolen they tended to apply the court only when they found their 
property or saw items that resembling their stolen property. Let me give an example: 
in his complaint dated August 11, 1695, Mehmed said that “the donkey that is now 
under the property of this man is my donkey that Arab bandits in the nahiye of Suruç 
had taken from me six years ago by force.”60 One can wonder that, what would have 
happened if Mehmed could not have seen that donkey by accident years later? For 
instance, the donkey could have died during that time. Most probably, we could not 
have learned anything about this man and his donkey. I would not be wrong therefore 
to say that what is reflected in the sicils about banditry was only the visible part of an 
                                                 
60 ACR 43, p. 76. There are numerous cases resembling to this. They generally lost either a horse or 
mule or donkey.   
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iceberg. It is because of this, we are not in a position to exactly in what period 
banditry increased and/or declined. Therefore, the role of the kadı court in the 
peasants’ lives should not be exaggerated as Barkey did in her study.  
I am also suspicious whether the court really functioned as mediatory between 
peasant and the tımar holder. It is true that there are some records of disputes of 
peasants over tımar holder’s inequities. On the other hand, there were numerous 
examples of peasant flight (perakende ve perişan olmak) because of the oppression 
by such Ottoman officials. That is to say, it can hardly be assumed that the kadı 
courts prevented them from becoming active figures of banditry or rebellion. To the 
contrary, in many cases tımar-holders applied to the court with the allegation that the 
defendant peasant was a peasant of his land, therefore he should be taxed. On the 
other hand, most of the times, we find out from decree sent to local authorities that 
peasants had problem with tımar-holders rather than disputes solved in the court. 
Another point is the standard language used of in these records, which in itself 
poses a serious problem. In sicils a special type of script, called talik, was commonly 
used.61 This makes it easier for a researcher. Besides, there is also a standard 
language in expressing the events. We know that, for some practical reasons, a 
method of standardization (Sakk Usulü or Sakk-ı Şer’i) was taught to kadıs. For this 
guide books, called sakk mecmuası, were prepared for scribes (kâtib).62 This matter 
of standardization was solved with a serious education that was called ilmu’ş-şurut 
(science of stipulations) or simply eş-şurut.63 The problem derives from this: diverse 
events were explained and recorded with special clichés, so the differences melt 
down in obscurity.  
                                                 
61 Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihi Hakkında Mühim Bir Kaynak.” p. 90.  Kemal Çiçek, Zımmis (Non-
Muslims) of Cyprus in the Sharia Court: 1110/39 A.H / 1698-1726 A.D. (Unpublished Phd. Thesis, 
University of Birmingham, October 1992), p. 18. 
62 Aslan, “Milli Arşivimiz İçerisinde Şeri’yye Sicilleri.” p. 5. 
63 Çiçek, Zımmis (Non-Muslims) of Cyprus in the Sharia Court. p. 25. 
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The term ‘banditry’ is also one of those clichés. It is therefore highly likely that 
the term was simply used as a jargon with a negative connotation. After the rebellion 
led by Sheik Celal in 1519, the Ottomans began to use the term Celali for all banditry 
and rebellions throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Similarly, the 
term eşkiya was used for any unlawful activities regardless of their relation to 
banditry. Mehmet Bayrak explain this: “from the most personal one, to the most 
social one; from the most aimless one, to the one that have the most serious aim; 
from the worst one, to the holiest one; from the most bloodcurdling one, to the most 
lovable one, every uprisings were named as banditry…even contemporary 
revolutionists are called “city bandits.””64 Indeed, I gave up looking for an ideal 
banditry, as defined by Slatta or Hobsbawm; it will be handled as a phenomenon that 
explains social tension and the conflict with the state. Nevertheless, the actuality of 
accusations attributed to someone (bandits) is still important. For example, it is quite 
probable to see such a cliché in decrees: ‘people sent us a written complaint that 
(certain) bandit (group) does highway robbery, kidnaps girls, collects money with 
force’. Here, the official who sent the decree might talk about a small case with a 
common cliché. That is to say, the bandit might do highway robbery but not kidnap 
anyone. In order to solve this problem I examined some other archival documents 
that were called Records of Complaints (Şikayat Defterleri) housed in Başbakanlık 
Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul. With that, I aimed to compare public perception of banditry 
with that of the state discourse. Unfortunately I could not see complaint in those 
records since they contain mainly the résumé of decrees, which were sent by the 
government to various people about certain complaints.  
                                                 
64 Bayrak, Eşkiyalık ve Eşkşya Türküleri. p. 24. 
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Another source that I consulted to test this issue is the chronicles of Raşid 
Efendi (Tarih-i Raşid). Even though to some degree these chronıcles have great 
contribution to this study, they are not so sufficient to test kadı records. The only 
choice left was to compare the texts in the kadı records with themselves. By 
comparing complaints of people with the decrees sent by the government or local 
governors, it can be conclude that ordinary people could have been more slipshod in 
using the term banditry than the state. In the eyes of the public any simple act like 
drinking wine, playing musical instruments (like saz) could be labeled as banditry.65 
Similarly, the usage of tribe and tribal identity is also problematic, which will be 
discussed further in the Chapter 2.  
 
                                                 
65 In a case some people from the village of Arıl accused some other men from the same village of 
being bandits, since they were carrying fatal tools; drinking wine and distrub people. ACR 51, p. 225. 
In another case some people accused a man of always meeting with bandits and palying saz with 
them. ACR 59, p. 183.     
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CHAPTER II 
BANDITS AND THE STATE 
“Ferman padişahın dağlar bizimdir.” 
“The command is emperor’s, mountains 
are ours.” 
Dadaloğlu1 
II.1 Bandit Groups 
Lucy M. J. Garnett, who worked on the Ottoman life at the turn of the twentieth 
century century, talks about the long-lasting widespread banditry in the Ottoman 
Empire:  
Brigandage has from time of immemorial, and more especially perhaps 
during the last century and a half, played an important part in the social 
and political life of Turkey, and the present anarchic condition of 
Macedonia offers every facility for the pursuit of this adventurous calling. 
The brigand bands that infest many districts of Turkey, both Asiatic and 
European, are, strange to say, hardly at all recruited, as might be expected, 
from the nomad tribes…but present a motley gathering of outlaws of all 
races of the country, Moslem as well as Christian, one band frequently 
containing representatives of three or four.2  
 
What she calls one century and a half priod was, in fact, was no less than four 
centuries. As a matter of fact, banditry was a reality of almost all countries, in which, 
due to inefficient technological development, social control could not be fully 
maintained in every locality. That is to say, banditry was a concrete reality in places 
where there was no state authority. However, as far as banditry is concerned, the last 
four centuries of the Ottoman Empire mean something more than this concreteness. 
                                                 
1 Dadaloğlu, who lived in nineteenth century, is a well-known poet from the Avşar tribe. His poems 
are invaluable sources for tribal life. Since during the period he lived the state tried to resettle his tribe, 
he often emphasized on migration. The above verse is about this issue. Ahmet Z. Özdemir, Avşarlar 
ve Dadaloğlu, (Ankara: Dyanışma, 1985), pp. 164-5.     
2 Garnett, Turkish Life in Town and Country. p. 305. 
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Banditry became a serious and long lasting problem on which the state worked 
overtime and made a great effort to get rid of.  
During the period between 1691 and 1731 banditry was not only a problem 
limited to the region under review but also it was quite widespread throughout the 
Empire. The government often sent decrees to the state officials who administered in 
Anatolia to prevent banditry. There are lots of documents containing such 
information: ‘to beylerbeyis, kadıs, sancakbegis, voyvodas, mutesellims, ayan, 
işerleris (and others) ruling the districts and sub-districts located on the left, right and 
mid routes from Üsküdar to the end of these routes, we hear that banditry became 
widespread. For that reason, we choose the Governor of Anatolia (some other 
governors). And, you all deal with this problem in the places under your 
administration and cooperate with Governor of Anatolia in that affair.’3 In this 
chapter we shall focus on some important bandit groups and the state’s struggle with 
them in the case of Ayntab region.  
 
II.1.1 Levends  
The word, levend, was used in different contexts and different periods for 
various meanings. According to Mustafa Cezar, at first, it was used for soldier or the 
man who were able to fight in warfare. Then, the word came to mean ‘pirate’ and the 
tough seamen who were incorporated with them. And lastly, it was used for those 
                                                 
3 ACR 41, p. 158 (d. 1691); ACR 41, pp. 133, 170, 171 (d. 1692); A.DVN. 19/84, 174, 220, 400, 438 
(d. 1694/5); ACR 43, p. 290; ACR 48A, p. 215 (d. 1696); ACR 47, p. 22; ACR 48A, p. 176 (d. 1697); 
ACR 51, p. 128 (d. 1700); ACR 52, p. 92 (d. 1703); ACR 54, p. 15 (d. 1704); A.DVN. 41/532 (d. 
1704/5), ACR 62, p. 165 (d. 1712); ACR 65, p. 261 (d. 1714); ACR 62, p. 214 (d. 1715); ACR 67, pp. 
596, 598, 307 (d. 1717); ACR 68, p. 456 (d. 1718); ACR 69, p. 245 (d. 1719); ACR 73, p. 214 (d. 
1722); ACR 76, p. 111 (d. 1725). I could not look at the all A.DVN. (Atik Şikayat Defterleri) dated 
from 1691 to 1731. From 2 defters out of 8 we could see records, which mention that the government 
dealt with banditry through out the Empire. All these records do not show the banditry in different 
parts of the Ottoman Empire. They were the firmans, which were sent to almost all over the Empire 
and contain the cliché mentioned above. As it can be seen the banditry was quite widespread through 
out the Empire in the period under review. 
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who left their lands (Çift Bozan) and become vagrant.4 During the period in question 
it was used for a special kind of soldier who was not a part of the regular army, that 
is, janissaries, timarli sipahis, or kapı kulu corps. They were irregular mercenaries 
who were recruited during wars or campaigns to oppress a rebellion. In a decree (d. 
December 18, 1717) it was stated that (miri) levends were needed for being used in 
the war with Austria: 
It is needed to conscript an amount of infantry Levends from Anatolia for 
the expedition over Austrian troops…1000 conscripts, that is, 20 flags 
(military unit) under each of which there will be 44 people plus excluded 6 
military officers (zapit) with total of 50 people, are required…except for 
excluded officers, each of 880 recruits will be paid 35 kuruş tip and of 
1000 recruits each will receive salaries of six months and provisions of 
three months in advance…total expense is 55.940 kuruş…5 
 
In another record, it was pointed out that 242 cavalry levends were required to join 
the main army together with züema and tımar holders.6 Here, as it is seen, levends 
were paid soldiers who could be either infantry or cavalry. Moreover, they were 
perceived as different from other military units of Anatolia. The problem is whether 
they were different from other mercenaries, called sekban and/or sarıca.  
Sekbans/sarıcas were mercenary troops that comprised governors or elites from 
ex-tımar holders, the sons of janissaries and other local elites and ordinary people.7 
Because of that they were known as ‘people of the door’ (door keeper, kapı halkı). 
When compared to levends, they were more like regular mercenaries. Generally, they 
were perceived differently than levends however when they began to take part in 
illegal activities they also began to be called as levends. That is to say, usage of 
                                                 
4 Cezar, Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler. p. 17.  
5 ACR 68, p. 175. 
6 ACR 68, p. 169. (d. March 2, 1718) 
7 Midhat Sertoğlu, “Sarıca” in Sertoğlu, Osmanlı Tarih Lugatı. (Istanbul: Enderun, 1986), pp. 303-4. 
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levendat as criminals or bandits enclosed both actual levends and sekbans/sarıcas.8 
Moreover, other vagabonds might also join them during banditry. Thus, by bandit 
levends we mean all of those groups. 
Beside tribes, levends were one of the most notorious bandit groups of the 
period in the question. However, the levend banditry had been continuing for more 
than one century and a half.9 Sekbans were used in political struggles throughout the 
seventeenth century. They reached their heyday during the period of 1687-1689.10 In 
the period 1688-1689 (h.1100), the government decided to abolish these corps and 
reform them as new corps under names of divanegan, deliyan, gönüllüyan, farisan 
and azeban.11 However, that process took a long time. Throughout the period 
between 1691 and 1731 there were lots of decrees from different dates, which were 
sent to all over the Empire, for declaration of their abolition.12 However, as we 
learned from Raşid, in 1726-7 the problem of sekbans was still continuing.13 As a 
matter of fact, their abolition did not prevent those actors from taking part in 
banditry, since both newly formed corps and those who refused to join those corps 
                                                 
8 According to Virginia H. Aksan, “Levend or levent is the most common name for troops (peasants 
who were mobilized into infantry regiments)...also meaning both “bandit” and “warrior.”” Aksan, 
“Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires.” Journal of Early modern History 3/2 (May, 
1999); p. 115, footnote 38. Stressing so much upon peasant as the main actor who formed levends may 
depict the picture weakly. In Ayntab a tımar holder left his land and became a sekban. ACR 57, pp. 
208, 209, 211, 212; ACR 58, pp. 40, 48. Though, it can be a calumny, it is still important to show the 
possibility that not only vagrants but also landholders could be levends.  
9 According to Mustafa Cezar, levend movement began in the second half of the sixteenth century 
when they began to support Şehzade Bayezid in his struggle for capturing the throne and in return for 
money (being paid by him). See Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler. pp. 34-9. However, Mustafa Akdağ 
talks about the role of levends in the uprisings of the first half of the sixteenth century. According to 
him, when Shah Ismail captured the throne of Iran and established Safavid Empire he looked for 
source of power among Kızılbaş Turks. And masses who deprived economically, Akdağ reckons them 
as levends, began to go to Iran. In 1510 they looted the properties of Şehzade Korkud, however, as 
mercenaries levends were used by Şehzade Ahmet in his struggle for the throne against his brother 
Selim I, the Grim.  Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası. pp. 115-116.  
10 Halil Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700.” (Archivum 
Ottomanicum 6: 283-337; 1980), p. 299. 
11 Tarih-i Raşid, Vol, 2. p. 70. Maybe the government decided before that date to abolish them; 
however the earliest document that I could find was dated h.1100. 
12 ACR 69, p. 245 (February 4, 1719), ACR 73, p. 262 (January 18, 1722), ACR 75, p. 22 (February, 
1723). 
13 Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 6. pp. 404-6. 
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carried out banditry for a long time.14 Somehow, in general, the banditry of levends 
lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century.15  
During the period between 1691 and 1731, the Ottomans had engaged in war 
on the west and northwest frontiers, with Venice, Austria, and Russia, and at the east 
frontier with Persia. In general, levend banditry was related to that state of warfare. 
During those wars the state often demanded mercenaries who had experience in 
fighting and ability to use guns. We do not know much about the process of 
recruitments. Even though some historians estimate that those who volunteered were 
poor people, from the decrees sent to Ayntab we see that when the government 
demanded, for instance 1,000 mercenaries, their economic status was not regarded. 
Moreover, the government demanded 2,000 levends from several tribes, as a way of 
punishing those disloyal tribes, for the war with Persia in 1724.16 Thus, this explains 
why they deserted the army so often. Indeed, desertion was not the prerequisite for 
banditry but the state’s treatment to them was influential in driving them towards 
banditry. As a rule, all mercenaries, including janissaries and other kapı kulları, had 
to be punished when they refused to join the army during the war or when they 
deserted the army. On the other hand, in the same case tımar and zeamet holders lost 
their right to hold lands. This also explains the difference in frequency of becoming 
bandits between mercenaries and land-holding soldiers. However, the difference 
between janissaries and levends can be explained by coercive and seasonal 
recruitment of levends. Moreover, the banditry of kapulu levends (sekbans) was little 
different. Their banditry was more dependent on the position of their lords. When 
                                                 
14 In 1777 around Antioch some divanes were reported for their banditry. Mustafa Öztürk, “XVIII. 
Yüzyılda Antakya ve Çevresinde Eşkiyalık Olayları.” p. 972. Those deli corps after a while due to 
their banditries would be decided to be abolished. In 1829 the government was certain to abolish 
them. M. Çağatay Uluçay, 18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 80.  
15 Uluçay, 18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 80. 
16 ACR 76, p. 116. 
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their lords were dismissed by the government or became economically too weak to 
feed those troops, the unemployed mercenaries began to get involved in banditry 
until they were recruited again or were punished.17 In that sense, when compared to 
the tribal banditry, levend banditry was more of a forced banditry and had anti-social 
character. 
Levend banditry is a good example of the process to banditry mentioned before. 
The following order of the governor of Rakka well explains that process: 
Because of the disorder, of which the country has suffered from for 
several years, levends come and go. Some of them are employed by the 
state officials, and others who could not find such a job go on their ways. 
They wander from one village to another and they get food and fodder 
without paying their prices.18 
 
At this point I am not certain whether that was a kind of begging or banditry done by 
force or whether they saw banditry as temporary or permanent.19 No matter what that 
was, once they were denounced as bandits they had to continue banditry, that is, they 
had to escape from the state authorities. Otherwise they had to accept punishments. 
Though they were not punished they could not feed themselves either. Therefore they 
went further and demanded money (akçe) under the name of kıyafet, kurban, konak, 
zahireci, çavuş, hüddamiye, seyis, bayrak, ferman akçası, zahire baha and avaid.20 It 
was an obligatory process for a fugitive from army and justice, because while on the 
way to home from a campaign, they had to take part in scuh activities. But 
                                                 
17 Uluçay, 18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri. p. 74. 
18 ACR 55, p. 264 (April 15, 1705). 
19 Eight men from Berazi tribe applied to the court: “we and our friends wandered in the nahiye of 
Ayntab and collected food, fodder and akça (money) from people (reaya) free of charge. Since 
villagers complained about us, the Sanjakbeg of Ayntab, Ibrahim Beg, captured and imprisoned us. 
Since he gave our horses and other properties back, we don’t prefer a charge against him.” ACR 54, p. 
217.  This case is interesting since in fact bandits had no right to claim property. This is why I say that 
it can be begging. Hrand D. Andreasyan also talks about the begging of bandits. To him some 
Armenian trarders passed in front of Karayazıcı and his men, they did not robbed the traders, instead 
they open their handkerchiefs and began to begging and traders gave them some money with their 
own will. After that they thanked them. Andreasyan, “Bir Ermeni Kaynağına Göre Celâli İsyanları.” 
İÜEF Tarih Dergisi XIII/17-18 (Mart 1962-Eylül 1963), p. 31. 
20 ACR 54, p. 187; ACR 55, p. 251; ACR 65, p. 211; ACR 73, p. 171. 
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sometimes they did the same thing during recruitments. They wandered around from 
settlement to settlement and collected money and provisions as if they would join a 
war. 
There were numerous records that refer to the activity in banditry in the period 
of 1717-8. Just after a year when 80 levends were put to the sword, a levend leader 
called Postallı Bölükbaşı refused to go and join the campaign in 1718. Together with 
20 horsemen he wandered around and committed the crimes mentioned above.21 In 
the same period under the leadership of Bölükbaşı Kara Ahmed a group robbed Surre 
Company.22 Shortly after, some levends were executed in Ayntab.23 However, we do 
not know whether they were the same levends who robbed surre since the similar 
brief records do not enlighten us.  
 
II.1.2 Arab Tribes 
From the very beginning of the Ottoman conquest of the Middle East in the 
first half of the sixteenth century to the end of the Empire, Arab tribes created many 
problems especially in the regions of Basra and Baghdad.24 Even though Arab tribes 
were not so much effective in Ayntab region, their activities in northern Syria in the 
seventeenth century opened a new era for the history of tribes of Anatolia. The 
starting point of this thesis in a sense can be seen as the state’s response to banditry 
of Arabic tribes.  Around the middle of the seventeenth century a huge Arabic tribe, 
called Şammar, migrated from Arab peninsula to northern Syria. That migration 
would be followed by the migration of another tribe, Aneze, twenty years later. These 
                                                 
21 ACR 68, p. 487 (September 16, 1718). 
22 That company was formed by special troops who escorted the money that the state each year sent to 
the holy land (Hijaz).  ACR 68, p. 482. 
23 See ACR 68, p. 460 in Appendix V. 
24 Cengiz Orhonlu and Turgut Işıksal, “Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar: 
Dicle ve Fırat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat.” (Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakiltesi Tarih Degisi, Vol. 
XIII(17-18): 77-102; 1962-3), pp. 96-7 
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invasions led the flight of peasants living in those regions. The struggle between 
these two masses led to further misery in those regions.25 
In the period of 1691-1731 there were many sporadic cases of banditry of Arab 
tribes. Like levends and other nomads, Arab nomads were also wandering around, 
seizing properties of people and involving in highway robbery. Here I intend to have 
a closer look at some important cases of banditry that occurred outside the Ayntab 
region but affected that region. 
 
II.1.2.1 The Mevali Tribe and Huseyin Al-Abbas 
In 1694, the Arabic Muntafık tribe captured Basra.26 Just four years later, 
Mevalians under the leadership of Huseyin Al-Abbas began to surround the region.27 
In 1699, the Ottoman forces and Arab bandits were in a conflict and during that 
battle the Ottoman forces had suffered.28 The region in question was one of the 
farthest regions of the Empire. The tribes and deserts between Anatolia and Basra 
made the situation much more difficult. One of the easiest ways to reach there was 
the Euphrates. The Ottomans had already several times built naval and trade ships in 
the previous century.29 In order to transport provisions (≈640 tons of wheat) for 
troops that were in defense of Baghdad, a fleet was ordered to be built in Birecik in 
1697.30 We do not know if they were built or not; but in September 1699 
constructing a fleet of 60 ships commenced. By February 1701 they could only finish 
40 of them. The reason behind that slowness was the distance between the wharf and 
                                                 
25 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskânı. (Istanbul: Eren, 1987), pp. 45-6. 
26 Orhonlu and Işıksal, “Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar.” p. 98. 
27 ACR 50, p. 317. 
28 In that battle a zeamet holder from Ayntab was killed. ACR 50, p. 313. 
29 In their article “Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar.” Cengiz Orhonlu and 
Turgut Işıksal talk about building of fleet in different periods at Birecik, which was a town that had a 
wharf on Euphrates. 
30 ACR 47, p. 52 
 37   
the timber forests. In July 1702 the construction of 60 ships (firgata) were completed 
except for some details, such as the insufficient number of oars.31  
In 1700, Arab tribes invaded the rural of Basra and Baghdad. Most probably 
they captured those cities during that period, since according to Orhonlu, in 1701 
Arabs had already captured the fortresses of Basra and Korna.32 Moreover, they were 
attacking and robbing tribes, which the state resettled in Rakka. In order to capture 
and execute Huseyin al-Abbas, the Governor of Rakka, Hüseyin Pasha, was charged 
with launching a campaign and the governor of Maraş, Rışvanzade Halil, would send 
reinforcement. On March 20, 1701 Hüseyin Pasha prepared his army and demanded 
800 horsemen and infantrymen who were able to use firearms. Thus on 25 of March 
they would join and took their departures.33 Al-Abbas was defeated before April and 
some of his men were imprisoned. We do not know further about Al-Abbas but in 
1720 Mevali tribe was still continuing banditry that had begun 42 years before.34      
 
II.1.2.2 Security of Pilgrims and Sheik Kelib  
The security of pilgrims was important and a matter of prestige for the state. In 
order to protect them from bandits, the state paid some money, surre, to important 
Arab tribes. In fact, that money could be seen as a tribute since it was paid to them to 
prevent their own attacks as well. In 1680 (h. 1090) the government donated 23,900 
kuruş to the sheik of Damascus to distribute among Arab tribes Al-ma’mur, Vehiden, 
Beni Samar, Gazze and others. Between 1680 and 1699 (h. 1110) the amount 
increased to 111,000 kuruş. Whenever that amount was not paid, the tribes began to 
rob pilgrims who happened to travel across their regions on the way to Mecca. In 
                                                 
31 ACR 50, p. 181; ACR 51, p. 105; ACR 51, p. 159; ACR 53, p. 5. 
32 Orhonlu and Işıksal, “Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar.” p. 81. 
33 ACR 51, p. 70. 
34 ACR 72A, p. 265. 
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1698 the Şerif not only reduced that amount but also captured 150 of bandits and 
chained them. During their captivity 50 of them died. That led to further aggression 
of these tribes. Finally in 1700 (h. 1111) due to insufficient protection they attacked 
pilgrims and pillaged their properties. Many pilgrims were killed. Remaining 
pilgrims ran away, leaving behind their properties and animals.35 
Sheik Kelib was the Sheik of Damascus in 1705. We do not know whether he 
had relations with the event mentioned above but in July of 1705 he began to rebel. 
The governor of Şam (Damascus), Mehmed Pasha, was charged with suppression of 
that rebellion. As we can see from the records, it was a big rebellion since the armed 
forces in Rakka, Haleb (Aleppo), Diyarbekir, Ruha, Birecik and Ayntab were called 
for. The campaign could not advance in success. Court records inform us about 
several causalities of troops of Ayntab. Indeed records do not mention about all. I 
therefore think that Ottoman Army was seriously defeated since in March 1706 the 
state was still seeking a solution for the protection of pilgrims.36 
According to Raşid, Kelib had killed Hüseyin Pasha of Bosna and the state 
intended to take revenge of him. Nobody could perform that duty. The government at 
last assigned an ex-bandit Nasuh Pasha, the son of Osman,37 who was the muhassıl 
(tax collector) of Aydın Sanjaq by that time, for the protection of pilgrims. He began 
to escort the pilgrims in the Arab dominated areas between Hidjaz and northern 
Syria. In April 1709, a bandit army of 4000 militias ganged up on the pilgrim route. 
                                                 
35 Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 2. pp. 503-4 
36 ACR 56, pp. 127, 185, 201, 224, 270, 271, 307. 
37 Nasuh, the son of Osman was a bandit who wandered around Aydın. The government bestowed him 
the position of collecting the taxes of that region. Then he was appointed to the Baghdad for 
protection of pilgrims. After he defeated Sehik Kelib he demanded a promotion to vizierate. Not only 
that demand was rejected but the government decided to eliminate him. Under the command of the 
governor of Rakka, Yusuf Pasha, a tribal army of 10,000 was prepared for a battle. Nasuh Pasha at 
first intended to fight but his army betrayed him so he planed to flee with his money to Yafa (Jaffa) to 
sail away. But he was found and killed in 1711 (h. 1123). Tarih-i Raşid, Vol.4, pp.14-7. In Çağatay 
Uluçay’s article he was written as Sheik Küleyb. Uluçay based on dıfferent sources tell about the 
same story. Uluçay, M. Çağatay, Üç Eşkiya Türküsü. Türkiyat Mecmuası 13 (1958), p. 94.     
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The forces of Nasuh Pasha attacked them and slaughtered many bandits and the 
remaining ones fled from the battlefield to join the army of Sheik Kelib. Meanwhile, 
the Pasha encamped pilgrims in a shadow and sent 20 men for negotiating with Sheik 
Kelib. In fact, it was a part of the trap that Pasha had set. Sheik accepted the offer 
and came to the camp of Nasuh Pasha with his army. He went in the tent of the 
Pasha with 30-40 and he made the remaining 1000 militias to wait around the tent. 
With a signal of Pasha, his men killed Kelib and 7-8 of the sheik’s men. When they 
left their dead bodies in front of other Arabs then they began to dissolve and disperse 
around with horror.38 
 
II.1.3 Kurdish Tribes 
Unlike Arabs and Turcomans, Kurds, not only those of Ayntab but the most of 
other Kurdish emirates also welcomed the Ottoman conquests. Besides the role of the 
Ottoman pacifist policy, religious differences with Safavids brought Kurds closer to 
the Ottoman Empire.39 But the Kurdish tribes of Kilis, which were the most 
notorious groups for their banditry in the period under analysis, lived along the 
border of Memluks so the relations between those groups and Mamelukes were much 
important than those with Safavids.  
During the reign of the Ayyubid dynasty, a tribe leader called Mend achieved 
the leadership of Kurds living in the north of Aleppo. Within a short period of time 
he expanded his authority over all other tribes. However, Yezidi Kurds sometimes 
struggled with him. After the collapse of Ayyubids and during the sovereignty of 
Memluks, still a man, Kasım, from family of Mend ruled that region. However, 
Memluks supported a Yezidi sheik, İzzeddin, against him. Despite several attacks, 
                                                 
38 Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 3 p. 281-3. 
39 Solakzade, Mehmed Hemdemi Çelebi, Solak-zade Tarihi vol. 2. (trans. Vahid Çabuk, Ankara: 
Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989), pp.39-45  
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Memluk and Yezidi Army could not succeed to eliminate him. When Selim I came to 
conquer the region, Kasım and other opponents supported him against Memluks. 
However, after conquering those lands, Selim took Kasım and his son Canpolat to 
Istanbul. The governor of Aleppo, Karaca Beg and his ally İzzeddin sent a report to 
the sultan, Selim I, to prevent Kasım from coming back to the region stating that 
otherwise he would lead to a great disorder. As a result, Kasım was killed and his son 
Canpolat was trained for the state treasure.40 After a period of a successful service in 
the army Canpolat managed to obtain the right to possession of income of Ma’arra 
and Kilis.41 After his death in 1572, his son Hüseyin somehow could expand his 
authority over Aleppo.42 He was then to be executed by Sinan Pasha, one of his best 
friends, under the pretext of being late to the battle with Iran in 1605, in which the 
Ottoman army was seriously defeated.43 
                                                 
40 Şeref Han, Şerefname. (trans. M. Emin Bozarslan, Istanbul: Hasat, 1990.) pp. 248-50. Another 
historian İbrahim Peçevi tells the story as: “when he was a child officials brought Canpolat in 
presence of the sultan (Suleyman, the lawgiver). The sultan rubed his earring and ordered them to join 
him to his harem.” Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1. (trans. Murat Uraz. Istanbul : Neşriyat Yurdu 1968), p. 33. 
William J. Griswold guesses that he was trained during the first years of Süleyman’s reign. See 
Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan, 1591-1611, pp. 66-68.  
41 Griswold, Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan, 1591-1611, p. 68. 
42 Hüseyin had fought against Iran as a second man after Cağalzade Yusuf Sinan Pahsa in 1578. 
Griswold, ibid., p. 68. That loyalty encouraged him to demand the governorship of Trablusşam and in 
response he promised to pay a good amount of tax. The government accepted that desire of him. He 
received the title Pasha. However, a man called Kamize did not like that situation, since he was the 
tax farmer of that district. Moreover he had borrowed 10,000 florin from Sa’d El-Mille ve’d-Din Hoca 
(According to Bozarslan he was Hoca Sadeddin Efendi p. 257, footnote. 278). When Hüseyin Pasha 
got that position he took that gold and hit the road in a panic to escape to İstanbul. After a while he 
was found dead and his gold was stolen. Hüseyin Pasha was blamed for that and he was imprisoned in 
Aleppo. See Şerefname. pp. 257-8. In his Phd thesis Metin Akis also claims his governorship of 
Trablusşam based on the state sources. He also talks about a debt but that was the debt that he 
borrowed from the state. Metin Akis, XVI. Yüzyılda Kilis Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat 
(unpublished Phd. Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tarih (Yeniçağ) Anabilim 
Dalı: Ankara, 2002) footnote 36, p.8. It may be the amount that each year he had to pay to the state. 
He might have delayed his taxes. Griswold doesn’t mention about his position of governorship of 
Trablusşam. Similar to Akis he talks about that debt. According to him, since Hüseyin had borrowed 
an amount from the state he was imprisoned. Griswold, ibid., p. 69. After a while he was found 
innocent and was set free. Şeref Han, Şerefname. p. 258. Anyhow, his struggle with the governor of 
Aleppo opened the way of his aim to capture that position. Once more his loyalty changed the 
equilibrium in favor of him; Sinan Pasha sent an order that appointed Hüseyin Pasha to the 
governorship of Aleppo. After it was approved by the sultan he was captured that position. Griswold, 
ibid, pp. 75-6.     
43 Many historians see that as a great mistake. According to Griswold that was the second most serious 
mistake that Sinan Pasha had ever done. Griswold, ibid, p. 85.  Peçevi reproaches Sinan Pasha for 
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After the death of Hüseyin Pasha his nephew Ali held that position. Since Sinan 
Pasha had already been dead, the primary target for revenge no longer existed but he 
began to fight against his rivals, fabricating excuses about revenge.44 After a while 
the government decided to eliminate him and the famous vizier Kuyucu Murad 
Pasha was sent to Anatolia. According to the Ottoman chroniclers Ali Pasha offered 
peace but Murad Pasha rejected.45 Ali Pasha’s army was defeated and after a period 
of fugitiveness he went to Istanbul to beg the Sultan Ahmed I, to be forgiven. Sultan 
forgave him and appointed him as the governor Tımaşver district. A year later, in 
1610, he was killed.46 
 
II.1.3.1 The Kurds of Kilis and the Okçu İzzeddinli Tribe 
After the rebellion of Ali Pasha, his followers were still effective in Ayntab in 
1613.47 It is not clear what happened there in the following eighty years period but it 
was apparent that the Kurds of Kilis from the 1690s to the end of the period under 
                                                                                                                                          
leading to trouble. Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 410. Çağatay Uluçay, goes further and blames him for 
making decisions that lead to many banditries. To him he was responsible for banditry of Karayazıcı, 
Canpolatzade Ali, and Kalenderoğlu. Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalik ve Halk Hareketleri. 
p. 11. To some extent he was right; during the war with Iran he cancelled the right of some 30,000 
officers to possess the tax of a land for not being in the battle. Naima Mustafa Efendi, Naima Tarihi 
vol. 1. (trans. Zuhuri Danışman, Istanbul, 1967.) p. 171. 
44 Griswold, ibid., p. 90. 
45: According to Peçevi’s version of the story Ali Pahsa made an offer to Murad Pahsa: “If it is my 
head that is demanded, send a man to whom you trust to my canvas to cut my head off and bring it to 
you. But if the purpose is eliminating all the bandits, let me hold my position in Aleppo. Then let me 
go to Kızılbaş (Iran) and let me take revenge for your losses. Either I will kill them or they will kill 
me. Let them (bandits, my soldiers) die. We can keep the remaining ones in fortress. Thus all of them 
will be eliminated.” But Murad Pasha did not accept that. Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 437. Naima also 
talks about such a legend but does not give details. Naima Tarihi vol. 2. p. 547. 
46 According to Naima he continued his rebellious behaviors. Since he oppressed people, he was 
killed. Naima Tarihi vol. 2. p. 554. However Peçevi tells a different story. After oppressing bandits in 
Anatolia, Murad Pasha returned to Istanbul. When he heard that Ali Pasha had been forgiven, he 
asked the sultan how a man, apparently a Celali (bandit) could be forgiven. Then the young sultan sent 
a decree to capture him and bring him to Istanbul. His fellows warned him that he would be killed. 
But he did not take their advices and went to Belgrade. After 40 days of imprisonment he was killed. 
Peçevi also underlines another story. According to that, the sultan was not in favor of execution of Ali 
Pasha but Murat Pasha had him killed and reported to the sultan that he died because of an illness. 
Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 439.  Giswold also talks about a division between state officials about that 
matter. Some of them wanted him to be executed and some others did not. Griswold, ibid, p. 122.  
47 Griswold, ibid, p. 125. 
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review was still a source of trouble. Sometimes they created serious problems and 
sometimes just robbed people as almost all other tribes did.  
The Okçu İzzeddinli tribe was one of the most disobedient tribes not only 
among Kurds of Kilis but also all over Ayntab region. When Selim I conquered those 
regions, Okçu İzeddinli was one of the small tribes that were organized under the 
name of Sanjaq of Kurds (Ekrad Sancağı) under the Authority of İzzeddin Beg (the 
Yezidi sheik).48We do not have any evidence to show whether the Okçu İzzeddinli 
was more influential than others at that time. It can be speculated that the word 
İzzeddinli here refers to the name of İzzeddin Beg. However İzzeddin Beg had 
already a group known with his name, Ordu-yı İzzeddin Beg.49 Whatever it was, after 
the defeat of the Canpolatoğlu Ali, Okçu İzzeddinli tribe, together with other tribes, 
began to be more active in banditry.50 
The first record which reports banditry of Kurds of Kilis in the period we 
analyze was dated 1694;51 however, they had long been involved in banditry52 
therefore the year 1694 was not a milestone in their level of banditry. The importance 
of that year is rather related to the state’s decision to fight against them. During the 
                                                 
48 In the land register of 1518-20 İzzeddin Beg was recorded as the leader of those tribes. In 1527 
those tribes organized as a separate sanjaq and again İzzeddin Beg was the leader of them and at the 
same time he was the governor of the district. Enver Çakar, XVI. Yüzyılda Haleb Sancağı (1516-
1566). (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi, 2003), p. 209.      
49 Enver Çakar, ibid., p. 210. Mustafa Öztürk, 16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde 
Cemaatler-Oymaklar. (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkez, 2004), p. 22. 
50 In fact, banditry was a reality of those lands from the very beginning of the Ottoman sovereignty. 
When Canpolat was sent to Kilis banditry had already been so widespread. Canpolat was able to get 
rid of them in a short period.  Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1. p. 33. Şeref Han tells about an interesting story: 
“When Sultan Suleyman, The Lawgiver, went for campaign against Iran he encamped in Aleppo until 
the end of winter…a thief stole a sword embroidered with precious jewels from the section where the 
sultan used to sleep of the tent to which no one could come to close, even birds could not fly over. 
Sadrazam Rüstem Pahsa who felt antagonism toward Huseyin Pasha blamed him for that. Since, 
according to him, no one could dare except for Kurds depend on Huseyin Beg, who had been going 
too far. Thus, the sultan boiled with rage and decided to eliminate him. But Canpolat wanted a delay 
the execution for five days. If he could not capture the thief he would accept execution. On the fourth 
day the thief was captured. Hence he was pardoned.” Şerefname, p. 252-3. Peçevi also talks about 
such an event but he does not give any details. See. Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 1. p. 33.  
51 ACR 43, p. 199 (d. November 21, 1694) 
52 ACR 43, p. 210. A man in this dispute mentioned that bandits had robbed his friend four years ago 
in Kilis. ACR 43, p. 164. (d. January 7, 1696)   
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period, some bandits from Şeyhlu, Amiki and Okçu İzzeddinli tribes formed an allied 
band and robbed people.53 In 1696 a new wave of banditry by those groups surfaced. 
People who had been resettled in Harran several years ago came back to their 
motherlands and began to engage in banditry.54  In 1697 the government was still 
trying to send them back to Harran.55 We do not know to what extent the government 
had success in that policy but in 1698 the government sent a decree stating that no 
one should disturb Okçu İzzeddinli tribe since “…they occupied with their own 
affairs (kendi hallerinde)…”56 Most probably, they reached an agreement in one way 
or another.  
It appears that the terms of the agreement were broken by one of the sides after 
a short period of tranquility. In 1703, bandits from those tribes were wandering 
around in bands formed by 40-50 men.57 The voyvoda of Kilis, Kartallı Ahmed was 
assigned with the duty of getting rid of these bandits. 7-800 bandits from the Okçu 
İzzeddinli, the Amiki and the Musabeyli tribes killed him in his house and looted his 
properties in 1704. Moreover, they looted properties (worth about 25,677 kuruş) of 
the commander (serdar) Abidin Çavuş, as well as those of his brother, his two sons, 
his father and his sister. After that event, the governor of Aleppo was charged with 
punishing them.58 Although in summer the government conducted another campaign 
against them, throughout that summer they continued banditry.59  
                                                 
53 “The community of Odunlu and Kavaklu, which are subtribes of Şeyhlu tribe, and Karcu, his 
brother Ali, Kasabcık Seydi, Heladiz oğulları, Kör Musa and Kızılbaşoğlu Hüseyin from Amiki tribe, 
Menla Musaoğlu Seydi, his brother Ali, Duloğlu Telli, his brother Süleyman, İnce Davud oğlu Kel 
Zeyni, Çömlek Kasım, İnce(?) Hüseyin, Kel Selim oğlu Yusuf, Kılıççı, and Kebapçı İbrahim from Okçu 
İzzeddinli were making alliances with each other and their followers…they are robbing people on 
highways…” ACR 43, p. 198. Those are just known ones. In fact that group seems quite crowded.  
54 ACR 48B, pp. 136, 137. Kadızade Hüseyin Pahsa, the governor of Rakka, had resettled them in 
Harran. Most probably he died or was dismissed in the early days of 1695. Therefore those tribes had 
been resettled in Harran in between 1691 and 1694.  
55 ACR 48A, p. 221. 
56 ACR 49, p. 174. 
57 ACR 52, p. 358. 
58 ACR 54, pp. 9, 324. 
59 ACR 54, p. 40 (November 25, 1704.) 
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Another campaign that was conducted in the very beginning of 1711 continued 
throughout spring.60 During the period, two other tribes, Tacirli and Kılıçlı, which we 
shall talk about later, were also targeted together with Kurds of Kilis. During that 
campaign it seems that they resisted against the state army.61 In 1713 they not only 
continued banditry but also disobeyed their voyvoda and refused to pay their taxes.62 
In that period several bandits from Okçu İzzeddinli draw our attention: Koco, Köse 
Bekir oğlu Halil and Sarı Hüseyin oğlu.63 Among them especially Koco would be a 
problem for the state. In 1714 a group of 5-600 people from Okçu İzzeddinli, 
Heşetvanlı, Şeyhlü and Amiki attacked the palace of voyvoda. During a violent 
confrontation they killed Voyvoda Elhac Mehmed Kasım, his kethüda, (servant) five 
çukadars (lackey) and two janissaries. They seized the revenue of the hass of the 
mother of the sultan as well as all the properties and livestock of Elhac Mehmed.64 At 
the end of the year the beylerbeyi of Maraş, Ali Paşa, launched a serious campaign 
against them.65  
In January of 1720 the government planned another campaign against them.66 
In that campaign the commander was the governor of Rakka, Ali Pasha. At that 
campaign ten bandits were captured and imprisoned.67 Nevertheless the problem 
could not be solved fundamentally. In 1721 they began to fight against each other.68 
We do not know the reason behind that but the government was discontented about 
the result. As it was made apparent, the effort of the government could not solve the 
problem. In 1722, Koco was still wandering around and he was even able to come to 
                                                 
60 ACR 63, pp. 18, 19, 24 
61 In a report, it was stated that an Ottoman soldier was killed in that battle. ACR 61, p. 43. 
62 ACR 61, p. 239. 
63 ACR 65, pp. 213, 272. 
64 ACR 65, p. 243. 
65 ACR 65, p. 220. 
66 ACR 70, p. 262. 
67 ACR 70, p. 248. 
68 ACR 78, p. 322. 
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Ayntab without any difficulty.69 In the period following 1722, the officials reached 
an agreement with them.70 However, Koco was still being pursued in 1730.71 
At the end of 1730, the government decided to recruit 1,000 levends from the 
Okçu İzzeddinli to use them in Baghdad against Iran.72 That decision made bandits of 
the Okçu İzzeddinli radicalize further. In February 1731 they carried out a daring raid 
with 300 bandits together with some other tribes at the city center of Ayntab, killing 
53 people.73 Unfortunately we do not know the exact reason behind that. Since we do 
not know who those 53 people were either, we cannot be sure whether the targets 
were officials as they had done before or ordinary city dwellers. After that event the 
government decided to send them together with their families to Cyprus in exile.74 In 
order to capture them another campaign was launched.75 
 
II.1.3.2 The Kılıçlı Tribe 
This tribe at first took part in sporadic robberies, which might be regarded 
normal. In 1706 they were resettled in villages of Menbç nahiye where the İlbegli 
tribe had been resettled before. At first they were giving the impression that they 
were loyal peasants who dealt with their own business and disturbed no one.76 
Meanwhile, some of them refused to be resettled. Those members of Kılıçlı went to 
the district (nahiye) of Ayntab and stayed there for one year and a half until villagers 
from 24 villages complained about them. According to them, they fed their animals 
on villagers’ hay and usurped their cereals, animals and grapes. The estimated value 
                                                 
69 ACR 73, p. 248. 
70 That agreement was mentioned in a record dated April 19, 1730. Therefore, the agreement was 
reached before that year. ACR 81, p. 106. 
71 ACR 81, p. 212. 
72 ACR 82, p. 161. 
73 ACR 82, pp. 31, 32, 95, 96. 
74 ACR 82, p. 96 (July 31, 1731.) 
75 ACR 82, p. 102 (2 records). 
76 ACR 57, p. 71B. 
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of the damage was around 36,000 kuruş.77 Evidently, officials took their complaint 
into consideration. They immediately began an operation. Some of them were killed 
and some others were imprisoned in a fortress to be punished later.78 Those who 
could save their lives promised to not get involved in banditry anymore but they did 
not keep their promise. The governor of Rakka, Yusuf Pasha, sent them an order to 
make them give back the properties they had stolen to their ex-owners and resettled 
them in areas where the government had determined before.79 Not only they renege 
on the deal of the agreement but also they went further by killing people. Some 
members of Kılıçlı did not hesitate to kill people during banditry.80 Because of that, 
as mentioned before, in the campaign of 1711 the Kılıçlı was also targeted.    
So far it seems that everything is logical, since each story we talked about has 
coherence in itself. However, an interesting record that I have found in ACR 64 
shows how history could be a fake and why the historian should be suspicious about 
historical phenomena. This record was not dated but most probably it was written in 
June, 1712. The record contains a report that was sent by the governor of Rakka, 
Yusuf Pasha, to the müftü of Ayntab: 
You sent us a man and a proclamation, claiming that, “The Kurds of 
Kılıçlı disturb our villages and they take our wheat and barley.” Then we 
immediately sent an official (to them). They said “we bought the wheat 
and barley from villagers.” Then some livestock and cloths were seized 
from them and given to (your) subaşıs and the representatives of the 
village. You had sent a complaint to the noble state and claimed that “200 
horsemen of the Kurds of Kılıçlı came to our city and raided the shopping 
district and bazaar and they killed a man.” ….However, in fact those 
horsemen had been 16 people. And they had brought three camels to sell 
at the bazaar. And you had claimed, “you raid our villages” and then 
attacked them. After they escaped you send them their camels later…81 
 
                                                 
77 ACR 58, p. 172. (the beginning of  June, 1707) 
78 ACR 57, pp. 38, 58, 59. 
79 ACR 63, p. 56. 
80ACR 63, pp. 90, 255. 
81 ACR 64, p. 40.  
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Do we need to revise our evaluation of those tribes? I do not think so. Even if the 
Kılıçlı in fact was an innocent tribe it is obvious that they had some problems with 
other villagers. What is meant here is that, the conflict between groups in a society 
gave birth to banditry. Banditry was something mutual but only one side was able to 
legitimize its’ behaviors and labeled the other as bandit. In fact almost every group 
more or less took part in banditry or theft. But only some groups were conspicuous. 
That could be because of discriminatory attitudes against some groups or a stronger 
tendency of some groups to banditry. On the other hand it might be argued that the 
governor had sympathy for the Kılıçlı, therefore, he manipulated the reality. That is 
to say, what we see can be true or false but banditry as a mode of conflict between 
groups was a manifest phenomenon everyday life. 
From the succeeding part of this record we learn that, because of so many 
complaints, Kılıçlı tribe was decided to be sent away from Ahsendere region of 
Elbistan and resettle in Rakka. However, after they went to Rakka people began to 
complain about Cerid and Tacirli tribes. Then, Yusuf Pasha ordered them to come 
back to Elbistan. As far as one can understand, Yusuf Pasha was trying to support 
Kılıçlı in order to use them against other bandits and to start a negotiation between 
villagers and Kılıçlı. As we shall see later he achieved his aim.  
In between June 13 and July 5, 1712 (Cemaziyelevvel 8-30, 1124) some 
representatives from 19 different villages applied to the court. Everyone more or less 
talked about the same thing. Bandits of Kılıçlı had been coming to their villages 
every summer during the last five years. They had been destroying their crops and 
usurping their livestock and other properties. They notified the state on a number of 
occasions. The state had sent them decrees to make them return those properties to 
their owners. They accepted to compensate the damage but only those that were done 
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in 1711. So representatives informed the court about the amount of damage done to 
their villages.82 The estimated total value of the damage was more than 20,000 kuruş. 
After fixing the cost of the damage the Kılıçlı and villagers, thanks to the negotiator 
appointed by Yusuf Pasha, reached an agreement in a meeting held at Düztepe (now 
is a ward in the city of Gaziantep) on July 25, 1712. According to that agreement, 
Kılıçlı side agreed and promised that their members from then on would ever wander 
around the Kaza of Ayntab, Menbiç, Ravendan and Sof Mountain83 and would not 
bother or pester anybody. They accepted to pay 20,000 kuruş to the shipyard84 of the 
sultan and would not claim the blood money (dem u diyet)85 of 40 members if they 
broke their agreement. 86  
It seems that the efforts of Yusuf Pasha were in vain. Several months after the 
agreement, the state launched an operation against them. In September the 
government decided to resettle them back in Rakka.87 That is to say, when they first 
time resettled in Rakka, as mentioned, Yusuf Pasha let them go back to their home 
place at Maraş. But at that moment, they would be sent to Rakka once more. It can 
rightly be thought that Kılıçlı did not keep their promise. However, the problem was 
more than that. We learn from a decree (firman) sent to the governor of Aleppo, 
Mehmed Pasha, that the government had confiscated (added to havass-ı hümayun) 
the tımar lands in the nahiyes of Zamantu, Pınarbaşı, Murmeşk (?), Hınziri and 
                                                 
82 ACR 64, pp. 205, 207 (2 rec.), 210(2 rec.), 222 (2 rec.), 223 (2 rec.), 224 (3 rec.), 225, 226, 227, 
227, 228, 229, 230. 
83 We can interpret this point as that, after Kılıçlı tribe was ressetled in Menbiç (Northern Aleppo), 
where İlbegli tribe had been resettled before, they began to threaten the southern villages of Ayntab.  
84 As mentioned before at that period both the threat of Arab tribes and Iran in Basra and Bagdad 
increased the importance of the navy and transport ships which was built in Bireck wharf. Most 
probably with that article they meant navy of the Euphrates.   
85 Bloody money was very important in culture of those tribes. According to that when a member of a 
group was killed his family or other members of group had right to demand either a certain amount of 
property and/or money or retaliation (kısas). According to this article 40 members would be allowed 
to be punished and executed. 
86 ACR 64, p. 174. 
87 ACR 64, pp.  75, 78. 
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Ahsendere of Maraş together with the malikane of kethüda of Kılıçlı.88 According to 
that decree, though Kılıçlı was ordered to resettle in Rakka, some of them had not 
gone there and they were still in Maraş and were involved in banditry.89 At this point 
it will not be wrong to talk about a disagreement between the center and Yusuf 
Pasha. As a matter of fact the governors of Rakka were charged with resettling 
almost all tribes that were decided to send to Rakka. The contact with Aleppo instead 
of Rakka in the case of Kılıçlı might be because of that disagreement. 
In November 1714 the government launched a campaign under the leadership 
of the governor of Maraş, Ali Pasha, against several tribes, which were the Kılıçlı, 
the Tacirli, the Koyunoğlu, the Elci, the Bektaşlı and the Doğanlı.90 If those tribes 
would resist against them, they were allowed to kill the members of the tribes.91 
During that conflict the tribes were destructed and more than 80 bandits were killed. 
Remaining members, who could save their lives, fled from Maraş to Ayntab.92 Since 
the Ottoman forces were insisting on eliminating that problem, they were pursued for 
a long time.93  In that campaign lots of females and young boys were captured. They 
were imprisoned in the fortress of Ayntab. Ali Pasha planned to exile them to 
Cyprus. In his several orders sent to officers of the fortress of Ayntab he insisted on 
treating them in a good manner and giving them 150 kıyye (≈192 kg.) bread per 
day.94 447 (445) people had imprisoned after that operation. When they were 
registered two months later (in the first week of January 1715) only 272 of them 
                                                 
88 That may be seen as a part of abolishing of malikanes in 1715.  See, Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 4, pp. 176-
7. 
89 ACR 64, p.  75. 
90 ACR 65, pp. 225, 227, 229.   
91 ACR 65, p. 229. 
92 ACR 65, p. 228. 
93 ACR 65, pp. 226, 227, 228; In February 1715 it was ordered that if the remaining bandits were seen 
they would be punished. ACR 66, p. 245. 
94 ACR 65, p. 226. (November 19, 1714.) Ali Pasha in an order sent to the officials of Ayntab said 
that: “if there will be any missing person from (the number recoded in) the record you will have not 
been any answer (to excuse)” ACR 65, p. 217. (December 25, 1714.) However he could not prevent 
some tragic events. One boy from Kılıçlı was sold as slave in Aleppo. ACR 65, p. 206. 
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were registered as alive, 98 (97) had died and 76 people were too sick to even tell 
their names.95 This means that each person consumed 431 gram bread. If the officers 
of the fortress really give them that generous amount, ceteris paribus, they had not to 
die so much in such a short time period. Indeed we do not know the conditions in the 
fortress, which they had been living in. Another important point is that the record had 
been written just before they began their long journey to Cyprus. If these 76 people 
were as sick as could not tell their names, we may then reckon them dead as well, 
since in such a condition arriving Cyprus after a long and difficult journey would be 
miracle, if they could stand up and walk through.   
Adult males were not as unlucky as more vulnerable children and women. 
Some of them could save their lives. On the other hand men were not as lucky as 
those captives since lots of them were killed during the battle. And whenever they 
were captured they were put to the sword.96 Nevertheless “the rumps of the sword” 
(bakiyettu’s-suyuf) in every occasion continued banditry.97 The growing conflict 
between Iran and the Ottomans created an appropriate situation for banditry. In 1131 
Kılıçlı tribe was still carrying on banditry. Among 300 raiders who destructed 
Ayntab, we mentioned before, there were bandits from Kılıçlı.98 Moreover, the year 
was 1775 and Kılıçlı was still a problem for the state.99 
 
 
                                                 
95 See Apendix ACR 65, p. 216. 
96 According to the orders sent after the battle where ever they were seen they had to be eliminated. 
When they captured and imprisoned 3 bandits from Kılıçlı and 4 from Doğanlı they were ordered to 
be put under the sword. ACR 65, p. 225 (November 29, 1714). 
97 ACR 78, p. 33 (February, 1727) 
98 ACR 82, p. 95. 
99 ACR 120, p. 97. Cited from Zeynel Özlü, Gaziantep'in 120 Numaralı Şer`iye Sicili: Transkripsiyon 
ve Değerlendirme, (unpublished master thesis, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 
1999), p. 445. 
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II.1.4 Turcoman Tribes 
 
After the defeat of Seljukids in 1243, the weakened central authority opened 
the way for other Turcomans who had potential to construct political units. Thus, lots 
of principalities appeared. Only one, the Ottomans, could survive for a long time, 
expanding its rule over others, the last one of them being Dulkadirs that would be 
captured by Selim I in 1515. 
The principality of Dulkadirs, which centered on Maraş and controlled Ayntab 
region for a long time, to a certain extent, was a buffer zone between the Memluks 
and the Ottomans. Sometimes they were pro-Memluks and sometimes pro-Ottomans. 
The last bey (ruler), Alaüddevle, of this principality during the reign of Mehmed II 
had established good relations with the Ottomans. According to Solakzade, 
“[Alaüddevle] had obviously betrayed…with provocation of Circassians [Memluks] 
they did not hesitate to raid the Ottoman territories…he did not fulfill the call for the 
campaign against Iran…[and] his ill-treatment towards traders exceeded the level of 
mercy…”100 It is for sure, Turcomans were accused of banditry. In the battle in 1615 
his army was defeated and those who could escape from the Ottoman rage ran to 
Turna Mountain for cover, but the Ottoman forces pursued and destroyed all of 
them.101 
 
II.1.4.1 The Tacirli Tribe 
The Tacirli was one of the most active tribes in the period of analysis. In their 
complaints some members of the Kuşçu Ceridi tribe claimed that bandits of the 
Tacirli and the Ufacıklı tribes had come to their village in 1688/1689 (h. 1100) and 
had usurped their properties; killed two men, and set 30-40 houses on fire with all the 
                                                 
100 Solakzade, Solak-zâde Tarihi, p. 35.  
101 Solakzade, Solak-zâde Tarihi, p. 37. 
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possessions in them.102 This is a unique case since burning down a house was not a 
common behavior of bandits, let alone burning down 30 of them. It was either a false 
claim or there might be an enmity between Kuşçu Ceridi and the other two tribes. In 
struggles between such groups such extreme violent phenomena could possible. 
Nevertheless some members of Tacirli were imprisoned in that period because of 
banditry.103   
Because of their banditries Tacirlis were resettled in Rakka in the 1690s. 
However they escaped from Rakka and began to engage in banditry around Maraş 
and Kars-ı Maraş.104 Nomadic segments of this tribe during their seasonal migration 
were destructing the crops and usurping properties of villagers.105 With the help of 
Okçu İzzeddinli and Bahadırlı tribes they expanded their field of banditry over 
villages of Ayntab.106 People sent a petition to Istanbul in October 1704 to complain 
about their banditry.107 The state ordered the payment of a pecuniary punishment of 
50,000 kuruş and settling them in Rakka. Most probably because of that punishment, 
they began to sell more than 100 oxen secretly; but some spies informed the officials 
about that.108 The governor of Maraş, Hasan Pasha, ordered Ayntab the capture of 
Köse Hasan who was blamed for that sale and that he be sent to Maraş with the 
animals he had.109  
The sporadic banditries of Tacirlis continued throughout the period of 1706-
1708.110 We do not know whether the governors launched operations against them or 
                                                 
102 ACR 41, p. 22 (April, 1692.). 
103 ACR 43, p. 221. 
104 ACR 54, p. 273 (d. December, 1701). 
105 ACR 52, p. 358 (d. March, 1703). 
106 ACR 54, p. 33. The villagers of Çartıl, Tıhnatan and Burç complained about their banditries. 
(August 21, 1704).  
107 ACR 54, p. 46. 
108 ACR 55, p. 261. In another records it was said that Köse Hasan and his janissary friend Osman 
Beşe brought about 100 oxen, 4 camels and horses and some other properties. ACR 55, p. 258. 
109 ACR 55, p. 259. 
110 ACR 57, pp. 26, 192, 231; ACR 58, pp. 42, 197 (3 rec.), 202; ACR 59, pp. 20, 50; ACR 60, p. 199. 
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not but as mentioned before, in the campaign of 1711, the Tacirlis were also targeted 
beside Kurdish tribes mentioned above. The government insisted on resettling them 
in Rakka since, as mentioned before, when Kılıçlı tribe was sent to Rakka, their 
banditry increased in 1712.111 At last, an army equipped with fire arms was sent to 
put them in order. 112 If they resisted against the army, they would be massacred and 
their properties would be pillaged.113 In the campaign of 1714 Tacirli shared the 
same destiny with Kılıçlı.114 After that, from 1727 onwards, the name Tacirli was 
mentioned in many records together with Okçu İzzeddinli and Kılıçlı, (sometimes 
İlbegli, Bektaşlı and Elci tribes as well) tribes.115 Can we conclude that bandits from 
those tribes cooperated in their actions? Most probably yes. In the case of raiding 
Ayntab city, they seem to have cooperated with Okçu İzzeddinli and Kılıçlı.116  
 
II.2 The State Response to Banditry 
The history of banditry in the Ottoman Empire is a history of the cycle of 
activation and deactivation of banditry. Whenever banditry appeared it was 
suppressed immediately on the second attempt if not on the first. That can be 
attributed to the success of the state or her centralization. However, as we have seen 
in the discussion so far, that success was an illusion. As a matter of fact, shortly after 
their repression, bandit groups reorganized and carried on their activities. What 
changed from before to after repression was a chronic tendency of banditry; because, 
instead of structural solutions, the state resorted to case-based solutions each time. 
But this does not mean that the state was completely unaware of the structural 
                                                 
111 ACR 64, p. 40. 
112 ACR 62, p. 155 (May 11, 1712). 
113 ACR 62, p. 156. 
114 ACR 65, p. 229. Among the women and children recorded you can see someone from that tribe. 
See, ACR 65, p. 216. 
115 ACR 78, pp. 33, 147; ACR 82, pp. 23, 95, 96. 
116 ACR 82, pp.  95, 96. 
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problems. For example, if the policy of resettlement of tribes that began in the 1690s 
and continued till the second decade of the twentieth century117 had been successful, 
the Empire could have demolished the tribal structure, which was one of the main 
factors behind banditry. All in all, that rational project turned into an irrational 
insistence; since whenever they were resettled in elsewhere they came back to their 
host territories. The state could not provide security for them ine their new places, or 
worse; in order to cut their link with their places of origin, the state reserved their 
territories for some other groups. That led to reproduction of banditry rather than 
elimination of it; because, as well as having violated the laws by returning back to 
their lands, they always faced the risk of struggling against newcomers when they 
got back. 
 
II.2.1 The Process of Complaint and Response 
We can divide the Ottoman realm into three entities (see figure below). The 
level of masses is the level of banditry, in which there is conflict between different 
groups. At this level the state spies118 and the victims could directly or indirectly 
(letters, petitions = mektub, arzuhal, mahzar) apply to officials on an organizational 
level or could send information about the situation to the Porte - the central 
government in Istanbul. Generally, the cases of minor importance were directly 
solved at the level of Organization 2. There are many records about how the disputes 
between plaintiffs and litigant bandits were solved in courts. On the other hand, if the 
                                                 
117 On March 9, 1916 a commission, called General Directorate of Immigrants and Tribes (Aşâir ve 
Muhâcirîn Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyesi), was established as continuity of the resettlement policy of the 
Ottoman Empire. The resettlement of tribes continued at least until 1922. 
http://www.khgm.gov.tr/kutuphane/toprakiskan1.htm [Accessed August 8, 2005]. For the transition of 
that policy also see Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İskân Siyaseti ve 
Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), pp. 1-9.   
118 In 1705 spies informed the beylerbeyi of Maraş Hasan Pasha about the illegal activities of Tacirli 
tribes. See ACR 55, pp. 258, 259, 261.  
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situation was much more serious than they could deal with, they informed 
beylerbeyis or the central government.  
 
Figure II-1: The Process of State Response to Banditry. 
 
 
 
The beylerbeyi was the key figure in the state’s struggle against banditry 
throughout this period. People who had problems with bandits often applied to them. 
Beylerbeyi could order the officials and notables of the Organization 2 what they had 
to do. He could order them to send someone to his council (divan) or execute 
someone. He had more authority in executive matters than anyone of Organization 2. 
For example, in a record dated 1697 the governor of Rakka ordered the warden of the 
castle (kale dizdarı) of Ayntab to send him the two prisoners who were imprisoned in 
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the castle.119 In another case, the beylerbeyi of Maraş ordered the sancakbeyi and the 
substitute judge (naib) to capture some bandits and to send them to Maraş.120 
Moreover, in 1701 the beylerbeyi of Aleppo demanded three bandits imprisoned in 
the castle to be punished.121 And in the last example, the beylerbeyi of Maraş ordered 
the officials of Ayntab to execute some imprisoned bandits and to send him their 
heads.122 Obviously, it can be seen the beylerbeyi could interfere with the judgment 
and that intervention was legitimized by firmans of the sultan. According to normal 
procedure, Ayntab was dependent on Maraş province; however, in the period under 
review one can see more orders of the beylerbeyi of Rakka than those of the 
beylerbeyi of Maraş. One reason behind this was that the beylerbeyi of Rakka was 
chosen by the state to resettle the tribes in Rakka and to deal with the problems 
created by them. Another reason might be about the rank of the beylerbeyis. In the 
records it can be seen that the governors of Rakka were often entitled to vizierate 
however the governorship of Maraş was turned almost into a kind of patrimonial 
administration of Rışvanzades.123  
Once a complaint or information was sent to the Porte the government would 
send decrees that ordered officials what they must do and how. Based on the 
organization of the operation, the center could send decrees to a beylerbeyi and give 
him full authority of the operation or could send these to any officials of 
                                                 
119 ACR 49, p. 170. 
120 ACR 55, p. 259. 
121 ACR 60, p. 232. 
122 ACR 65, p. 226. 
123 Between 1707 and 1737 Halil, Mehmed, Seyyid Mehmed, and Süleyman Pashas, who were from 
the same family known Rışvanzades held the governorship of Maraş respectively. Orhan Kılıç, 18. 
Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin İdarî Taksimatı: Eyalet ve Sancak Tevcihatı. (Elazığ: 
Ceren, 1997), pp. 132-3. Halil pasha was executed in 1712 due not to join the army during the war 
with Russia and being bandit. He was most probably from Rışvan tribe since there were several 
thousands bandits from this tribe and other Kurds. Tarih-i Raşid, Vol. 3, pp. 357-8. This is an 
important reason for the state to not trust them. Moreover, in the court records almost all the 
governors of Rakka were mentioned as viziers however, the same thing cannot be mentioned for 
Rışvanzades. As a mater of fact, in that period there were also some other governors but we do not 
know their titles. 
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Organization 2, mostly to all of them. But the general procedure was that, the 
beylerbeyi was chosen as the absolute authority in the operation and organization 2 
was ordered to support him. Sometimes the decrees were only sent to beylerbeyis 
who were told that some officials of the organization 2 and/or reaya and/or some 
tribes were entrusted with him in that operation. After that, beylerbeyi sent orders 
(buyruldu) to anyone whom he needed the help of. When beylerbeyis sent their 
orders they sent the original firman (the imperial decree), or a copy of it together 
with his buyruldu (order). Hence, in the kadı records often these two orders were 
registered one by one. 
Sometimes the government let them to be much free about the decision of what 
would be done against bandits. It could be ordered that “do what is needed” or 
“punish them with a punishment that they deserve”. Such obscure orders were 
embodied by beylerbeyi. At other times, they had no such luxury, as made apparent 
by such orders like “without sparing a minute, go/do…” or “execute someone and 
send their heads to my sublime gate.” Nevertheless, the organization of operation 
was planned by beylerbeyis or sancak officials.  
 
II.2.2 The Ottoman Policies of Banditry 
What did they have to do against bandits? In fact, the answer to this question 
varied according to the character of banditry. It might not need to mobilize a hundred 
militias to capture a single bandit or no need to punish them at all. The policies can 
be collected under some headings like, ‘imprisoning’ (kalebendlik), ‘amnesty’, 
‘exile’, ‘(re)settlement’, ‘agreement’, ‘intimidation’, ‘recruitment’, ‘campaign’, 
‘unrestricting’ and ‘banning’.  
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II.2.2.1 Imprisoning and Amnesty 
Imprisoning and amnesty were the basic and most prevalent approaches to all 
the similar crimes. Usually ordinary criminals and bandits of small bands were 
imprisoned to execute later or used as slaves in galleys. Many bandits were 
recognized during their illegal activities or informants informed on them to officials 
so that they could be easily captured and brought before the court or other officials. 
Some others who were seen less guilty were sent to the prison after being captured in 
campaigns launched against their groups.  
Sometimes when officials were convinced that they had corrected themselves 
(ıslah-ı nefs) they could be released. In a document, it had been recorded that old 
muhzırbaşı would be kept in prison until he corrects himself.124 A man from Kilis 
named Seyit Mehmet was imprisoned but escaped by misleading the officials with a 
spurious firman.125 After several months of freedom he was captured once more. 
Within a short time he was released because officials were convinced that he had 
corrected himself.126  
 
II.2.2.2 Exile and (Re)settlement 
The more powerful groups were sent to exile to the distant places to isolate 
them from the communities they were attached to. Cyprus Island was one of the ideal 
places for that. As mentioned before, captives of the Kılıçlı and other tribes were sent 
                                                 
124 ACR 55, p. 260 (April 18, 1705). There were made efforts to capture another man in order to 
correct his behavior; however, he escaped so he could not be captured. ACR 61, p. 279. 
125 ACR 58, p. 21 (January, 1707).  
126 ACR 58, pp. 21 (March 21, 1707), 45 (May, 1707). 
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to this island. The Tacirli, the Kılıçlı, the Okçu İzzeddinli and the Bektaşlı tribes were 
also decided to be sent there in 1731.127 But we do not know if that had taken place.  
On the other hand, resettlement was something more than punishing banditry. It 
had dual purposes: on the one hand the state tried to benefit from economic resources 
which came to halt because of depopulation; on the other hand the state gave priority 
to the resettlement of the tribes who took part in banditry. Thus, it became a kind of 
punishment to such tribes.  
Due to banditry, invasion, of Arabic tribes, from Rakka to Harran, many 
settlements were depopulated. One of the primary aims of the resettlement policy 
was repopulation these empty places.128 The government especially chose the 
nomadic tribe to settle there. With doing that the government planed both to increase 
the state revenues with puting the empty lands under cultivation and to pacifying the 
nomadic tribes who often engaged in banditry.129 However, many sedentary tribes 
were also sent to Rakka for resettlement. At this point we must find a valid reason if 
the state did not put some land under the cultivation in expense of some others.  
On the other hand, this policy was a part of the state’s intention of preventing 
the banditry of Arabic tribes.130 In this sense, the tribes settled in Rakka would be 
exempt from some taxes in return for protect themselves and these lands with their 
own forces.131 Moreover, if anyone of them committed crime they would hand 
                                                 
127 ACR 82, p. 96. Since the tribes ressetled in İç İl involved in banditry the state decided to send them 
to Cyprus in 1712. Ahmet Refik, Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri: (966-1200), (İstanbul: Enderun, 1989) 
pp. 143-4.  
 
128 ACR 40, p. 67; ACR 41, pp. 17, 42. 
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131 ACR 41, p. 17. 
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him/her over to the law and when someone engaged in banditry, they would inform 
the governor of Rakka about the event and join the governor’s forces to oppress 
bandits.132  
The plan of the government did not work properly. Some tribes accept 
settlement but some tribes did not go to Rakka, let alone, run away from Rakka. 
Almost all tribes mentioned in the table of Appendix I/A, who (re)settled in Rakka, 
Hama, Humus and Çukurova, left the place of resettlement. Sometimes big groups 
and sometimes families escaped. The Ottoman policy of banditry back fired, let 
alone, diminishing or eliminating the banditry. The tribes who resisted to the policy 
or who run away automatically labeled as bandits, since what they did was 
disobedience to the sublime imperial order. Moreover, they were labeled as bandits, 
since most of time they really involved in banditry. The problem of resettling the run 
away-tribes continued through out the period in question, and even, continued 
through a long period after that period. Sometimes, exactly similar operations 
launched against them, no matter whether they were bandits or not. One of such 
cases in this sort is about some Turcoman and Kurdish tribes who escaped from 
Rakka and scattered all over Ayntab region. In his order the governor of Rakka said 
to the officials of Ayntab to kill them and loot their properties.133 In 1697 the 
government use cannons in an operation against some such tribes to force them to go 
back Rakka.134 In another operation the government used 200 horsemen and 1,000 
infantrymen who were able to use firearms.135 These cases are only few examples 
among many to show how serious an operation can be. 
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No doubt, the resettlement policy triggered some fundamental socio-economic 
changes. The case of the Okçu İzzettinli, the Amiki and the Şeyhlü tribes is an 
explanatory example of such change. The governor of Rakka, Kadızade Hüseyin 
Pasha killed the leaders of these tribes and the remained members of these tribes 
were sent to Rakka. However, some 500 of them escaped and ran to mountains. Only 
when Hüseyin Pasha was dead they dared to go down to Kilis and Azaz where they 
had been living before. More than that, the resettled people also began to escape back 
to their motherlands in small groups. But they did not see a place where they left 
behind. The state had already sold their lands to some other people.  Therefore, they 
were engaged in banditry. They prevented these new comers to cultivate the lands 
and captured some of their lands back by force. According to the decree if they could 
not be prevented and resettled in Harran many peasants would leave their villages.136 
The state was right to be annoyed, since in just several months later many peasants 
left their lands and took shelter in the farms of powerful (zi-kudret sahibi) lords.137 In 
another document dated 1711 these farms were mentioned as military farms (askeri 
çiftlik).138 Such demographic movements were against the benefits of the state, since 
the state was loosing its taxpayers.139  
However the social turmoil led by the bandit fugitives was much more serious. 
The state sent not only the tribes who were living in countryside, but any member of 
a tribe living city was also often sent to the place of resettlement. When two imams 
from the İlbeyli tribe, who were living in Ayntab, were sent to Rakka they lost their 
jobs.140 In another case a man, who had been living in the city before resettlement, 
                                                 
136 ACR 48B, p. 137 (May, 1696). In another case some people of the Kızık tribe who were resettled in 
Menbiç captured a land belong to İlbeyli tribe. ACR 54, p. 105 (October or November, 1704). 
137 ACR 48B, pp. 2, 3 (November 18, 1696). 
138 ACR 63, p. 29. 
139 ACR 48B, pp. 2, 3. 
140 ACR 43, p. 83; ACR 47, p. 9. 
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escaped from Rakka. When he came to the city his house had already been sold. That 
situation was led a tension and he began to harass other dwellers of the district.141 As 
a matter of fact it is a good example to see the logic behind banditry.   
When fugitive could not be powerful enough, they began to take shelter among 
other tribes. A record dated 1704 mentioned the fugitives who took shelter in some 
Turcoman and Kurdish tribes.142 And this is also against the state interests since the 
host tribe would also be treated as guilty as the fugitives. On the other hand, such 
alliances would contribute the powers of such tribes.  
 
II.2.2.3 Agreement and Intimidation 
Social power facilitates a group’s bargaining power against the state. As it is 
seen, some Arab tribes could have such a bargaining power. The state had to reach an 
agreement if she wanted to guarantee the safety of the roads, which passed through 
the lands of these tribes. According to Rita Stratkötter, the amount that the state paid 
them for security depended on their bargaining power that changed from time to 
time.143 Another example of this issue is the case of Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha. He sent 
a letter in 1606 to the state in which he offered a deal of sending more Army to the 
campaign in return for more privileges.144 The state had reached a reasonable 
compromise in order to prevent them from involving in banditry. However, such 
agreements lasted only for a limited period of time since either the balance of power 
changed in favor of the state or somehow one side broke the agreement. To make a 
                                                 
141 ACR 52, p. 263 (April 2, 1703). 
142 ACR 52, p. 46. 
143 Rita Stratkötter, Von Kairo nach Mekka. Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Pilgerfahrt nach 
den Berichten des Ibrahim Rif’at Basa: Mir’at al-Haramain. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen-Band 
145, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin 1991 Cited from A. Latif Armağan, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Hac Yolu 
Güzergâhı ve Menziller (=Menâzilü’l-Hacc).” Osmanlı Araştırmaları 20 (2000), p. 78, footnote 18. 
144 To see that deal see Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 189-90. 
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sense, the banditry of Canpolatoğlu Ali and that of Sheik Kelib can be considered 
respectively.  
Another type of agreement, which was much prevalent, was unilateral and 
contained imposed terms (nezir) defined by the state. In such agreements, the state 
did not make concessions; rather, in order to deter the bandit groups, she held them 
liable to heavy fines. The above mentioned Düztepe Agreement which was held 
between villagers and the Kılıçlı Tribe in 1712 was a good example of such 
agreements. Another example is the state agreement with the Com, the Musabeyli, 
the Okçu İzzeddinli, the Amiki and the Şeyhli tribes in between 1722 and 1730. 
According to that, these tribes agreed to pay 20,000 kuruş if they would involve in 
highway robbery and/or steal something from anyone.145 Another agreement was 
between tribes of İfraz-ı Zülkadriyye and the tax-farmer, Paşazade İsmail Paşa. 
According to this agreement, if they had created difficulty in paying their Imperial 
taxes (mal-ı miri) or had given up cultivating their lands and taken part in banditry 
they would have paid a fine of 20 kise akçe each. However they did not remain loyal 
to the agreement and they robbed 65,000 kuruş from the provincial treasure of 
Aleppo.146 Fahrettin Tızlak also mentions about such an imposition. After the 
suppression of the banditry of the Şeyh Hasanlu, the Disümlü, and the Kurtlu tribes 
in 1782, the state imposed them to pay 1,500 kuruş if they ever got involved in 
banditry again.147   
 
                                                 
145 ACR 81, p. 106 (April 19, 1730).  
146 ACR 57, p. 249. The same amount was recorded as 130 kese in ACR 57, p. 248. This means that 
each kise contained 500 kuruş. This is appropriate what M. Zeki Pakalın says. See Pakalın “Kese” 
Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü. Vol. 2. pp: 247-249. According to that each tribe 
accepted to pay 10.000 kuruş. We do not know the exact number of those tribes which were shown 
under the name of İfraz-ı Zülkadriyye but in one record 48 tribes (cemaat) were mentioned. See ACR 
67, p. 558. That is, if every one of them were responsible for that they would be expected to pay a 
total 480.000 kuruş. It seems like an amount impossible to be collected.          
147 Fahrettin Tızlak “XVIII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısı İle XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Yukarı Fırat 
Havzasında Eşkiyalık Hareketleri.” (Belleten, Vol LVII(220): 751-780; 1993), p. 762-3. 
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II.2.2.4 Recruitment and Campaign  
The Ottoman state had realized the importance of recruitment from early 
periods of the Empire. Non-Muslim children were seen essential for the future of the 
central state. In the period under review, the state had already witnessed the miracle 
of recruitment.  
The aim behind recruitment was to eliminate the potential threat of the bandits. 
Canpolatoğlu Ali’s deal with Kuyucu Murat Pasha that has been mentioned above 
clearly explains this point: 
If it is my head that is demanded, send a man to whom you trust to my 
canvas to cut my head off and bring it to you. But if the purpose is 
eliminating all the bandits, let me hold my position in Aleppo. Then let me 
go to Kızılbaş (Iran) and let me take revenge for your losses. Either I will 
kill them or they will kill me. Let them (bandits, my soldiers) die. We can 
keep the remaining ones in the fortress. Thus all of them will be 
eliminated.148 
 
Murad Pasha did not accept that deal but the state would try that method in the 
period of analysis. Throughout a long period of struggle with the Okçu İzzeddinli, the 
state could not get rid of the problem. Eventually she tried a new solution for bandits 
of the Okçu İzzeddinli in 1725. The Porte tried to recruit 2,000 levends from Çermik, 
Bucak, Seyudek (?) regions of Diyarbekir and from Okçu İzzeddinli and other tribes 
(cemaat) of Kilis.149 In the following several orders dated 1725-1726 it was 
mentioned that 1,000 levends were demanded from Ayntab region.150 Most probably 
those levends were those who were demanded from Kilis. Finally in December 1730, 
1,000 levends were ordered to be conscripted from Okçu İzzeddinli and to be sent to 
Bagdad.151 It seems that the government could not recruit them throughout these five 
                                                 
148 Tarih-i Peçevi vol. 2. p. 437. 
149 ACR 76, p. 116. 
150 ACR 77, p. 205, 219. 
151 ACR 82, p. 61. 
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years from 1725 to 1730. Moreover, the raid on Ayntab that took place several 
months after the last order shows that plan failed. 
The last form of punishment was campaign and operation. From smallest 
groups to the biggest ones, the state launched operations against bandits. The general 
characteristic of these operations was capturing bandits or preventing their actions. 
However some other operations called sefer (campaign) connotes the possibility of 
active conflicts between the state forces and bandit groups. In the period under 
review there were a lot of examples of campaigns, which were interestingly recorded 
by the name of ethno-lingual identity of the tribes on which the campaign was 
launched: ‘Arab campaign (Urban seferi)’, ‘Kurdish campaign (Ekrad seferi)’, and 
‘Turcoman campaign (Türkmen seferi)’. Sometimes they were named by the tribal 
names, like İfraz-ı Zulkadriye seferi.  
Generally speaking records are silent about the details of campaigns. Thanks to 
chroniclers we learn what happened during some important battles like that of 
Canpolatoğlu Ali Pasha and Sheik Kelib described in detail before. Here I would like 
to emphasize some other points concerning those campaigns. Discussing the burden 
of those campaigns, the resistance of the state forces during the campaigns, their 
behaviors against targeted people and the use of nefir-i amm soldiers (arming the 
populace) in the operations are essential to understand the banditry in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Banditry had a twofold economic burden on the state. On the one hand, with 
robbing the taxpaying reaya, bandits stroke the state income; on the other hand in 
order to prevent banditry, the state had to launch operations, which did cost a serious 
amount. Depending on the importance of the campaign, some or all of the levends, 
tımar and zeamet holders, janissaries, other elements of the central army and nefir-i 
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amm in a specific region could be dispatched. For example, one of the most serious 
campaigns was launched against Arabs in 1700. In a firman, the government ordered 
all the administrative units in Anatolia to supply food for the recruited 1,000 
silahdars and 1,000 sipahs from Anatolia.152 Moreover, in some campaigns the state 
forces took cannons with them as a measure or to use in those campaigns. Indeed, the 
amount of the expenditure changed depending on to what extent the state was taking 
the operation seriously.  
The state expenditure for those campaigns reached an important amount at the 
period under review. Immediately after the attack of bandits of the Okçu İzzeddinli, 
the Amiki and the Musabeyli tribes to the Voyvoda of Kilis, Kartallı Ahmed, in 1704, 
the government launched a campaign against these tribes. In August, the official 
ordered nine villages that each taxpaying unit (hane) pay 1.25 kuruş for the military 
unit (bayrak akçesi) that was dispatched to Kilis to punish the bandits who were held 
responsible for the event. Accordingly, those nine villages would prepare a sum of 23 
kuruş within a day.153 In fact this amount is insignificant when compared to the 
expenditures from the beginning of June to the end of November. In the period of 
June-September, the total money taxed for the campaign was 1,074 kuruş, 1,064 
kuruş of which was spent for the expenses of the campaign.154 In the period of 
October-November, 906.5 kuruş was spent out of taxed 911 kuruş.155 That is to say, 
the total money collected in the period of June-November was 1,985 kuruş without 
                                                 
152 These two corps were in fact were two cavalry group of the central army. Those corps was paid 
every three months. But in this case these corps seems to be mercenaries who were paid daily.  See 
ACR 51, p. 122.   
153 ACR 54, p. 9. 
154 See Appendix III ACR 54, p. 18. The reason behind the leftover 10 kuruş is that taxpayers were 
divided into taxpaying units each of which paying the same amount. For example in the period of 
June-October from the countryside of Ayntab 228 kuruş was collected and the taxpayers of the city 
divided into 188 units each paying 4.5 kuruş. This shows us that after the calculation of estimated or 
real expenditure the expenses were allotted to determined units.     
155 See Appendix III ACR 54, p. 46. In this period only city dwellers were taxed. Of 188.625 units 
each paid 4.83 kuruş (4 kuruş and 10 sümün).  
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mentioning 23 kuruş. To make sense of these figures, one must take into 
consideration that the total annual avarız taxes collected in Ayntab Sanjak in the 
period between May 1704 and April 1705 (h. 1116) was about 1,870 kuruş.156 As it 
is clearly seen, the expenses within 6 months for eradicating banditry exceeded the 
total avarız revenues of 11 months. If the total expenditure is calculated for a whole 
year it can be seen that in fact the expenses doubled the income from avarız taxes. 
The deficit increased further in 1714. During the campaign launched against Kurds of 
Kilis, Kılıçlı, Tacirli, and some others, the expenditures calculated for the cost of 
three days was 4,529 kuruş.157 However, the income coming from avarız for the year 
1713 was 1,243 kuruş and 1271 kuruş for 1715 (January-November). Worse, 4,529 
kuruş was only calculated for the expenses of three days.158  
As a matter of fact those campaigns were not so big campaigns. For the 
campaign of 1714 only 3 flags (150 troops) were mentioned in the records of 
expenditure. Now let us look at the expenditure of the campaign of 1700 against 
Arabs. Among troops, commanders (ağa) would be paid daily 20 akçe, chiefs 
(kethüda) 15 akçe, officers (zabit) 10 akçe and others 7 akçe each. We do not know 
the exact number of people in each group. Ignoring high rank troops, the minimum 
daily expenditure for those 2,000 cavalries can be calculated as 116.7 kuruş. That 
amount was the only money that they would receive as salary. In addition, subjects 
on their route would supply their provisions. We do not know the amount of that 
provision. However, even if the total cost was accepted as 116.7 kuruş daily, the total 
expenditure of the campaign was far more than those expenditures mentioned above. 
Though we do not know the duration of the campaign, according to the term they 
would be allowed a vacation at the end of one-year period. That is to say their 
                                                 
156 ACR 53, p. 100. In h. 1116 there were 373.875 tax units and each paying 600 akçe (5 kuruş).  
157 See Appendix III ACR 65, p. 220.  
158 ACR 61, p. 280; ACR 66, p. 244. 
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expenditures can be calculated between 3,500 kuruş (for one month) and 42,000 
kuruş (for one year). 
In all these operations, the almost whole costs of the operation were supplied 
by re’aya. And re’aya had to pay a quite serious amount to inform the government 
about their submissions. For instance, during the campaign of 1704 over Kilis, to 
inform the government abaout the event they paid a man (muhzır) 120 kuruş. Of 
course such expenses can be seen as normal for such operations. However, though 
the commanders of the operation received a quite good amount, which was 250 kuruş 
in the campaign of the 1704, he also received some extra money and service. During 
those campaigns they were demanding some money for their servants (saraydar159) 
for their services in their palaces in his absence. He also got 12 kuruş for the repair of 
his palace. Moreover, he did not forget his shepherd who would receive 3 kuruş.160 
During the campaign of 1714 the commander, Ali Pasha, got some money for the 
clothes of his saraydars. It is interesting that the costs of the gifts presented to him 
were also calculated as the costs of the campaign.161 The money spent for those extra 
costs may not be seen a big amount but it became widespread.162 This reflects a 
degeneration of the bureaucratic and military discipline. That is to say, such costs 
were more than the fundamental cost of the struggle of the state to defeat bandits.   
Indeed those expenditures mentioned are just only the surface of iceberg. The 
human cost of those operations also needs to be considered. Those operations could 
have tragic results for both sides. An operation was not only launched to punish 
bandits but bandit families and other members of their tribes could be punished as 
                                                 
159 Saraydar were Armenians of Van or Kurds who were working in the kitchen and in other services 
in the houses of notables. Pakalın, “Saraydar” Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü. Vol. 3. 
p. 126. 
160 For a further information see Appendix III ACR 54, p. 18; ACR 54, p. 46. 
161 See Appendix III ACR 65, p. 220. 
162 The governor of Rakka, Ali Pasha, in 1718 ordered Ayntab to prepare provisions for six days. The 
expenditure was calculated 9,359 kuruş. In the record especially gifts (pişkeş), palace expenses (saray 
harcı) and repair of the palace (saray tamiratı) were emphasized. ACR 68, p. 198.   
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well. This point can be clearly seen in the campaign launched against Kılıçlı tribe in 
1714.163 The following tables based on the record reporting the transfer of captives to 
Cyprus Island (See Appendix IV ACR 65, p. 216.) show how women and children 
suffered from that campaign. Those tables only contain the people whose names 
were recorded. Thus, they do not include 76 people, who, since they were seriously 
ill, were not able to tell their names to the officials. Table 1 shows the number and 
percentages of adult and child females and males among the total number of 
captives. The significant point is that adult males were very few among those 
captives, only 3%. One of the reasons behind this might be the fact that; adult males 
had more capability to escape when compared to children and women. The second 
reason might be that they were killed during the battle or executed after the battle. If 
we think that 5 (45.5%) of them had died in the prison we can say that those 11 adult 
males most probably were old people since adult men can be expected to be as 
stronger as adult women.164 
 
Table II-1: People Captured During the Campaign of 1714, and Age-Gender/Total 
Captives Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
163 As mentioned above, during the same period the beylerbeyi of Maraş, Ali Pasha, launched a 
campaign against Kurds of Kilis as well. Moreover, from the same record mentioning the campaign 
over Kılıçlı, we learn that some members from the Tacirli, the Koyunoğlu, the Hacılar, the Elci, the 
Dokuz, the Mamalı, the Elhalub, the Bektaşlı, the Cihanbeyli, and the Doğanlı tribes were also 
captured. See Appendix IV ACR 65, p. 216. That is to say, with that campaign the government might 
have tried to bridle all tribes taking part in banditry in one attempt.       
164 As a matter of fact one can reject this conclusion since 11 is not a sufficient number to infer a 
highly reliable conclusion. However, as mentioned before, at the same time 7 prisoners who were 
accused of being bandits from the Kılıçlı and the Doğanlı tribes were put the sword. Most probably 
those were young males. Moreover, talking about those tribes in the later periods as “the rumps of the 
sword” refers to a massacre happened at that period.  
Gender 
Female Male Total Total 
% # % # % # 
Adults 69.6 257 3.0 11 72.6 268 
Children 12.2 45 15.2 56 27.4 101 A
ge
 
Total 81.8 302 18.2 67 100.0 369 
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Tables 2 and 3 show respectively how many people were alive during the 
record and how many of them had died in prisons. Of living people, 86.8 percent 
were females. Especially the adult females constitute a great proportion 78.7 percent. 
However among the deceased children constitute a greater proportion than adults. 
This picture seems normal since children were more vulnerable than adults. Since the 
dispersion of these four categories was not normal, it can mislead us. For example 
the proportion of deceased adults and deceased children were close to each other 
however in general children much more vulnerable than adults. 
 
Table II-2: Living Captives of the Campaign of 1714 during the Record 
and Age-Gender/Total Living Captives Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II-3: Deceased Captives of the Campaign of 1714 during the Record 
and Age-Gender/Total Died Captives Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Table 1 and Table 3 depicts the situation much clearly (see Table 
4). For example it can clarify such a question like; what proportion were deceased 
adult females among the total number of adult females? We can see clearly which 
Gender 
Female Male Total Living 
% # % # % # 
Adults 78.7 214 2.2 6 80.9 220 
Children 8.1 22 11.0 30 19.1 52 A
ge
 
Total 86.8 236 13.2 36 100.0 272 
Gender 
Female Male Total Died 
% # % # % # 
Adults 44.3 43 5.2 5 49.5 48 
Children 23.7 23 26.8 26 50.5 49 A
ge
 
Total 68.0 66 32.0 31 100.0 97 
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groups were more vulnerable and which were stronger. In the prisons 26.3% of 
captives had died. If one considers those 76 sick captives who also died, it can be 
seen that 38.9% died only in prison. And god knows how many of them died on their 
way to exile to Cyprus. The calamity mostly struck children (48.5%), especially 
female children (51.1%). This table shows how much the death rate was among the 
adult males. That highness changes the picture. Even though the 32% percent of 
deceased people were males, of males 46.3% were dead. The proportion was lesser 
among females, of whom 21.8% dead. 
 
Table II-4: The Death Rate among Adult and Children, Female and Male Captives 
of the Campaign of 1714 (Table 3/Table 1 Ratio) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, it was not only the relatives of bandits who suffered from those 
operations since other people also often suffered from them. A man from Gözü 
Kızıllı tribe named Isenbeg applied to the court and charged some officials with 
seizing his money and properties by force:  
When the men of the beylerbeyi of Maraş, Mustafa Paşa, were 
investigating the bandits of Tacirli four months ago, mentioned Menla 
Ahmed, Ali and Yakub, who unfairly sneak on me, brought them to my 
house. They made them to seize my 5 camels, worth 60 kuruş, 2 horses 
worth 30 kuruş, 8 goats worth 2 kuruş and 50 kuruş ready coins.165   
 
In their advocacy those three men claimed that the beylerbeyi of Konya had sent an 
order to loot the properties of Tacirilis wherever they found. And they claimed that 
                                                 
165 ACR 58, p. 202 (the beginning of May, 1707). 
Gender 
Died 
Female % Male % Total % 
Adults 16.7 45.5 17.9 
Children 51.1 46.4 48.5 A
ge
 
Total 21.8 46.3 26.3 
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they found them in Isenbeg’s home. Moreover when they informed about him, that 
he was also one of the highway bandits, his properties were also looted. In the 
following three records, Isenbeg and two other men from the same tribe were 
accused of being bandits or cooperating with bandits respectively four, ten and 
eleven years before.166 Isenbeg applied to the court for an event that had happened 
four months ago but he was accused of banditry that happened 4 years ago.  
There are several other cases that quite resemble this case. A man from the 
Okçu İzzeddinli tribe claimed that when the beylerbeyi of Rakka, Kadızade Hüseyin 
Paşa, came there (to resettle them in Harran) 15 years ago, some men usurped his 
130 goats.167 He lost the case. Again, Hüseyin from Bayadlı tribe claimed that the 
mule that was under the ownership of İsmail was actually his mule, which was taken 
by force by the kethüda of Tacirli, Ali. In his response, İsmail claimed that three 
years ago when kethüda of Tacirli had gone to resettle Bayadlıs, their kethüda had 
bought that mule for 35 kuruş and sold to Ali. Two witnesses confirmed what İsmail 
told before the court so Hüseyin lost the case.168 
There are two shared features of those three cases. Firstly, in all of them 
plaintiffs accused men assigned by the state as officials of operations.169 Secondly, 
all of plaintiffs lost adjudications. I am not sure whether these are accidental. Here it 
is important to rethink whether the courts could satisfy the needs and expectations of 
the reaya. Though those plaintiffs were considered as deceivers, their cases mirror a 
tension created due to the state conflict with tribes and anyhow in a situation of 
                                                 
166 ACR 58, p. 197 (3 records) (the beginning of May, 1707). 
167 ACR 57, p. 297 (November 1706). 
168 ACR 53, p. 225 (December 1703). 
169 One can oppose this point since the last two cases talks about resettlements but not campaigns. As 
we shall see later the resettlement operations were as serious as campaigns launched against bandit 
tribes. Even in many records those operations were recorded as campaigns.  
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disorder no one can reject the high possibility of irrational and unfair behaviors either 
from the state or bandits.  
Indeed there were other tokens of that tension. Once one group was declared as 
a bandit group, the others were forbidden to hide their members or their properties 
which most of the time the state tried to capture since either they were evaluated as 
robbed properties or the unpaid taxes. According to an order dated 1713, a man, 
named Abdullah, was accused of hiding and protecting the women and bandits of 
Avşar tribe. So his house would be sealed off.170 It can be seen as a normal procedure 
of fighting against banditry; however the social comfort corrupted further. After the 
serious defeat of Kılıçlı tribe in 1714, as we have already mentioned, a boy from this 
tribe was sold by a janissary in Aleppo as a slave. In another case, a man, Üveys 
Beşe -most probably a Janissary or a provincial cavalry- from Kızılhisar-ı Tahtani 
village had married a woman from this tribe just after that defeat. More correctly he 
had brought that woman to his house and declared that he married her. The husband 
was now, April 1715, in the army. When he was away two times some officials had 
come to that village and demanded some money from villagers under the name of 
Hizmet. Moreover, a representative of the mütesellim of Ayntab came to the village 
and harmed villagers. Because of that, villagers wanted the son of Üveyis and his 
wife to leave the village together with that woman.171 That is the point that makes the 
banditry communal. And this is why we could talk about something like tribal 
banditry.  
It appears that in this period discrimination rose against tribes. This is another 
important point in understanding tribal banditry. It was easy for us to handle them as 
bandits but in fact their banditry could be something different from what we 
                                                 
170 ACR 61, p. 282. 
171 ACR 66, p. 130 (April 29, 1715). 
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understand. That is to say, they did not need to be actual bandits in order to be 
labeled as bandits. What happened to Dedesli tribe can clarify this point. 16 cavalry 
delibaşs (kind of military unit formed as an alternative to levends) had attacked some 
members of this tribe and killed one of them. They justified their action by accusing 
them of being bandits.172 
 
Public Army vs. bandits  
As mentioned above, the government was using almost every kind of soldier 
against bandit groups. However, there were three important reasons behind 
preferring public army instead of or beside regular army or mercenaries. Firstly, the 
wars on the eastern and western fronts affected that decision. Secondly the 
government tried to decrease the costs of operations. Lastly, such a strategy could 
increase the effectiveness of the operations. 
  It was imperative for the state to keep a standing army ready due to long wars 
with Austria, Russia, Iran and Venice. Especially wars with Iran required a great men 
power. During those wars it was hard for the government to get rid of bandits. Hence 
the state had to find an alternative to standing army to use for solving internal 
problems. 
As mentioned above, the conflict with bandits created a multi-faceted burden 
for the state. One way to minimize this burden was seen as using public armies 
against bandits. But this does not mean that such an army had no cost. The Officials 
directed their cost to bandits. Thus they were allowed to loot the properties of bandit 
groups. The best representation of this can be seen in the words of the beylerbeyi of 
                                                 
172 ACR 67, p. 327 (the end of October or beginning of November, 1716). 
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Rakka: “heads for us, properties for you.”173 An order dated 1697 ordered the 
villagers of Ayntab that if bandits came to their villages and mistreated them, they 
were allowed to kill them. People who had killed bandits would seize properties of 
them.174 In this case we cannot speak of an operation but the villagers were 
encouraged to defend themselves. Besides, they could rob bandits legally. Again, in 
1707 a campaign launched against Turcomans of İfraz-ı Zulkadriye. Public army was 
called for this campaign and they were ordered to “…immediately arrive there. Kill 
them and plunder and spoil their properties. Capture their leaders and send to us.”175  
Indeed promising plunder might be meaningless without a legal ground. A 
fatwa dated 1695 answered whether killing bandits might be glorified and whether 
those who killed them were meritorious in God’s sight. According to fatwa, one who 
killed them would be meritorious in God’s sight and whom they killed would be 
martyrs.176 In another fatwa dated 1697 it was legalized that if bandits showed 
resistance against armed forces, armed forces were allowed to kill them and plunder 
their properties.177 Such a legitimization might be required much more for another 
army than public army. In this period, persuasion of an army to be mobilized against 
bandits was not an easy task. Sometimes the government threatened them when they 
were unwilling to take part in the operations against bandits. A firman dated 1703 
ordered the governor of Maraş to launch an operation against Levends and Turcoman 
bandits. In that operation tımar and zeamet holders needed to be used. But if they 
refused to join the army or opposed the firman, their right to use lands would be 
                                                 
173 In fact it was not clear who says that, but since at that time the governor of Rakka was dealing with 
the tribes, which had escaped from Rakka, we attributed this sentence to him. See ACR 43, p. 214. 
174 ACR 47, p. 36. In another record it was ordered same thing but here they were needed to cut their 
heads and send to Rakka. ACR 49, p. 173.  
175 ACR 57, p. 267 (January 24, 1707). 
176 ACR 43, p. 210 (August 27, 1695). 
177 ACR 47, p. 52.  
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abrogated and those rights would be conferred to someone else.178 In 1704, this time 
the target was Kurdish bandits. However, somehow army had not joined the 
operation yet. Consequently, the governor of Maraş sent an order to Ayntab:  
The troops did not go where they were ordered to go. Go there until the 
time of the afternoon prayer (ikindi). The troops who did not go to the 
campaign under the flag of Alaybeyi will be killed and their properties 
will be seized in the name of sultan and their houses will be put under seal. 
And give foods (lands) of tımar and zeamet holders who haven’t joined 
the operation to someone else.179  
 
We do not know what happened to them or whether the government was serious in 
this threat or not. In another similar case Alaybeyi and some tımar and zeamet 
holders deserted from the campaign against İfraz-ı Zülkadriye without completing 
their duties. Alaybeyi, İsmail, was dismissed and a man from among zeamet holders 
was appointed to that position. Moreover, the lands confiscated from some zeamet 
and tımar holders were supplied to some others who were thought to have deserved 
donation.180 
However, such an orientation did not always work due to the conflict of 
practice and laws. If the properties of bandits were those they had robbed from 
innocent people, then how right was it for the armed forces to plunder them? 
According to Islamic Law (Şariat) the ownership still belonged to the person, from 
whom the property was stolen. Şeyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi (1490-1574) clarifies 
this point. The question is that: “For example, the slave Bekr has been sold to Amr 
by Zeyd. Then the slave is proved to be stolen. Can Zeyd get the slave after Bekir 
Pasha has decided to get Bekr from Amr and judged Zeyd to give the money back to 
Amr?” His answer is that “the one from who Bekr was stolen was the owner. (So) he 
                                                 
178 ACR 52, p. 45 (December, 1703). 
179 ACR 54, p. 14 (August 7, 1704). 
180 ACR 58, p. 12 (January 25, 1707). 
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will get him.”181 There are many other examples that the owners found their stolen 
property and proved their ownership before court and therefore took it. After the 
defeat of Kılıçlı in 1714, Ali Pasha ordered that some properties taken from those 
bandits to be sent to him.182 We could not be enlightened whether those properties 
were plundered from bandits or were bought from bandits sometimes before. If the 
first option was true than it means that those who took part in campaigns with the 
aim of counter-banditry (plunder) were disappointed. Therefore, possibly, they 
would be unwilling next time to join the army. If the second option is true then we 
must ask why the right owners waited till the defeat. 40 bandits from Kurds of Kilis 
had already killed the çukadar of the governor of Rakka and six other men in 
December 1709. After that two levend flags (100) had been charged with overcoming 
that problem. They had been able to kill six bandits and the remaining ones had 
escaped. After levends had returned back they had also returned back for taking 
revenge of their killed six friends. Because of that the settlers of three villages left 
their villages and migrated away.183 This is one of the reasons why I have claimed 
that the banditry could be much more widespread than we think. Villagers who were 
threatened by bandits might hesitate to inform the state about what had happened to 
them. 
Lastly, is this an effective method to get rid of bandits? To some extent it can 
be reckoned effective. First of all, by using villagers against bandits, the problem 
could be solved faster. Instead of informing the government and waiting for the 
response, ordering villagers that whenever bandits came to their villages they could 
kill them or could start operations automatically without being obstructed by 
                                                 
181 Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi'nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı Hayatı. p. 
238. 
182 ACR 65, pp. 226, 225. 
183 ACR 60, p. 229. 
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awkward bureaucratic hierarchy. When Okçu İzzeddinli and other tribes raided 
Ayntab in 1731 the governor of Rakka immediately demanded help from Kızık, 
Çepni, Bahadırlı and Reşi tribes.184 Secondly, if villagers could be successful to 
prevent bandits the government would save an important amount of money and 
manpower. And lastly, since those people were potential bandits, the government had 
dual benefit from that. Especially it is important to underline that in many cases the 
government used tribal armies.  
 
II.2.2.5 Unrestricting and Banning 
Like other armed forces, nefir-i amm also had a cost. If ordering the villagers to 
protect their own villages or their recruitment was so simple, there had to be 
measures to keep them ready for fight. In other words, the villagers had to easily 
reach firearms. Arming reaya led to a contradiction that those flexible-minded 
people could easily change the side. After all, the space that banditry reproduced 
itself always fed on those masses. Because of that the government often restricted 
gun production in the seventeenth century. 185 In the period under review restriction 
of firearms continued. In a decree dated 1722 the government ordered closing down 
of the gun-producing workshops in Haleb, Şam, Sayda Beyrut, Ruha, Amed, 
Malatya, Ayntab and Maraş on the grounds that Arab bandits got the guns which 
were bought from them.186  
In this period ordinary dwellers of the cities were not allowed to carry fatal 
tools but it was almost impossible to restrict the armament of people of countryside. 
The close bond between countrymen and arms was something more than organizing 
                                                 
184 ACR 82, p. 31. 
185 Ronald C. Jennings in his article “Firearms, Bandits and Gun-Control-Some Evidence on Ottoman 
Policy towards Firearms in the Possession of Reaya, from Judicial Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627.” 
gives many examples about gun control in the seventeenth century.  
186 ACR 73, p. 259 (April, 1722). 
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countrymen as militias against bandits. Arms are not only tools with which humans 
kill each other but also human beings saw armament obligatory in their struggle with 
nature. For example, can a hunter or a shepherd be imagined without arms? Their 
professions would be irrational unless they did protect themselves and their means of 
survive.187 On the other hand, the logic behind armament of the groups like tribes 
was similar to that of states. That is to say, tribalism can be seen as a primitive 
version of nationalism and the relations between them as international relations. 
Suzette Heald cogently asks the question that “What does it mean to be warrior? 
What does it mean to be a thief?” The answer she offers for African tribes quite 
correctly explain the Ottoman tribal banditry. “Historically, the two are closely 
linked in the pastoral and agro-pastoral societies of Eastern Africa where political 
opposition was expressed largely through cattle raiding.”188 This is why I insisted on 
looking at the relations between them to understand what banditry is. However, if 
those groups were living in the same system, in which, unlike international system, 
the rules were clearly defined by the ruler and laws, they could not struggle for 
survival and domination unrestrictedly. Thus, the arm control policies can be 
considered in this context.  
Another point is that, the government used mercenaries not only in the wars 
with other states but also in the campaign against bandits. Especially sekbans had to 
go to campaigns together with their lords. On the other hand, as mentioned above, 
they were one of the most notorious bandit groups in the Empire. Though they were 
often thought as products of a natural process, which is related to economic 
deprivation, vagrants who joined that army, levends as a group, was an artificial 
                                                 
187 A depiction of Ottoman Vlah shepherds can make sense. See Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause. 
p. 160. 
188 Suzette Heald, “Tolerating the Intolerable: Cattle Raiding Among the Kuria of Kenya.” (in 
Meaning of Violence: A Cross Cultural Perspective. ed. Göran Aijmer & Jon Abbink, 101-121. New 
York: Oxford, 2000), p. 101. 
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group. The bond between their members was not as natural as that between the 
members of a tribe. The flags under which they joined and formed a group or the 
uniforms they were wearing created an artificial symbolic representation of a group 
unlike tribes’ symbol of blood, which shall be discussed later. At least from the point 
of view of the government it seemed so. The government forbade their flags and 
clothes. The term the government offered was that if they left their flags and 
accepted to join under other flags like divanegan, gönüllüyan, azeban and farisan 
they would be pardoned but those who refused that and were still wandering in the 
clothes which were identical to them would seriously be punished.189 The 
government must have thought that there were some malevolent people among 
mercenaries otherwise it must have known that reforming them as new groups could 
not have solved the problems they created.     
 
II.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has underlined several points: Firstly, the banditry, except for 
some ahort intervals, was a long-lasting and continuous phenomenon in the Ottoman 
Empire. Secondly, it was a broader concept than one that can be understood by 
looking at a specific kind of group. Lastly, as it is evident, the Ottoman response to 
the banditry can be examined under several contradictory concepts.  
Without considering its long history, banditry cannot be understood clearly. 
This is why the thesis of Barkey remains premature. Could it be the case that in the 
seventeenth century banditry contributed the centralization of the state but in the 
eighteenth century led to its decentralization? Or should we consider ayans’ banditry 
in the eighteenth century was still contributing to the rise of central state? It must not 
                                                 
189 ACR 69, p. 245; ACR 75, p. 22. 
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be forgotten that the sened-i ittifak of 1808 was the most noticeable agreement with 
bandits we have ever seen. It is far from to prevent notables from political banditry. 
Moreover, I wonder if the non-Muslim banditry, which turned into separatist 
movements in the nineteenth century, can also be seen as contributor to the 
centralization of the state. 
On the contrary, though the state was able to appease all uprisings or bandit 
movements, their effect on the state was like drops gradually eroding a stone by 
constantly striking it. Even, James Scott claims the same for what he calls ‘everyday 
forms of resistance’: 
Collectively, however, these small events may add up almost 
surreptitiously to a large event; an army too short of conscripts to fight, a 
workforce whose foot dragging bankrupts the enterprise…(p. 6.) Acts that, 
taken individually may appear trivial, may not have trivial consequences 
when considered cumulatively.190  
 
Without mentioning the cost of banditry, the benefit of the state from it cannot be 
claimed. We have tried to show some costs of banditry at first glance, let alone its 
long term costs.  
We have grouped the policies of the Ottoman Empire under several groups of 
two contradictory approaches. Barkey successfully interprets almost all such 
contradictions as the indicators of the power of the state. It is for sure that agreement 
was a more clever approach than fighting but can we be really sure that it worked? 
None of approaches above could prevent banditry; because, without detecting the 
real factor behind banditry, it could not be prevented. What the Ottomans did was 
extinguishing burning sporadic trees in a fortress fire, and when they extinguished 
the fire, or they thought that they did so; the flames had already spread to another 
tree. One of the basic factors was economic degradation. Understanding the peasant 
                                                 
190 James Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” (in Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. ed. 
Forest Colburn, pp. 3-33. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), p. 13.  
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response to the seventeenth century crisis is the starting point of Barkey’s approach. 
It is right that the reaction was much in form of banditry than a collective action in 
Barkey’s sense. However she does not enlighten us whether the economic 
deprivation stopped in the period she has reviewed. She depicts the picture as if at 
the end of the seventeenth century the state had already overcome the serious 
political rivals -in fact to her none of bandits could be serious political rivals- and 
become a highly centralized state. 
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CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND BANDITRY 
 
“Me against my brother. Me and my 
brother against my cousin. Me, my 
brother, and my cousin against the 
stranger.” 
Arabic proverb 
 
III.1 The Ottoman Social Structure 
In the Ottoman historiography millet system is often associated with socio-
religious organization and tımar system with socio-economic organization of the 
Ottoman social structure. On the other hand, the tribal system is not given the same 
importance as the ‘millet’ and ‘timar’ systems. The one reason behind this is millet 
and tımar systems were legally defined systems, whereas the tribal system was much 
a traditional social organization. For example, millet system was shaped by the legal 
space of Non-Muslims (Zımmi) drawn by Islamic Law (sharia). According to this 
system, there are two millets, which are ruling Muslims (Millet-i Hakime), and ruled 
non-Muslims (Millet-i Mahkume).1 Nevertheless, millet system cannot be considered 
as purely religious, since such a social organization that was based on a belief system 
was at the same time an ethnic organization. On the other hand, tımar system was a 
fundamental economic organization of the classical period of the Ottoman Empire. It 
was the main source of the Ottoman military and finance. Besides, it was a social 
                                                 
1Bilal Eryilmaz, Osmanlı Devleti'nde Millet Sistemi. (İstanbul: Ağaç, 1992), p. 13. According to this 
system Armenians, Jewish and Orthodox Greeks were recognized as different millets; however we are 
not sure about the positions of some other groups like Alevi Turcomans, Yezidi Kurds, Durzi Arabs 
and Assyrians. Alevis, Yezidis and Durzis were most probably seen as heretics than different sects or 
religions. So even if the state was not so negatively treated them, except for the Alevis after fifteenth 
century, the social pressure on them was much influential than political pressure of the state.   
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organization, which organized the society based on the relationship between labor, 
and land, which defines the productive capacity. Because of these factors millet and 
tımar systems have drawn historians’ attention more. However, if it is the Ottoman 
tribe the point at issue, historians mainly reflect a reductionist tendency in their 
approach to the issue.2 Tribes are almost always considered as identical to nomads, 
who are seen as deviant and non-stop problem-creating entities. Tribal system was 
not a de jure defined system it was rather a traditional social system formed by 
relation of blood. Because of that, historians almost always excluded tribal system 
from social structure of the Empire and analyzed it separately. However, the role of 
the tribes both in the formation of the state and in its transformation can hardly be 
ignored.  
 
Figure III-1: Tribes in the Ottoman Social Structure 
 
 
                                                 
2 The same approach cannot be claimed for pre Ottoman tribes, which often seen as the nomads who 
created a great empire.  
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III.2 An Ideal Type of Ottoman Tribal Organization 
Tribal system was an optional system in the Ottoman social structure. Tribal 
ties usually dissolved more in the cities compared to the countryside. And tribal 
system was much widespread in Muslim communities than non-Muslims. Lastly, it 
was seen much in eastern regions than western regions of the Empire.  
As we mentioned before the analysis of structural organization of tribal system 
is no less problematic than the definition of banditry. Kinship organizations, in fact, 
are quite systematic genealogical trees. The terminology used by tribes to represents 
their genealogy is constructed according to the generations.3 Ziya Gökalp details the 
structure of the Ottoman tribes as in the following table.  
 
Table III-1: The lineage system of the Ottoman tribes4 
 
Turks Arabs Kurds French 
Kavim Kavim Kavim Ethnie 
Uruk (Cil) ─ ─ ─ 
İl  Şa'b Bend Peuplade 
Kol Kabile Kabile Confederation 
Boy Amâre Amâre Tribu 
Bölük Batın  Obe Phratrie 
Tire (Fahz) Semiye Ber Clan 
Yarım Tire (Fasile) Tâli Semiye ─ Sous Clan 
Soy Asabe Ezbet Agnat 
─ ─ Malbati ─ 
Ocak Ehl Mal Famille Agnatique 
Akev Ayal Khani Ménage 
 
Even though the above complex terminology was used to describe tribes, we 
cannot see the same complexity in the Ayntab court records. From the above list the 
                                                 
3 One of the practical reasons behind that terminological differentiation is the application of tribal 
laws. The tribal sanctions were rearranged according to the degree of kinship. Ziya Gökalp gives some 
examples of how punishment for the blood feud changes according that structure. Kürt Aşiretleri 
Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler. p. 22.  
4 For the structure of the Arabic and Turkish tribes see pp.19-21. He does not give a list for structure 
of Kurdish tribes however he talks about them in details from his explanations we draw a list ford 
Kurdish tribes. 24-34.  
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terms İl, Boy, Kabile, Ehl and Ayal are only look familiar after reading the court 
records. In the records, all of these terminologies reduced to only six terms: ethnicity 
(it means kavim but I did not come across this term in the documents), aşiret, 
cemaat, oymak, ehl and ayal. However, the problems occur not just because of such 
reductionism, but also the meanings of terms are blurred in records because the terms 
were often served different purposes. Therefore, depicting the structures of the 
Ottoman tribes becomes difficult. Subsequently, this difficulty leads to a 
disagreement among historians. According to Cengiz Orhonlu the tribal system was 
formed by the hierarchy of boy (aşiret), oymak (Cemaât), oba (mahalle).5 The model 
of Faruk Sümer was a little bit broader than that of Orhonlu: el (il, budun, Ulus), Boy 
(kabile), oba (cemaat) and aile. These two historians use the oba differently. 
Moreover, to Sümer ‘oymak’ was the can generally be used for ‘boy’ and its 
subdivisions.6 Yusuf Halaçoğlu describes the same hierarchy as il (ulus), boy 
(kabile), aşiret, cemaat, oymak, mahalle, and oba (aile).7  Mustafa Öztürk is another 
historian who depicts the hierarchical structure of tribes. To him the Ottoman tribal 
hierarchical system can be depicted subsequently as taife, oymak and cemaat 
(sometimes last two terms were used interchangeably).8 Finally, according to Cevdet 
Türkay all of the terms like boy, oymak, aşiret and cemaat were often used 
interchangeably in the Ottoman documents.9 How such diversity can be possible? 
Interestingly, the hierarchical system that each one of these historians offers can not 
be rejected at all. There are several reasons behind this diversity. First, 
unstandardized language of the Ottoman official documents makes the terms 
                                                 
5 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskânı, p.14. 
6 Faruk Sümer. Sümer, Faruk. Oğuzlar (Türkmenler): Tarihleri-Boy Teşkilatı-Destanları. (İstanbul: 
Türk Dünyası Arağtırmaları Vakfı, 1992), p. 163. 
7 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin 
Yerleştirilmesi, p. 16. 
8 Mustafa Öztürk, 16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar, p. XIII. 
9 Cevdet Türkay, Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar. (İstanbul: İşaret, 2001), p.17. 
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ambiguous. Secondly, historians could have misunderstood some of the terms or 
unsuccessfully mixing Turkish terminology with Arabic. Finally, historians could 
have insufficiently compared the actual tribal structure with their hierarchical 
models. 
The model of tribal lineage that I have drawn based on the court records is as 
follows: ethno-lingual groups, Aşiret, Cemaat, Oymak, and aile. However, such a 
claim is not easy at all, since the interchangeable usage of those terms makes it 
complex. The figure 2 shows an ideal lineage system that can be claimed for the 
Ottoman tribes. And the concrete application of this model can be seen in the table of 
Appendix I/A. Nevertheless, all of the terms used in this figure are needed to be 
discussed in detail. 
Figure III-2: The Lineage System of the Ottoman Tribes 
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III.3 The Problems of Disclosing the Ottoman Tribal System 
 
The Ottoman society can be mainly divided into two main entities: Muslims 
(majority) and non-Muslims (minority). Muslims, regardless of their ethnic or 
physical differences were accepted as Ümmet in Islam. That is to say, in theory there 
must not be any differences between them. As a matter of fact, different ethnic 
identities in the Ottoman Islamic society did not create problems for the state. Nor 
was the state hostile to any ethnic group for the sake of one another. In the cadastral 
records or other official documents they were just recorded as Muslims. Differences 
only emphasized with stereotypic attitudes like ‘Etrak-ı bi idrak, Ekrad-ı bi insaf’ 
(unintelligent Turks, cruel Kurds). Then, how can one interpret the terms like 
‘Turcoman’, ‘Arab’, and ‘Kurd’ that were often used in the court records? Are they 
actual ethnic identities or mean something else? 
In a tribal system the ethnic and lingual differences automatically appear, 
because tribes’ members as a part of their genealogical roots accept such 
differences.10 They could even trace their genealogy back to the formation of their 
ethnic identity. It was not so uncommon to see someone claiming to be descending 
from one certain son of Noah. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, claims that the ethnic terms used in 
the Ottoman documents do not often mean an actual ethnic identity.11 No one can 
reject that ethnic terms were not always used for the actual ethnic identities however, 
no one can also reject that the Ottoman bureaucrats almost always used them 
correctly. There are several serious fallacies in Halaçoğlu’s analysis. The first 
methodological fallacy is about not using statistical methods. It is a rule if, let us say, 
the ninety-nine percent of documents say the same thing about an issue, one cannot 
                                                 
10 Tribesmen claim that they were descended form an apical ancestor. They rationalize the differences 
no matter whether this figure is true or not.  
11 Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme.” (Belleten LX (227): 139-146; 1996), p. 140. 
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use the remaining one percent as the basis for generalization, instead the deviancy 
should be questioned.12 It is true that one can see such terms as “Ekrad-ı Türkmanan” 
(Turcoman Kurds) or “Türkman-ı Ekrad” (Kurdish Turcomans)13 in the Ottoman 
records. However, in order to support his ideas, Hallaçoğlu exaggerates the 
frequency of such usages. As a matter of fact, one does not come across such terms 
in the Ottoman records as often as he claims. It is quite normal to reject such dual 
identities. If one accepts that these kinship groups traced their lineages according to a 
patriarchal culture, there must be only one ethnic identity of which they had 
descended from male side. Otherwise, they must be accepted as unilineal societies.  
There might be such a thing. Or maybe the clerk recorded them wrongly. And many 
other possibilities can be found. But Halaçoğlu appears to have not questıoned such 
possibilities.  
The second fallacy is that, he does not accept that those groups could be mixed 
or assimilated by the other ethnic group. As a matter of fact, even though sub-tribes 
can be thought as homogeneous (due to being close societies) the same thing cannot 
be claimed for bigger groups. From the bottom to upper ranks of the tribal system the 
heterogeneity increased. Halaçoğlu claims that since the Kılıçlı Ekradı (Kurdish 
Kılıçlı) tribe was recorded among Türkman-ı Haleb (Turcomans of Aleppo) Kılıçlı 
must be Turcoman.14 How can one be sure that all the groups recorded under 
Türkman-ı Haleb were really Turcoman? It is a big contradiction in Halaçoğlu’s 
thesis that ethnic terms used in the records “most of times have connotations that 
                                                 
12 I do not want to ignore the importance of the deviant information. I do not want to glorify statistical 
methods either. The thing that I am against is ignoring what majority of documents says and making 
generalizations based on deviant documents, like what Halaçoğlu does. 
13 Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme.” p. 143. 
14 Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme.” p. 144. 
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differ from their actual meaning.”15 His thesis is like that: both ‘A’ and ‘B’ is 
problematic. ‘A’ is problematic since ‘A’ is not ‘A’ but ‘B’. It is quite controversial 
to prove one problematic thing with another in same quality.  However, the Kılıçlı 
tribe was not only dwelling among Türkman-ı Haleb, as mentioned in previous 
chapter, an important part of the tribe were living in Maraş and they were resettled in 
Menbiç among the Turcoman İlbeyli tribe in 1706. If one sees the Kılıçlı living 
amongst the İlbeyli in the documents without realizing this settlement policy then 
s/he can conclude that the Kılıçlı was either a sub-tribe of İlbeyli and/or a Turcoman 
tribe. As mentioned in the previous chapter the tribes that escaped from the places of 
resettlement were looking for shelter among other tribes.  
As a matter of fact, the problem of their identity is not a primary concern of this 
thesis. The difficulty is not only related to defining their ethnic identity, but there is 
also a common problem in determining the lineage system of a tribe. If looked at the 
table in the Appendix I/A, one can see that the İlbeyli is a Turcoman tribe but we do 
not know whether cemaat of Karataşlı, which was recorded in the court records as 
the sub-tribe of the İlbeyli, was a Turcoman tribe or not. Most probably it was a 
Turcoman tribe16 but we cannot claim that just because of such records “İlbeyli 
Türkmanı taifesinden Karataşlı cemaati” (the Cemaat of Karataşlı of the Turcoman 
İlbeyli). Here the Turcoman was only represents the İlbeyli. We cannot actually be 
sure whether that cemaat was really descended from the İlbeyli tribe or another tribe.  
Why we cannot be sure about the lineage system of a tribe? The demographic 
movements of tribes are one of the reasons behind this. Like other sections of the 
society, tribes were also dynamic groups, and because of economic, social and 
political reasons they could leave their settlements and mixed with other tribes. 
                                                 
15 Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme.” p. 139. 
16 Türkay has recorded this tribe as a Turcoman tribe Türkay, Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar. p. 417. 
 91   
Another reason is related to their economic organization shaped by the state. In all 
territories where the Ottoman state inserted its full authority, the society was 
organized into units according to an estimated surplus that each unit was expected to 
produce. The tribes were also organized more or less in same way. But it was never 
an easy task to organize those groups like the Rışvan and the Reşi tribes, which can 
be considered as semi-political social structures. Because of that reason the state 
preferred to impose tax farming rather than tımar system on such tribes. They were 
big territorial groups rather than simple lineage systems. Even, under the Mukataa 
(tax-farming) of Yeni İl-Türkman-ı Haleb some non-Muslim people were also 
recorded.17 On the other hand, when one examines the subgroups of the Rışvan tribe, 
s/he can see that some of them were Kurds some others were Turcomans or might be 
Arabs. Similarly, some other groups of tribes were organized as hass, like Türkman-ı 
Haleb, Yeni İl Türkmanı, İfraz-ı Zulkadriyye, and Kilis Ekradı. All of those groups 
were constituted by groups of tribes, which might not be in the same genealogical 
structure. That is to say, these groups were not tribes but kinds of tribal 
confederations. For example, Türkman-ı Haleb together with Yeni İl Türkmanı were 
constituted the hass of waqfs (pious foundation) of the mother of the sultan.18 
Another group, Kilis Ekradı, was also depended on the same waqf of the mother of 
the Sultan. In the period under review an important change occurred. The Şekaki 
tribe from Diyarbekir region migrated amongst the Rışvan and the Okçu İzzeddinli 
                                                 
17 The voyvoda of this mukataa applied to the court and caımed that the defendant non-Muslims were 
the peasants of his mukataa. Those defendants refuted his claims, for they had been living in the city 
for a long time. ACR 56, p. 53 (October, 1705). This case shows that the non-muslims were also could 
be economically in the same system with tribes.    
18 At the beginning of the seventeenth century Yeni İl and Türkman-ı Haleb annexed to the income of 
the mother of the sultan. At first the mother of the Süleyman the lawgiver enjoyed the revenue of Yeni 
İl. Then it was used by the waqf founded by the mother of the Murad III, known Nurbânu. Faruk 
Sümer, “XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irakta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumi Bir Bakış.” 
(İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakiltesi Mecmuası, 509-522; İstanbul: 1952), p. 517.  A court record 
dated 1692 mentions that the tribes of Türkman-ı Haleb had been giving their taxes for approximately 
a hundred. ACR 41, p. 24.  
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tribes, who were living the region in question. 19 The Şekakis in time became a part of 
the Kurds of Kilis. Another example the Turcoman Tacirli tribe was recorded under 
İfraz-ı Zulkadriyye in 1707.20   But in reality they had escaped from Rakka and in 
1730 dispersed among the Beydilli tribe in Karaman region, the Milli-i Kebir-i Tavan 
around Diyarbekir and Mardin, Kilis Ekradı in Kilis region and some other tribes in 
Kars, Erzurum and Çıldır.21 
Another dimension of the issue is about the separation of the tribes. Organizing 
both nomadic and resident groups under the same economic unit was not an easy task 
at all. The government could organize tribes according to the lands they cultivate. 
This is the basis of the tımar system. Think of such big tribes like the Rışvan that 
contain both nomadic tribes and resident tribes, how could it be possible to organize 
all of sub-tribes in the same economic organization? One option might be forming 
autonomous economic organizations, which is mukataa (tax-farming) system. It is to 
say, the state only appropriates a determined amount of tax. On the Other hand, the 
nomadic fractions and residents could be organized differently. According to Türkay, 
the Baziki was a Kurdish tribe and a sub-tribe of the Rışvan.22 In general, the court 
records correct him but in two documents this tribe was called a tribe of nomadic 
Turcoman (Konar-göçer Türkmanından).23 If we accept what Türkay tells us then we 
can conclude that a nomadic group of the Baziki tribe was counted in the economic 
organization of nomadic Turcomans. If he is wrong, then the mentioned tribe might 
be a Turcoman tribe registered under the economic organization of the Rışvan. I 
                                                 
19 In this period this tribe migrated two times. In the first migration they went around Aleppo in 1703. 
ACR 53, p. 60. In the second wave they settled on the border of the territories of the Rışvan and the 
Okçu İzzettinli. ACR 63, p. 22 (May 26, 1711).  
20 Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi. 
p. 50. 
21 Murat Çelikdemir, “Osmanli Devletinin Rakka İskan Politikasında Önemli bir Kaynak: Mühime 
Defterleri.” (Birinci Ortadoğu Semineri: Kavramlar Kaynaklar ve Metodoloji, ed. Mustafa Öztürk et 
al. Elazığ: Fırat Ünivesritesi Orta-doğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 353-4. 
22 Türkay, Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar. p. 212. 
23 ACR 79, p. 551; ACR 81, p. 4. 
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mentioned the first possibility since economic organization of Rışvan was not a 
single one. In the period under review there were both hass and mukataa of Rışvan.24 
It is for sure, that the clerks could sometimes write wrongly. A record dated 
January 1725 talks about two bandits, of them Arslan was a Kurd and Firuz Bey was 
a Turcoman.25 However another record, dated February 1725, talking about the same 
bandits tells us that both of them were Kurds from Ruha.26 Unfortunately, there is no 
other record mentioning the same bandits, therefore one of them must be wrong. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, after the operation of 1714 against Kılıçlı, a boy 
from Kılıçlı was sold as slave. In this document the plaintiff says that “A janissary 
brought a boy from the Turcoman Kılıçlı (Kılıçlı Türkmanı) to the Bazaar of Aleppo 
claiming he was a slave...”27 If approached the case from Halaçoğlu’s perspective, 
one can conclude that the title ‘Turcoman’ does not refer to an actual ethnic identity 
but the nomadic structure of the tribe. This is the last thing a historian can claim. 
Instead, we can claim that the plaintiff did not know the ethnic identity of Kılıçlı, 
since in all other documents we analyzed, it was recorded as Kurdish tribe. 
Moreover, I do not think that what the plaintiff said was wrong. If we look at the 
document ACR 65, p. 216 in Appendix IV, which talks about the same event, we will 
see that, in the beginning of the record it is mentioned that the document contains the 
list of the women and children captives from the Kılıçlı tribe. Herewith some of 
names taken from the list of the document: Tohtemür Meryem Bint Hamza, Bektaşlı 
Selur Bint Kara Mehmed, El Halub Arabından Safiye Bint Çerkes, Kılıçlı Besey Bint 
Ali, Koyunoğlu taifesinden Yusuf bin Mehmed, Elciden Musa Kızı Güllü, Dokuz 
taifesinden Elif and so on. The names written in italic are the names of tribes of the 
                                                 
24 For the mukataa of Rışvan see ACR 77, p. 206; and for the hass of Rışvan see ACR 78, p. 13. 
25 ACR 76, p. 110. 
26 ACR 76, p. 90. 
27 ACR 65, p. 206. 
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captives. Can this legitimize historians’ claim that all of those tribes were sub tribes 
of Kılıçlı tribe or all of them were Kurds? Highly unlikely. We learn from some other 
records that the military campaign of 1714 was launched not only against the Kılıçlı 
but also against the Doğanlı, the Koyunoğulları, the Elci, the Tacirli and the 
Bektaşlı.28 But why the Kılıçlı was emphasized so much in the document? This is 
most probably because the Kılıçlı was the most notorious tribe amongst the other 
tribes. As it is seen, in order to answer such a question we have to look at as many 
different documents as possible. This is why I question the reliability of the records 
and suggest comparing the documents from the court records with each other.  
The last point about Halaçoğlu’s perspective is that he sometimes misleads 
with inaccurate examples. For example, he claims that the Turcoman İzzeddinli and 
the Kurdish Okçu İzeddinli were the same tribes and for him the main reason behind 
that is the appointment of the İzzeddin Bey as the governor of Ekrad Sancağı 
(Sancak of Kurds).29 Professor Mustafa Öztürk, who claims to descend from Okçu 
İzeddinli tribe, points out exactly the same thing what Halaçoğlu mentions.30 But in 
the following pages of his study he claims differently about the roots of this tribe.31 
Indeed, he tries to assume how this tribe was named Okçu İzeddinli. Therefore, his 
efforts can be respected. However, from the name archer (okçu) construction a link 
with Scythian is too much assertive. Among such works on onomastic İlhan Şahin’s 
article “Osmanlı Devrinde Konar-Göçer Aşiretlerin İsim Almalarına Dâir Bâzı 
                                                 
28 ACR 65, pp. 225, 227, 228 (2 records), 229.   
29 Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrâk, Kürd-Ekrâd Kelimeleri Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme.” pp. 142-3. 
30 Öztürk, 16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar. p. 17. 
31 Öztürk talks about some different possibilities to explain the word İzeddinli in the name of the tribe 
but he doe not mention that İzzedin Bey named that tribe (pp. 21-2). He goes further and this time he 
explains the root from the Okçu (Archer). According to him this name Okçu refers to their culturally 
descendant from Scythian since those people were developed in arching. Öztürk, 16. Yüzyılda Kilis 
Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar. p. 42. 
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Mülâhazalar” can be a good reference.32 In this work Şahin points out some factors, 
which play a role in the naming process of the Ottoman tribes. The name of a 
geographic place or a notable name could be used as the name of tribe. Moreover, 
their economic activities, or a social phenomenon, or the category of tax paying 
could be the name of those tribes. He gives many interesting examples. But not every 
name of tribes was Turkish name; so determining their meanings can be 
controversial. In such an analysis the knowledge of Arabic and Kurdish can partly 
solve the problem to some extent. I would like to mention some clues, which can 
help a researcher to define their ethnic roots. The common suffixes used in the name 
of Turcoman tribes are ‘-lı’ (-li, -lu, -lü) that means ‘from’. Another suffix is ‘-lar’ (-
ler) like the suffix ‘–s’ (plural) in English is not so widespread as ‘-li’ but it can 
explain something. For the Arabs prefix ‘Al-’ (el- in the Turkish pronunciation) 
means ‘the’ in English. Another clue is that in the names of Arabic tribes the word 
‘beni’ (derived from Arabic word ‘ibn’) means ‘sons’.  For the Kurdish tribes clues 
can be the suffixes ‘-i’ that means ‘from’ and ‘-an’ is the counterpart of the suffix ‘-
s’ (plural) in English. These types of clues can be beneficial for basic analysis but 
can also mislead the researcher. For example ‘–lı’ in the name of the Cerikanlı is a 
Turkish suffix (from) however ‘–an’ is a Kurdish suffix (plural suffix ‘-s’). 
Moreover, many recorded names derived from the dominant language-Turkish. For 
example though the Okçu İzeddinli was a Kurdish tribe its name was a good example 
of influence of Turkish.33  
                                                 
32 İlhan Şahin, “Osmanlı Devrinde Konar-Göçer Aşiretlerin İsim Almalarına Dâir Bâzı Mülâhazalar” 
Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, XIII, 1987, pp. 195-208. 
33 In court records this tribe was always recorded as a Kurdish tribe. Moreover, the letter sent by the 
leader of this tribe to the Turkish government in 1922 obviously mention about the identitiy of this 
tribe. See M. Fahrettin Kırzıoğlu, Dağıstan-Aras-Dicle-Altay ve Türkistan Türk Boylarından Kürtler. 
(Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1984), pp: 35-51. 
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Overall, it will be wrong to simply claim that those ethnic identities do not 
mean the actual ones. It is known that in the Ottoman official documents such ethnic 
identities of Muslim subjects were almost identical with tribal system. That is to say, 
it was not that frequent where people were recorded with their ethnic identity. The 
first thing one must question in this case is to know the reason behind the state’s 
recording of ethnic identities of tribes. One reason can be sociopolitical organization 
of tribes. It’s well known that some Kurdish tribes were autonomous. Such tribes 
could apply the tribal law to their subjects but had to pay taxes and give soldiers to 
the state. According to Orhonlu, the Rışvan tribe was one of the good example of 
having its own rules and regulations.34 Such tribes were not unique case in that sense; 
in fact almost all other tribes had their own rules and regulations. Indeed those ‘laws’ 
were not written nor were necessarily religious rules, but unwritten customs. Their 
ethnic identities were most probably the symbolic representations of such laws.35 
Otherwise, there is no need to register the group of the Kılıçlı, which became part of 
Turcoman of Aleppo, still Kurdish. 
On the other hand, economic organization of tribes also plays an important role 
on ethnic identities. Why did the Ottoman state records someone as ‘the Turcomans 
of Aleppo’ but not, let say, the Arabs of Aleppo. Indeed, the Ottoman tribes were 
more open communities than one can estimate. Pervasiveness of in-group marriage 
in such tribes can be shown as the evidence of their being close communities but it 
was quite common among tribes or peasantry, migrating and looking for shelter 
                                                 
34 According to Orhonlu “in some organizations like the Rışvan the boybeyis (tribal leaders) were not 
chosen by the government; but by Kethüdas (a man who was a mediator between the state and 
members of tribe), ihtyars (old men) and other arbiters who constitutes the tribal aristocracy.” 
Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskânı. p. 14. 
35 W. R. Hay mentions this point: “‘I am a tribesman’ is the equivalent of ‘civis Romanus 
sum.’…even though he is a member of no recognized tribe, will refer to himself as a tribesman, by 
which he means that he recognizes tribal law and customs and expects other to treat him as enjoying 
tribal rights.” Hay, W. R. Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920. 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1921), p 65.  
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among other tribes. Then, if there was still something as the ‘Turcomans of Aleppo’ 
then there must be a cultural and/or political dominance of Turcomans in that 
economic organization. Similarly the Reşi and Rışvan were registered as Kurds but 
no one can claim that there were no other groups amongst them. It will be, therefore, 
not wrong to suggest that the ethnic identity represents the economic organization, 
but not tribes, which were forming them. Nevertheless, using specific identities were 
not randomly chosen or used by accident; rather it is an evidence of the dominance of 
a specific group of a specific ethnicity.  
We can conclude, from the above discussion that the problem was not only 
related to the ethnic identities, but the other ranks were also problematic. What are 
Aşiret, Cemaat and Oymak? Which group was descended from the other? That is to 
say, the meanings of these terms and their hierarchy are not an easy task to solve, 
otherwise there would not have been so many different approaches mentioned above.   
To begin with, such terms as il, el, ulus, and oba which we could not see in the 
court records must be discussed. No doubt, il, el and ulus were used before for the 
big tribal groups and/or tribal confederations. But in the court records we see them as 
just a part of the names of some tribes like İlbeyli, or Elbeyli, and Bozulus. 
According to Halaçoğlu and Sümer il and ulus are the same things. If they are right, 
then these words in the names of these tribes do not show the tribal rank, but, in fact, 
Ilbeyli was a sub-tribe of Bozulus.36 Therefore, these words can represent different 
ranks. Moreover, in the period in question the İlbeyli was in fragments. There was no 
big economic organization constituted by them in Ayntab region. Maybe they were 
                                                 
36 Tufan Gündüz, Anadolu’da Türkmen Aşiretleri: Bozulus Türkmenleri 1540-1640. (Ankara: Bilge, 
1997), p. 77. In the court records the Bozulus was written as the Bozulus Mandası. In the common 
usage, Manda means mandate, but its meaning in this context is not clear. 
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much powerful elsewhere. Somehow, these terms were not a part of the terminology 
that described the ranks in actual kinship lineage.37   
Mustafa Öztürk considers taife as a concept representing a group in the lineage 
system of the Ottoman tribes. Taife was used in the ottoman documents to emphasize 
group identities in general. You can see that taife-i Türkman (Turcomans), taife-i 
İlbeyli (İlbeylis), nisa taifesi38 (women) and levendat taifesi (levends) and so on. That 
is to say taife is not a term used specifically for kinship groups.   
  Aşiret is the actual term, which was used to signify the term ‘tribe’. The 
leadership is very important in this social organization. The leader of a tribe would 
be called boybeyi, mir or sheik. Şeyh (Sheik) was the title of the leaders of Arabic 
tribes.39 Sheik Kelib was one of the important Arabic bandit leaders of this period. 
On the other hand, the common name for leadership was called boybeyi. This term 
was sometimes used as ‘Aşair ve kabail boybeyleri’ (leaders of Aşirets and Kabiles). 
Kabile was almost always used synonymously with the term tribe. The term used for 
leadership -boybeyi- shows that at the same time boy also means a tribe. In that 
sense, Halaçoğlu and Orhonlu cogently used boy and aşiret synonymous. Similarly, 
Sümer also correctly uses kabile and boy synonymously.  
What is mir? This term was used for a special kind of tribe, namely mir aşireti. 
According to Orhan Kılıç some big tribes were organized as such. Their own tribal 
leaders called mir-i aşiret enjoyed the economic and politic power of these tribes. 
The leader had the right to collect raiyyet rüsumu (some taxes levied on peasants) 
and curüm (taxes of criminal events), and these taxes were fully possessed by the 
tribal leader. These privileges passed to their sons or other relatives. If there were no 
                                                 
37 Gündüz points out the possibility that Bozulus was a name that the Ottomans gave to the tribes that 
had remained after the collapse of the Akkoyunlus. Gündüz, Anadolu’da Türkmen Aşiretleri. pp. 43-4. 
38 It is interesting; though there is such a usage as nisa taifesi in the court records, I could not see any 
document saying erkek taifesi or adam taifesi (men).  
39 Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskânı. p. 14. 
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relatives to take the possessions, these privileges were not given to anybody else.  In 
return, the tribal leaders had to join the ottoman army on demand. They could not 
enjoy full autonomy (tabl u alem sahibi değiller).40 A Mir-aşiret can be considered 
as chiefdom. Their autonomy was not as much as that of principals-flag and drum 
owners. In the first half of the seventeenth century, there were more than 400 
chiefdoms in the Empire. And some of them were given the status of sancak.41 In the 
sixteen century one of the sancak-chiefdoms was based in Kilis and was called Ekrad 
Sancağı led by İzzeddin Bey.42 In the period under review, the İlbeyli, the Rışvan, the 
Reşi, and the Karalı tribes were recorded as mir-aşiretlik.  
The term ‘aşiret’ was usually used for an actual group in a kinship system as 
well as for economic organizations and tribal confederations, which did not need to 
be kinship groups. The Bozulus, as mentioned before, was mainly a name of a top 
identity, which possibly had different lineage systems in it. The Kılıçbeyli was a tribe 
(aşiret), and a sub-group of the Bozkoyunlu who were also recorded as a tribe. Each 
step in the lineage system needs to be unique. This is not because these upper groups 
had no titles but because of the existence of reductionism in the Ottoman records. 
Such reductionism is a big obstacle for kinship studies. 
Another kin-based group was cemaat (clan). In the Ottoman documents, 
however, cemaat sometimes has an even broader usage. Cemaat could be a religious 
society, like yahudi cemaati (Jewish society). In the records sometimes this word is 
used for people who were attending religious ceremony at a specific mosque. This 
                                                 
40 Kılıç, 18. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin İdarî Taksimatı, p. 14. In the Ottoman society 
drum (tabl) and flag (alem) were two symbols of full autonomy. 
41 Kılıç, 18. Yüzyılın ilk Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti’nin İdarî Taksimatı, p. 14. 
42 Mustafa Öztürk, 16. Yüzyılda Kilis Urfa Adıyaman ve Çevresinde Cemaatler-Oymaklar. p. 18; 
Metin Akis, XVI. Yüzyılda Kilis ve Azez Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat, p. 7. After the 
oppression of Canpolatoğlu Ali the government confiscated the lands and properties of Ali Paşa. Most 
probably at that period tribes of Kilis lost their title of chiefdom and were reorganized as has called 
Ekrad-ı Kilis hassı allocated to the waqf of the mother of the sultan.  According to Griswold in the 
northern Syria there were a dozen of big tribes in which leadership passed from father to son. 
Griswold, p. 57. Most probably they were also in the status of mir-aşiretlik. 
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term was most probably used for the residents of a village or people living in the 
same district of a town. Moreover, cemaat coul also refer to a group of Janissaries.  
Each clan had a leader who was called Kethüda. According to Orhonlu, the 
kethüda of a clan was appointed by the boybeyi on whom he was socially and 
administratively dependant.43 They were an official administrator and a medium 
between the state and the clan. When the government decided to resettle clans in 
Rakka, each kethüda was responsible for taking his clan there.44 Moreover, 
sometimes a kethüda of a clan could intervene in the affairs of other clans when 
needed.45  
Oymak was a cemaat that had no subdivisions. On the one hand oymak can be 
seen as a clan, on the other hand as a sub-clan. As it is shown in the table of the 
Appendix I/A, there are many oymaks that are directly connected to an Aşiret. Maybe 
there were cemaats between them and Aşirets, but we know nothing about them, 
since the documents do not mention them. Another point is that we do not know 
anything about its leadership. The documents often mention the leadership of tribes 
and clans, aşair ve kabail boybeyleri ve cemaat kethüdaları (tribes’ leaders and 
clans’ leaders), but do not mention the leadership of oymaks.  
Lastly, in the court records the basis of the structure of the kinship organization 
was mentioned as aile or ehl u iyâl (family). Though ehl is something broader than 
ayal, these two terms were always used together. Thus, these terms were employed 
both for nuclear family and extended family.  
The hierarchical order that we have simplified so far, in fact, is much more 
complex. There are several reasons for this complexity. Firstly, the Ottoman 
                                                 
43 If kethüda could not properly administer or collect taxes properly he would be dismissed. Some of 
kethüdaness of clans of Bozulus in Ankara and Aydın was turned into venality in 1698. Orhonlu, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskânı. p.15.  
44 See Appendix I ACR 41, p. 39.  
45 In 1701 the kethüda of Tacirli was charged with resettling of Bayadlı. ACR 53, p. 225. 
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administrative and economic systems sometimes overlap with lineage systems, but 
sometimes state organization could also be something broader than the linage 
system, or divide the lineage into pieces. Small lineage systems like cemaats 
especially could be organized as independent economic systems. They could be 
organized as tımar, zeamet or hass.46 In a tribe, which was organized this way, 
subgroups were most probably the real descendents. In the united systems several 
kinship systems were organized under the same economic and administrative unit. 
The tribes that were organized as chiefdoms or principalities could appear in this 
form. For example, many different lineage systems were under the rule of 
Canpolatoğlu Hüseyin in the beginning of the seventeenth century. According to 
Griswold, his power was based in Arabic, Kurdish and Turcoman tribes.47 In such 
systems the leadership had great importance on the identity of the tribes, since the 
identity of the unit was defined by the leader. Of course, leadership was not free from 
the dominant tribe or ethnic group. Why do we say the Turcoman of Zulkadriye or 
why do we say the Mukataa of Rışvan? This is related to dominance. Lastly, nomads 
or other migratorial group, if not sent back to their lands by the government, were 
reorganized under an available unit or formed into a new unit. It is hard to talk about 
a pure nomadic or sedentary tribe. Most likely, most tribes had power over both 
(semi)nomadic and sedentary sub-tribes. In a document this point was mentioned: 
“Rışvan aşairinin konar ve göçer ve yerli ve yurtluları” (nomadic and sedentary 
tribes of the Rışvan).48 Moreover, sometimes some tribes reorganized because of 
economic policies. For example, in the beginning of 1715 the malikane organizations 
of the Boynuinceli, the Şereflü, the mahalle-i Küçük Şereflü, the Beni Huneyn (from 
                                                 
46 In a record dated 1721 it is possible to see different tribes were organized in different economic 
organizations. ACR 72A, p. 257.  
47 Griswold, Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan, p. 71. 
48 ACR 76, p. 320. In different records separately the nomadic and indigenous subgroups of this tribe 
was mentioned.  
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Kırşehir Sancak), the Bozulus tribes at Ankara Sancak, the Turcomans of Kara Bekir, 
Neferir Hacı Ahmedli, the Mamalu (from Bozok Sancak), the Dedesli and the 
Salmanlı (from Maraş Eyalet), the Geyikli, the Aybasanlu and the Çokşurucaklı tribes 
(from Bozok Sancak) were abolished and annexed to the hass of Yeni İl.49 This 
example shows that not every group within a tribe was reorganized, only some of 
them.  
The Beni Huneyn has an Arabic name. In the court records its ethnic identity 
cannot be determined. According to Cevdet Türkay it was an Arabic tribe. Türkay 
recorded it both as an aşiret (seen at Mecca, Rakka, Sivas) and a cemaat (seen at 
Kırşehir, Çorum sancaks).50 Just based on this information it can be claimed that a 
group from the Beni Huneyn tribe migrated to inner Anatolia. Moreover, we can 
follow the assimilation process of this separated group. According to Türkay the 
other name of this separated group is the Çemelü or Çemenlü Arabı (Arabs of 
Çemenlü). If one looks at the record of the Çemelü in his book, it can be seen that 
this group was recorded as yörükân.51 It is well known that yörükân means 
Turcoman.52 That is to say, this sub-group of the Beni Huneyn lost its ethnic identity 
and was integrated into Turcoman culture in time. But it is still possible its ethnic 
origin from the new name, the Yörüks of the Çemenlü Arabs. Thus, this is a good 
example of a shift within a lineage system. Most probably after the migration, this 
group began to claim an apical ancestor not among Arabs, but Turcomans.  
 
 
                                                 
49 ACR 66, p. 251. 
50 Türkay, Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar. pp. 60 and 208. 
51 Türkay, Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatlar. p. 253. 
52 According to Ahmet Refik, yörük is the synonym of Turcoman. According to him the tribes situated 
at south of the River Kızılırmak and those who were living in Syria and Iraq. However, the Turcomans 
who had living at the west of this river were called yörüks. Sümer, “XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve 
Irakta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumi Bir Bakış.” p. 520. 
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Figure III-3: Formal (Legal) Organization of Lineage Systems 
 
a) Overlapping Systems 
 
 
b) United Systems 
 
 
c) Separated Systems 
 
Besides the dual organization of tribes, the language of the documents can 
sometimes mislead the researcher too. Normally, in such lineage systems the same 
name rarely applies to both a group and its sub-groups. The logic behind this is 
similar to that of difference between the names of father and son, or those of mother 
and daughter. Otherwise, the subdivision would be meaningless. Even if the sub-
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group was known with the name of the upper group, there must be another name that 
shows the difference. For instance, all of the tribes, the Bayadlı Ceridi, the Kuşçu 
Ceridi, the Sakallı Ceridi, the Şeyhli Ceridi, the Silsüpür Ceridi and the Sof Ceridi 
were most probably the sub-groups of a big group called the Cerid. Nevertheless, 
Cevdet Türkay in his list of tribes recorded some groups under all categories-oymak, 
cemaat and aşiret. Is it true that the Ottoman clerks used these categories 
interchangeably? There is a possibility that the clerk could have recorded them 
carelessly. But, still the historian could/must correct this. In this sense, there is 
nothing wrong in historical sources; these are the mistakes of historians.      
One of the problems is related to the dual organization of the tribes. The 
historian must not forget that the Ottoman records did not have a specific aim in 
revealing tribal organization; instead the government dealt especially with the taxes 
that tribes had to pay, and the army they had to provide. That is to say, the group 
connections these records mention are more about their formal organizations, rather 
than their traditional organizations. Therefore, the connections that the table of the 
Appendix I/A shows us do not necessarily have to be the actual kinship connections. 
On the other hand, as mentioned before, the formal organization of a tribe cannot be 
thought independent from kinship organization. In the court records I have found 
nine sub-groups of the Turcoman Bozulus tribe (see the table in the Appendix I/A). 
Four groups of them were recorded as Turcoman, but the ethnic identities of others 
are not mentioned. When one compares these groups to those mentioned by Tufan 
Gündüz’s work on the Bozulus53 it can be seen that they are one-hundred percent of 
them are the same. Another example is the Rışvans. This group was recorded as a 
Kurdish tribe, but among its seventeen sub-groups only four groups were recorded as 
                                                 
53 See Tufan Gündüz, Anandolu’da Türkmen Aşiretleri.  
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Kurds, and we cannot clarify the ethnic identity of the remaining thirteen groups 
from the court records. Based on Türkay’s list we learn that two of them were 
Turcoman tribes. There are several points to be mentioned. First of all, the example 
of the Rışvan tribe shows that a group may not always share the same identity with 
its sub-groups. I do not mean by identity only an ethnic identity; similarly, a tribe 
might be sedentary whereas some of its subgroups could have been nomads. 
Secondly, as mentioned before, the Ottoman officials recorded them according to 
their dominant group or leader. So instead of trying to prove the genuine identity by 
generalizing the identity of a group over its subgroups, or vice versa, spending effort 
to understand the logic of documents will be more helpful. Finally, different kinds of 
documents must be evaluated differently. In the case of the Bozulus, we learn of its 
subgroups from the records mentioning their resettlement in Rakka; however, in the 
later case we learn its subgroups from documents mentioning their economic 
organization into the hass or mukataa of the Rışvan. Therefore, the second example 
says less about the actual kinship organization than the first one. This is why there 
are both Trucoman and Kurdish sub-groups of the Rışvan tribe. 
It is necessary to look at the language of the documents to see how it can 
mislead the historian. In general, tribes and sub-tribes were recorded as taife or with 
an ethnic identity. For example, in a record saying ‘İlbeyli taifesi’ (İlbeylis) the 
position of İlbeyli in kinship organization is not clear, like ‘İlbeyli Türkmanı’ 
(Turcoman İlbeyli). In the table (see Appendix I/A) I have recorded such cases as 
cemaat if other records say nothing about their positions, for the term cemaat is a 
more common term in the records. Does every cemaat occupy the same position in 
the lineage system? To be more precise, if you see such a phrase as ‘İlbeyli Aşireti’ 
(İlbeyli Tribe) you may think that there is a tribe with the name İlbeyli, but if you see 
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in another document the phrase ‘İlbeyli Cemaati’, what will you do? Because of such 
contradictory records, Türkay claims that the Ottomans used terms interchangeably. 
However, based on the phrase ‘İlbeyli Cemaati’ two different things might spring to 
the mind. One, ‘there was a cemaat called İlbeyli’. The other, ‘there was a tribe 
called İlbeyli and it had a cemaat’. The difference is like the difference between 
‘Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ (Republic of Turkey) and ‘Türkiye vatandaşı’ (Turkish 
citizen). Based on these two phrases it can be said that Turkey, which is a republic 
but not a citizen, has at least one citizen. For that reason the Afşar tribe can be aşiret, 
cemaat and oymak at the same time in the work of Türkay. Similar records can be 
seen on our table as well. For example, Rışvan is a tribe, but I have recorded it as 
cemaat as well. This is not because that tribe was mentioned in one document as a 
tribe, and as a clan in another. The Rışvan was one of the tribes constituting the Ulus 
tribe, and the Ulus was one of the sub-tribe of the Cihanbeyli tribe. Similarly, the 
Kılıçbeyli was one of tribes constituting the Bozkoyunlu, which was a sub-tribe of the 
Beğdilli (Beydilli). Determining aşirets and cemaats is not the primary concern of 
this study, since it is hard to find exact meanings for these categories. For this 
analysis, the relations between groups (either formal or traditional) are much more 
important than their actual position. Because of that, we treat them simply as tribes 
and sub-tribes. Indeed it would be better to define the exact positions of all tribes, but 
we may study fifteen years, as Türkay did, to prepare a more reliable list. 
The last point about language is that, since there are not punctuations in the 
sentences, the documents can lead to confusions. What must we inetrprete from the 
phrase ‘Kilis Ekradından Okçu İzzeddinli ve Tacirlü ve Kılıçlı ve Bektaşlı 
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cemaatlerinden 300 kişi...’?54 In this phrase we cannot be sure whether Kilis Ekradı 
identified all of the mentioned tribes or only the Okçu İzzeddinli.   
 
III.4 Social Organization and Banditry 
In a society groups are formed through various separating lines, which can be 
religion, ethnicity, language, geography, profession and so on. The special relation 
between the member and the group makes the individual more powerful. This is why 
the social organization is important for the action of the self. In the Ottoman society 
levends and tribes were good examples of groups who took part in banditry. 
Jenissaries was another group. In the period under review this group was a powerful 
group. They were inflentual in trade.55 But they were still an important group in 
banditry.56 That is to say, though to some extent the economic degerdation was 
important factor behind banditry, the social power of a group was no less important. 
Similarly the guilds also could be important power groups. In 1735 about 1,000 
people, weavers of Ayntab together with their children and women, attacked the 
palace of the voyvoda and rescued ten chained imprisoners and then plundered the 
properties of the voyvoda.57 Similarly some people joined around notables, 
“community owners” and killed the naib of Ayntab in 1731.58 The naib had collected 
some taxes for the warfare. But the war ended early and people began to demand 
                                                 
54 ACR 82, p. 95. 
55 In this period some peasants began to leave their lands and work for janissaries. They used to go to 
Istanbul for trade and began to not pay their taxes under the pretext of being the relatives of 
janissaries. ACR 65, p. 376. Such kinds of events were mostly interpreted as the degredation in the 
janissary corps. However, here they were important since such social networks made janissaries much 
more powerful. In the period in question in there were lots of cases about such networks. ACR 68, p.1.   
56 During the war against Iran in 1725 some hundreds jenissaries began to involve in banditry. ACR 
77, p. 264. A record, dated 1711, mentions janissaries who did not join the army against Venice. ACR 
62, 227.  
57 ACR 87, p. 207. Cited from Güzelbey and Yetkin, Gaziantep Şer’î Mahkeme Sicilleri (Cilt 81-141) 
Fasikül: 1, (Gaziantep: Gaziantep Kültür Derneği, 1970), pp. 17-8.  
58 ACR 82, p. 79. 
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their money back. Since he did not pay them back he was killed.59 The point needed 
to be mention here is that those notables had already become important power 
owners. And in the following decades throughout the eighteenth century they would 
be certain bandits. Another point is that, as the document mentions they were ‘the 
owners of communities’. For example, one of them was Debbağzade Mustafa and the 
other was Basmacı Mehmed Efendi. Here debbağ (tanner) and basmacı (dealer in 
printed fabric and cloth) obviously refer to their social organization. In the point of 
view of Hobsbawm social banditry lacks organization. However, banditry, especially 
tribal banditry, in the Ottoman case is closely related to social organization. There is 
a wide range of banditry from the personal level to the ethno-religious level. Each 
type of banditry was affected by the social organization that produced it. Therefore, 
we can talk about the different level of organization in banditry at different levels of 
the social structure. 
The relation between banditry and social structure determines the level of 
sociality of the banditry. As Anton Blok cogently says: 
In a sense, all bandits are 'social' in so far as they, like all human beings, 
are linked to other people by various ties. We cannot understand the 
behaviour of bandits without reference to other groups, classes, or 
networks with which bandits form specific configurations of 
interdependent individuals.60   
 
On the other hand, if we think of the banditry on the basis of group interactions, then 
we must accept that all bandits were anti-social at the same time. Here anti-sociality 
is not the exact opposite of sociality. That is to say, no one can claim that there is a 
negative correlation between sociality and anti-sociality. Therefore, the following 
figure shows not an increase in the social banditry, but mentions the possibility of 
                                                 
59 ACR 82, p. 230. 
60 Anton Blok, “The Peasant and the Brigand,” p. 498. 
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experiencing social banditry considering combinations of different motivators and 
social organization. 
 
Figure III-4: The Role of Social Structure on the Character of Banditry 
 
 
Without considering different motivators, the character of banditry cannot be 
fully grasped. A social scientist can claim that there are infinite variables playing role 
in social phenomena. Because of that, looking for the actual reason behind a social 
phenomenon cannot be meaningful every time, especially in historical research. 
However, we grouped the possible causes into three groups, which are economical 
factors, social factors and political factors. It is certain that, a person suffering from 
poverty is expected to behave differently than another person whose family is 
massacred. The problem here is that these three factors, in general, are mutually 
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interdependent. It is not so uncommon to see social degradation and/or political 
conflicts following economic depression.  
The second important factor behind banditry is social organization. The logic 
behind the relation between social organization and banditry can be thought of as 
twofold. Firstly, social organization is the area where the identity of self is formed. 
The stronger the tie of individuals to their groups, the more altruistic the behavior of 
the self. Even the self can sacrifice itself for the sake of its group. Secondly, the size 
of the group the bandit devoted herself/himself determines the level of sociality of 
his/her action. Think of a bandit stealing merely to fill his/her stomach, or a 
tribesman who attacks his enemy tribe for revenge, or a monk who targets ‘infidel’ 
Muslims for the sake of his ‘faithful’ brothers. By the way, it must not be 
misunderstood; all the groups we have been talking about are theoretically 
unprivileged groups, not dominant groups. 
Even though we draw a perfect correlation between motivator, -the level of 
banditry, and social and political banditry, in reality it was much more complex. This 
figure is not drawn based on quantitative data. The purpose of this figure is to 
develop a multi- dimensional approach to banditry. That is to say, it shows the 
possible reaction of people to different motivators under different conditions. 
Hobsbawm talks about three forms of social banditry: ‘the noble robber’, ‘the 
primitive resistance fighter or guerilla unit (haiduks)’ and the ‘terror bringing 
avenger’.61  According to him there are mainly two types of groups, which are more 
likely to be involve in banditry. The first group is the surplus population, which was 
produced by the limits of the rural economy or environment. The second one is the 
marginal people who could not integrate into rural society.62 As a matter of fact, one 
                                                 
61 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 15. 
62 Hobsbawm, Bandits. pp. 25-7. 
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cannot talk about social banditry, since the sociality of banditry is not something 
static, but can be changed conjecturally, and was mainly determined by social 
organization and motivators. That is to say, the combination of social structure and 
different kinds of motivators could produce a much richer typology. On the other 
hand, it is true that the economic limits of rural areas produce banditry. To a great 
extent the levend banditry is a good example of this kind.63 Levends can also be seen 
as marginals,64 but they were one of the least social bandit groups. However, as we 
see in the first chapter, levend banditry, in fact, was just a small part of Ottoman 
history. As a matter of fact, neither economic reasons nor marginality can explain 
tribal banditry. In tribal banditry social cohesion can be an important factor behind 
banditry. Similarly, social and political factors can be as important as economical 
factors.  
If we place the three types of Hobsbawm’s social bandits in the figure above, 
then the insufficiency in the Hobsbam’s model can be clearly seen. He sees Robin 
Hood as a noble robber. The main motivator behind his banditry is political rather 
than economical. In politically motivated banditries the action of the individual can 
only be meaningful when s/he gains public support. That is to say, s/he can either 
gather a group of people who think alike or s/he must increase the level of his/her 
banditry to an upper level. This is exactly what Robin Hood did. I do not know much 
about the social structure of the society he lived in, but at least he could get support 
from the peasants of the region by convincing them his movement was the right one 
for them. Unlike Robin Hood, haiduks were a part of Ottoman culture until its last 
century. According to Hobsbawm “their motives for going into the mountains were 
mainly economic, but the technical term for becoming a haiduk was ‘to rebel’, and 
                                                 
63 As mentioned before, not all but an important quantity of levends can be seen as vagrants.  
64 According to Hobsbawm, “among such marginals, soldiers, deserters and ex-servicemen played a 
significant role.” Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 27. Such a definition is quite suitable for levend banditry.  
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haiduk was by definition an insurrectionary.”65 It may be true that the economy was 
the main motivator, but the main factor that made them be seen as rebels is related to 
the bandit’s reference group, that is, the level of banditry. They were not only highly 
social bandits but they were at the same time highly political. Richard W. Slatta 
emphasizes the political side of haiduks: 
I believe, however, the term ‘guerrilla-bandit’ is clearer than Hobsbawm's 
rather murky depiction of the haiduk. Unless one's native language is 
Turkish or Magyar, the term haiduk evokes little useful imagery. The term 
guerrilla locates such bandits in the irregular warfare of Spanish-
American independence and civil wars.66  
 
Slatta has a tendency to separate political banditry from social banditry. To 
him, “Unlike social bandits, political bandits show clear partisan (rather than class) 
leanings.”67 A similar tendency can be seen in Blok as well: 
The more banditry is politically oriented and evolves into what Italian 
scholars have called brigantaggio politico, the more likely it is that it will 
assume 'anti-social' features when we take this term in the sense as 
understood by Hobsbawm, that is, anti-peasant. A surprisingly large 
number of the bandits mentioned by Hobsbawm were anti-peasant during 
most of their careers, which they typically initiated by righting personal 
wrongs.68 
 
However, these two features of banditry cannot be separated. Blok cogently talks 
about bandits’ anti-social character. Such anti-sociality is also caused by social 
organization. The social bandits of one group can be anti-social for another group. 
For that reason, the peasantry cannot be a good point of reference when talking about 
the sociality of banditry. Hobsbawm talks about “a certain Doncho Vatach, who 
flourished in the 1840s, only persecuted Turkish evildoers, helped the Bulgarian poor 
and distributed money.”69 It is obvious that he could have never been a hero for a 
Turkish peasant. Another similar example, he gives, is Schinderhannes who was 
                                                 
65 Hobsbawm, Bandits. p. 64. 
66 Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History,” p. 148. 
67 Slatta, “Bandits and Rural Social History,” p. 148. 
68 Blok, “The Pasant and the Brigand,” p. 499. 
69 Hobsbawm, Bandits, p. 63. 
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active in the Rhineland in the late 1790s. “…he robbed only Jews, that is, dealers and 
moneylenders…”70 Though we accept that he robbed only dealers and moneylenders, 
this is not sufficient explanation for his robbing only Jews. His reference group must 
be different. I do not know his religion but perhaps we wouldn’t be wrong by 
thinking that his religion (most probably something different than Judaism) played an 
important role in his selectiveness? And I wonder whether Jewish peasants saw him 
as a hero or not.  
In the Ottoman Empire religion, unlike ethnicity, could always be an important 
factor behind banditry. But the nineteenth century had a special importance for 
banditry. The nationalist movements melded ordinary banditry into the separatist 
movements.  Arabic tribal banditry was also affected by these movements. In the 
twentieth century, other Muslim tribes, which had been known for their banditry for 
a long time, became militia bands during World War I and the War of Independence 
(1919-22) against the occupying forces.  
The last type of social banditry of Hobsbawm, ‘avenger’, seems to be bandit 
groups, which are motivated by social factors rather than by the other two factors. No 
matter what the actual reason that sent them to mountains was, revenge is a part of 
bandit politics. It is hard for a bandit to survive on his own, so s/he must build 
networks with different groups. In society ordinary people had to choose between 
one of two mutually exclusive groups-bandits and others. So in any fault s/he can be 
punished by the anti-bandit group or by the bandit group. As a matter of fact such 
relations were not so clear. As we shall see later on, the bandits could punish 
someone because of betrayal and/or being on the side of ‘the enemy’. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
70 Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p. 20. 
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such an action is more rational than just killing someone due to economic reasons, 
since the target is not an ordinary one, but the ‘bad’ one.  
 
III.4.1.1 Personal Banditry 
With personal level banditry we mean the small groups who could attack any 
body when the occasion arose. Even though such bandits seem more selfish, they 
cannot be analyzed unless we consider their relations with social groups. In the 
period under review, most of that kind of banditry was also done by tribesmen. It is 
hard to say that those bandits got involve in banditry in the name of their tribes, but, 
no doubt, they were encouraged by their tribes. Tribes were not mere economic or 
kinship organizations, they had serious social power. That power was the main 
encouraging factor for the self to take part in banditry. Similarly levends and 
janissaries had greater tendencies toward banditry than others. On the contrary, 
though there was a non-Muslim population in the Ayntab region, we cannot see any 
non-Muslim who took part in banditry. Two reasons could be proposed for that. 
Firstly, other than their prosperous position, since they were non-tribal communities, 
they had no serious social power in this period, when the tribe was the main source 
of the power in that region. Furthermore, Yezidi Kurds, ‘a heretical’, were organized 
into tribes, and therefore took part in banditry. In 1709 some 500-600 armed men 
from the Yezidis and the Reşi tribe pillaged the town of Rumkale.71 Secondly, even 
though they took part in banditry personally or in groups, their reference group 
would be a religious community, which would give them little much chance among 
Islamic groups. Here, the Yezidis or Alevis did not need to emphasize their religion, 
since they had alternative groups like tribes and ethno-lingual groups.         
                                                 
71 ACR 60, pp. 1, 2. 
 115   
In the court records there are lots of examples of some three or four bandits 
attacking traders or others who were on the move on the trade routes or the roads 
connecting settlements. The stealth attack was the main modus operendi of personal 
bandits and small groups. Because of that, time and space are important for these 
bandits. They usually chose passes (derbend)72 in mountainous areas. Sof Mountain 
in the west of the Ayntab, and the mountains between the Maraş and Antakya were 
the main places for bandit activities. Alternatively, the deep valleys were other places 
of banditry, since valleys were the most forrested places in an arid climate like that 
of the Ayntab region. They allowed bandits to escape quickly after the fact.  
In banditry, time complements the space. Compared to large bandit groups, it was 
harder for personal bandits to rob people in daylight, so the time period between 
sunset and sunrise was usually preferred.73 There are numerous cases mentoning the 
ordinary criminals who stole vines from vineyards at night. This kind of theft was a 
wideaspread form. Such a high frequency in such actions forced the owners of the 
vineyards to guard their lands at nihgts, which sometimes led to confrontations 
between them and thiefs.74  
Warfare is another time period that had both pulling and pushing effects for 
banditry. Not only for the small groups but also for bandits in general, the time 
period of warfare facilitated them to be more comfortable in their actions. The reason 
behind this is that during that period the control mechanism of the state declines to a 
                                                 
72 In the Ottoman Empire there were specific villages, tribes or groups, which were called derbendci. 
Those people protected the mountain passes and they helped other officials to capture bandits. 
Özkaya, Yücel. XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı. (Ankara: Kültür ve 
Turizm Bakanlığı, 1985), p, 204. 
73 In many cases the bandits attacked their victims after evening (Bade’l-magrib,) or in the morning 
(vakt-i zuhur, vakt-i tulû’). 
74 After the sunset two men from the Bozkoyunlu tribe entered a vineyard to stole some grapes. During 
the dispute between them and the owner of the land they injured the owner. ACR 58, p. 94 (September 
1, 1707). In another case, a man from the Kılıçlı tribe similarly killed a man with a spear in his 
vineyard. ACR 63, p. 287 (August 18, 1711). Lastly, when a man from the Dimleklü tribe was staying 
in his vineyard at night, eight bandits from the Berazi tribe came and injured him. ACR 65, p. 85 
(September 28, 1714). Also see ACR 59, p. 86.   
 116   
minimum. The Ottoman-Iran war of the 1720s seriously affected, especially, the 
eastern regions of the Empire. A firman dated 1725 implies that due to the war with 
Iran at that time almost all the beylerbeyis and other regional officials joined the 
army. That created an opportunity for levends and tribes to take part in illegal 
activities.75 Secondly, during that war an important quantity of provisions flowed 
through the routes that began the in the İskenderun and Payas seaports at the east cost 
of Mediterranean and went to east. In 1720 the Arab tribes attacked ships that carried 
the guns and provisions on the Euphrates River.76 The next time, in 1725, as a 
measure against them, the state charged ten contingents, which were about 500 
cavalries, with riding down the bank of the river to protect ships.77 Thirdly, during 
this period warfare many levends and other corpses either deserted or did not join the 
army. Some janissaries collected money and food free of charge on the pretext of 
going to war.78 Those kinds of illegal activities were the general character of levend 
banditry. Deserting or refusing to join the army actually forced paid-army to take 
part in banditry since those illegal behaviors were need punishments. That is to say 
once they deserted they had to escape from the punishment, making banditry 
necessity and therefore chronic. The same thing was not true for the zeamet and 
timar holders. When they deserted from the campaign they just lost their right to the 
land. During the campaign of the defense of Tımaşver against the Austrian army in 
1696, of the total zeamet and the tımar holders of Maraş Eyaleti only 84 men 
remained in the campaign. All the others deserted. In the table of the Appendix II/A 
there are some names of tımar holders who lost their right of regency over their 
                                                 
75 ACR 76, p. 334. 
76 In 1720 some Arabic tribes attacked the ships carrying lumber. They captured 18 of them with 
lumber on them. Only 20 out of 38 ships could be reached the target place. Orhonlu and Işıksal, 
“Osmanlı Devrinde Nehir Nakliyatı Hakkında Araştırmalar.” p. 89.  
77 ACR 76, pp. 79, 133.  
78 ACR 77, p. 264. 
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lands. And the ACR 44, p. 90 in the Appendix II shows the zeamet holders who 
deserted from the campaign. All deserters lost their lands and their rights of using 
lands passed to loyal subjects. After that desertion mainly lands remained ownerless 
and some others collected under the control of a single man.79 Indeed, we do not 
have any information whether ex-landholders turned into bandits, but the indirect 
effect of such changes in the economic life had great impacts on the social life, that 
is, banditry. The transformation at the end of the seventeenth century especially 
needs to be mentioned. The heavy economic burden of the wars at the western 
frontiers in the late seventeenth century forced the state to increase its income. In 
1695 they tried to solve the problem by converting annual tax-farms (mukataa) into 
lifelong tax-farms (malikane).80 In the next five years lots of mukataas were turned 
into malikanes in Ayntab. The simultaneity of the rise of notables (ayans) and that 
economic transformation must not be coincidence. Those notables through the 
eighteenth century became important powers challenging the state. The government 
realized that in a short time the state’s control over land gradually weakened so in 
1715 the malikane system was abolished.81   
Lastly, spring was another important period for bandits. Not because the 
economic life awakened in spring, but trees’ bearing leaves in this season allowed 
bandits to hide themselves.82    
So far we draw a picture of bandits motivated economically. However the 
social motivation behind personal banditry is also important. The case of a woman 
                                                 
79 The total number of tımar holders was 150 and that of zeamet holders was 16 in Aynatb sancak in 
1706. See ACR 52, p. 269.  A record dated 1730 implies that four notables captured 30 tımars. ACR 
81, p. 34. Another case is that three men known as Bayezid oğulları (sons of Bayezid), who too the 
support of some tribes, captured the lands of the Keben (?) and Enderun districts of Maraş. See ACR 
73, p. 217.   
80 Mehmet Genç, Genç, Mehmet. “Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi.”  An article presented in 
Türk İktisat Semineri. Hacettepe, 8-10 Haziran 1973, p. 8.  
81 Raşid Efendi, Tarih-i Raşid. p. 176-7. 
82 ACR 82, p. 58. 
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named Elif is a good example of such banditry. Elif complained to some bandits 
about the bad treatment of (most probably sexual harassment) her father-in-law 
against her. Those bandits seized his fifty kuruş.83 Actually, in this case the father-in-
law was the litigant who claimed that she had slandered him. Maybe this was true, 
but the role of bandits in social justice is can be seen clearly. In another case, as 
mentioned before, a young woman, Hatice, was abducted by her cousin, Ali, to 
marry her. Similarly in this case several bandits helped Ali to abduct Hatice. As 
mentioned before cousin marriage was a cultural phenomenon that was widespread 
in this region. Therefore, in this case also banditry had a role in social justice.  
Revenge is another type of banditry that can be considered socially motivated. 
Normally it is hard to see in-group banditry if a bandit is not extremely egotist. That 
is to say, in normal conditions, a bandit does not take action against someone from 
his/her group. One of the examples of such in-group banditry was occurred in the 
Ceceli tribe. Two men from the same tribe stole six sheep from a man from a man of 
the same tribe.84 But the thieves were city dwellers. This shows the degenerating 
effects of the city. In cases of revenge in-group banditry can be seen as a way of 
executing social justice. Ömer, from the Oturak Kızığı tribe, together with some 
friends burgled the house of Zeynelabiddin who was also a member of the same 
tribe. He stole 18 oxen, 3 rugs, 5 kilos wheat, 2 swords, 2 quivers, 2 axes, 1 bowl, 1 
salt cauldron, 1 silver belt, and 1 store cauldron had with storing capacity of 2.5 tons 
wheat.85 At first this seems an economically motivated action. However, with that 
action Ömer claimed to take revenge for his brother, who had been killed by 
Zeynelabiddin. As a matter of fact, in law the family of a murdered person has the 
right to demand talion, or two sides could reach an agreement on blood money. If 
                                                 
83 ACR 76, p. 274.  
84 ACR 76, p. 54. 
85 ACR 48B, p. 76. 
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these two options could not be met the event might turn into a blood feud. In this 
case it seems that both sides did not reach an agreement so the brother of the killed 
man preferred to take the value of his brother’s blood. In such situations the action is 
motivated by reasons other than economical gain. In such cases only specific people, 
who were guilty in the eyes of society, were targets.  
Actions against state agents or state regulations could also be seen as politically 
motivated banditry. It was not so uncommon to prevent tax collectors from 
performing their duties or stopping officials who carry the imperial taxes (mal-ı mirî) 
from one place to another. In 1720 some Turcoman bandits robbed the officer who 
took the imperial taxes to Aleppo.86 They even stole the officer’s clothes of the 
officer. Another example is that, in 1729 some bandits from the Reşi tribe several 
times prevented the tax collector from collecting Imperial taxes.87 Lastly, since two 
men from İlbeyli tribe did not pay their taxes in 1730, were imprisoned by the 
governor of Rakka. One night, fifteen men from the Ufacıklı and İlbeyli tribes 
attacked the fortress of Ayntab and rescued those two men.88 As a matter of fact it is 
hard to talk about personal level politically motivated banditry, because the political 
sphere related than to the power than to the political dissatisfaction of the people. 
Even the state itself did not tend to mention them as political bandits.  What the 
Ottomans called bağy (rebellion or politically motivated banditry) “was used for the 
organized crimes which contained compulsion and had political purposes.”89 In order 
for the action to be rational the actor has to look for a common interest with other 
groups or must build close ties with the group s/he is belongs to. That is to say, 
                                                 
86 ACR 70, p. 229. 
87 ACR 81, p. 214. 
88 ACR 81, pp. 83, 211. 
89 Mustafa Avcı, Osmanlı Hukukunda Suçlar ve Cezalar, (İstanbul: Gökkubbe, 2004), p. 343. 
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generally, the politically motivated person looks for alliances with other people of 
that kind and larger groups.  
 
III.4.1.2 Tribal Banditry  
Tribal banditry was the most widespread form of banditry in Ayntab during the 
period under review. The socio-political power tribes enjoyed made them prominent 
in banditry. Indeed their power was only depended on their vertical relations with 
groups, which they descendent from, but also horizontal alliances with other group 
were also an important source of power. A bandit could see the Kılıçbeyli as his 
reference group against other groups; the Bozkoyunlu against another tribe; the 
Beğdilli against another; Turcomans against other ethnic groups and Muslim against 
non-Muslims. This Arabic Proverb explains such a group psychology: “Me against 
my brother. Me and my brother against my cousin. Me, my brother, and my cousin 
against the stranger.” Because of that, banditry must be handled as something 
between-group activity.  
Anton Blok emphasizes on the ‘blood symbolism of mafia’: 
We shall see that the relationship through which Mafiosi in Siciliy operate 
evoke blood imagery, and that blood metaphors are used to mark and 
foster reciprocity. These relationships include agnatic kinship 
(consanguinity), affinal kinship, ritual kinship (godparenthood, 
coparenthood) and ritual friendship (blood brotherhood).90  
 
In that sense, the tribal relations in the Ottoman Empire resemble to these of the 
mafia. So far, we have talked about the agnatic kinship of tribal system, but affinial 
kinship and ritual kinship were also important to to understanding the Ottoman tribal 
society.  
                                                 
90 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, p. 87. 
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According to Peter Tylor, “Peasants saw marriage as way to (only) partially 
diminish the dangers of enmity by concerting enemies into friends from whom one 
could expect support.”91 One of the apparent examples about such a marriage is the 
case of Canpolatoğlu Ali. The Canpolatoğlu trapped his top enemy, Seyfoğlu Yusuf, 
in Aleppo. Then, the two men reached an agreement, and Seyfoğlu accepted 
surrender. They married each other’s female relatives.92 Thus, instead of destroying 
Seyfoğlu, Canpolatoğlu converted the enmity into alliance. That event resembles the 
berdel tradition widespread among tribes. Berdel is a kind of exchange of women. In 
the same day two men marry each other’s relatives. Another example is marriages 
occurring after murder. The murderer side might pay, or give something, including 
women, to restore the peace. In this case the agreement is not reciprocal but one-way 
concession by the murderer’s side. The marriage cannot be seen as just a 
phenomenon that connect two sides, but more than that merriment during the 
weddings, like many public or religious festivals, creates cohesion between the 
people. The Kara Kaşaklı tribe, which was a nomadic sub-tribe of the Ağcakoyunlu 
tribe encamped on a mountain pasture at that time, invited the neighboring villagers 
to their wedding.93 In fact, almost always there was a tension between the nomads 
and the settled population, but this event shows that they could build networks as 
well. 
Secondly, brotherhood was another important way of redefining the border of 
the group. The blood brotherhood was a common phenomenon in the Ottoman 
Empire. A special form of this kind of brotherhood called Kirvelik, was especially a 
                                                 
91 Peter Taylor, “Some Ideological Aspects of the Articulation between Kin and Tribute: State 
Formation, Military System and Social Life in Hesse-Cossel 1688-1815.” (In Agrarian Studies, Edited 
by James Scott, 11-34. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.) p.18. 
92 Griswold, Anadolu’da Büyük İsyan, p. 92-3. 
93 Ironically in that wedding the tribesmen and some guests began to fight during dancing. See ACR 
58, pp. 119, 174 (2 records), 175 (May, 1707).   
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common among tribes. According to Mahmut Tezcan, this tradition has its origin in 
Islam. The kirve is the man who is a kind of godfather of the male children during 
the circumcision feast. The term kirve was derived from the Islamic concept of 
Hırva.94 Tezcan points out that, the blood of a child that smudged on the kirve during 
the circumcision creates a bond similar to kinship.95 As a matter of fact, kirve is not a 
single person, but a familial institution. When two men decide to be kirve, the 
families of these two men recognize each other as kirve. The important point is that 
members of these two families cannot marry each other. Another role of kirve is 
about marriage. Kirves pay for an important, sometimes the entire, amount of 
wedding expenditures. After the ceremony of nuptial chamber, the new couple’s 
kirve declares the virginity of the bride. It is important since the woman is seen as the 
carrier of the honor (namus) of the family. Neither the family of the bride nor the 
family of bridegroom wants the community to suspect their honor. Indeed, the 
kirveness is a process of inclusion of the outsider to one’s own. Kirveness is a 
symbol of prestige, power and honor.  
During the revolt of Canberdi Gazali in 1521 the Ottoman commander Hayre 
Bey, in order to dissuade him from revolt, sent him a letter to warn him that if he 
continued his uprising, without considering the ‘law of brotherhood’, he would be 
punished by Hayre Bey.96 As mentioned before, both tribes and levends collect 
money under different names, like bayrak akçesi, kurban akçesi and so on. Those 
terms were those used by the state. Such kind of banditry is a kind of deceit showing 
themselves as if they were working for the state. However one such kind banditry is 
needs a close look. Some tribes were collecting money from people under the name 
                                                 
94 “It was claimed that the Prophet Muhammad was circumcised with kirveness of angels.” Mahmut 
Tezcan, Kültürel Antropoloji, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1997.) p. 90. 
95 Tezcan, Kültürel Antropoloji, p. 91. 
96 Solak-zâde Mehmed Hemdemi Çelebi, Solak-zâde Tarihi, p. 113. 
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of Khuve, which means brotherhood in Arabic. It seems it was a kind of tribute that 
the leaders of Arabic tribes traditionally took from weak tribes. As we learn from 
Ziya Gökalp in the beginning of the twentieth century, that tradition still continued: 
Şammar tribe is like the locust of the tribes living in the desert and dealing 
with farming. As if this tribe was created for destruction on the earth. 
They hate every kind of official duties. They don’t hesitate to feed their 
camels and sheep with (someone else’s) crops without any sense of honor. 
Fundamentally they do not deal with any craft. Because of that, in order to 
protect themselves from the danger of this locust like tribe, poor wretched 
dwellers and cultivator tribes have to give some of their annual yields to 
Şammars as khuve.97   
 
Gökalp’s description more or less describes khuve. A record dated 1704 talk about 
Arabs who took money from people under the same name.98 However, it seems that 
he has prejudices about the Şammar tribe since it was a widespread action among 
some other tribes, which cannot be seen as ‘locusts’ at all. A record dated 1694 
implies that several tribes from Kilis Hassı were taking 30, 40 or 50 kuruş from 
villagers by force. When someone resisted them they looted their houses.99 That is to 
say khuve is not something only taken by destructive and useless tribes, but it was 
much more about tribal authority on a specific territory. That is to say it looks like 
the tribute taken by a sovereign state. But we cannot be sure whether the specific 
relation between the tributary tribe and the dominant tribe resembled that between a 
sovereign state and the tributary state. That is to say, did the tribe taking khuve 
protect the tributary tribe?   
Khuve is a reflection of tribal politics. If it was seen as a real symbol of 
brotherhood, khuve most probably constituted alliances against rival tribes. At least it 
can be said that the tributary tribe did not expect invasion, pillage or simply banditry 
                                                 
97 Ziya Gökalp, Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler, p. 63. Moreover, he says that the 
amount of khuve was something between 20-250 mecidiye and they took some wheat, and taxed the 
people who came and go to Mosul. Gökalp, ibid., p. 86. 
98 ACR 54, p. 322. 
99 ACR 43, pp. 198 (2 records), 199.  
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from the khuve taking tribe. Indeed the tributary tribe might see them as enemy as 
well, and looking for alternative alliances with other groups. But as long as the 
agreement of khuve continued both group could see each other as a symbolic 
brotherhoods.   
There is another form of horizontal alliance was that occurred in specific 
circumstances. As mentioned before migration could rearrange the border of the 
group. The long lasting relations between two groups could lead to the articulation of 
one to another. It could be as the shifting of the lineage system, that is, assimilation 
of one group or under the same political and economic organization a special form of 
alliance appeared. We do not know whether the whole tribes organized as Kurds of 
Kilis descended from the same root but in many banditry events they coalesced.    
It is difficult to reveal the importance of any of those alliances from the 
Ottoman sources, at least, for this work. However, what we call tribe cannot be 
thought of without considering such horizontal and vertical bonds together. 
As mentioned before, to some extent the personal banditry discussed so far was 
a part of tribal banditry. But with tribal banditry we mean much broader banditries. 
Similar to personal banditry it seems that economic motivators were dominant 
behind tribal banditry. It is unlike personal banditry, since tribal banditry was a kind 
of organized crime where the border between economic and political motivators is 
vaguer. Even if one considers the tribes as political units it can be said that almost all 
tribal banditry was political banditry. Unfortunately, court records usually do not 
mention about the social relations between robbed bandits and their victims. A 
record, dated 1693, mention the 15-20 bandits from the Gözü Kızllı tribe who robbed 
a man from the Karaşeyhli tribe. Bandits took his 37 camels with their loads of 
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wheat.100 With based on just this information it is hard to say that they were 
economically motivated. It is possible that their attack was caused by the enmity 
between those two tribes.  
However, the events happened between two groups, which were geographically 
distinct to each other, and can be interpreted as economically motivated. The 
economic value that flowed on the route between Aleppo and Erzurum, which span 
the west bank of Euphrates, always attracted all kind of bandits. In 1703 some 20-30 
bandits from the Rışvan tribe attacked some traders, who brought sheep from 
Diyarbekir, in locale of Merziman Nahiye of Rumkale Sancak and seized their 150 
sheep, 2 felts and 1 fetter.101 In November 1705 a large group of 50-60 bandits from 
the Rışvan this time attacked some traders of the Za’feranlı tribe from Erzurum in the 
same locale. Bandits from the Rumiyanlı, Hemdanlı, and Hacılar sub-tribes of the 
Rışvan joined during that event. They took 110 sheep (≈264 kuruş), 120 kuruş cash 
and killed one man with a rifle.102 Besides those events, bandits several times 
attacked caravans. A record dated 1704 mentioned that bandits headed by a man 
called Bektaşlı Nebi had attacked a caravan, looted its loads and killed someone.103 
In 1712 another attack on a caravan was performed by bandits from the İlbeyli 
tribe.104 In 1710 Kurdish bandits were wandering around Ayntab, so caravans were 
under threat. The governor of Alleppo, Mehmed Pasha, sent an order to the Officials 
of Ayntab to not allow the caravan going to Allepo to stop in Ayntab because of that 
threat. He ordered them to escort the caravan with a sufficient amount of army.105 All 
such events can be seen as economically motivated banditries.  
                                                 
100 ACR 40, p. 101. 
101 ACR 53, pp. 261, 273. 
102 ACR 56, pp. 67, 68, 83, 94. 
103 ACR 55, p. 278.  
104 ACR 61, p. 285. 
105 ACR 60, p. 234. 
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In the case of the Rışvans who attacked the traders, the importance of social 
organization is obvious. No matter whether all three groups had been descendent 
from the same apical ancestor, organizing under the same tribe created cohesion 
among them. Another example that shows the importance of organization is the 
quarrel happened between the Turcoman Gevune (َنُﻮَآ) tribe and Rışvan sub-tribes in 
1714. A hundred cavalrymen and infantrymen from the Gevune seized 1,200 sheep 
of the Rışvans. When Rışvans heard that event some men from semi-nomadic 
Muykanlı, Belkanlı and Şeyh Bilanlı sub-tribes immediately went for intervened 
Gevunean attacked them and killed at least three men.106 In the records three herds 
were mentioned. That means those three nomadic tribes performed a collective 
economic facility. Such collectivity brought about cohesion.  
This last case is a good example of tribal conflict (between-group banditry). It 
was possible for every tribe to conflict with any other tribe(s). However, of them the 
conflict between nomadic tribes and sedentary tribes or between nomadic and 
sedentary life, in general, was apparent. The Ottoman historians who talk about tribal 
banditry make the nomads a scapegoat. To some extent they are right, since 
genuinely in many cases nomads fed their herds with peasants’ crops and even more 
they sometimes looted their houses and seize their properties. The banditry of the 
Kuzugüdenli tribe in 1716 is a good example of this kind. 1,700 horsemen from that 
tribe came to the villages of Abalı tribe and took their 13,000 sheep and 30 camels 
and killed a woman.107 However, the cases in which nomads were victim were not so 
much lees then those in which they were bandits. Some bandits raided the camp of a 
group of the Chinabeyli and killed a man. Worse, they were not allowed by the 
                                                 
106 ACR 65, pp. 139, 141, 140, 142. 
107 ACR 68, pp. 35, 448. The important point is that, the tax collector of Abalı tribe was a man from 
Pehlivanoğlu that was sub-tribe of Kuzugüdenli. When he went and demanded their taxes they applied 
to the court and took his 1,000 sheep.  ACR 68, p. 450. 
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neighboring villagers to burry the dead man in their graveyard.108 Similarly, the 
Baziki tribe encamped around a ruined village, where some 40-50 bandits from the 
Gevune tribe attacked them and took their 800 of their sheep out of 1,000.109  
In the court records there are many cases about struggles between people which 
ended with serious injures and death. Interestingly, only a few of them were 
committed by tribe members. It seems contradictory that banditry was almost 
identical with tribes, but killing was not so common among them. No doubt, the kadı 
did not record every event. But the point I want to question is whether or not the 
killing is an identical part of banditry. Hobsbawm mentions that social bandits do not 
kill people if they do not suspect betrayal, or if the victims do not resist them. To tell 
the truth, there are few cases when bandits killed or injured their victims. Mostly 
such things happened when victims resisted. In one case the matter is more about 
betrayal than resistance. As has already been mentioned, revenge as a social 
motivator behind banditry let a sort of banditry that was much bloody but no less 
social. One good example of this kind of banditry is the Kurdish bandits wandering 
around between Kilis and Ayntab. They killed the footman (çukadar) of the governor 
of Rakka and hung six people from Adana. When they were in the villages of 
Antakya the armed forces came and punished them. After the army left there they 
came back and began to mistreat the people. The bandits hold the population 
responsible for the killing of their friends during the military campaign and blamed 
them for denouncing bandits to the state officials.110 Therefore, they came back for 
revenge.  Here, I want to underline the difference between their first act, killing six 
people, and the second act, coming for revenge. If those six people were innocent 
people their action can be labeled as anti-social. However, the second action is a 
                                                 
108 ACR 49, pp. 48, 53. 
109 ACR 57, p. 298 (November 24, 1706). 
110 ACR 60, p. 229 (November, 1709). 
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more rational action. The target was no longer an ordinary one. They were now the 
enemies of these bandits. This action can be legitimized easier than the former one.  
Lastly, in numerous cases the term used for tribal banditry is bağy (politically 
motivated banditry) and daği111 (highlander). In the Ottoman law code political 
banditry is separated from other kinds of banditry called hirabe112 (economically 
motivated banditry), based on the political goals in it. Such kind of banditry was 
more common among the tribes, which had strong ties with their dominant kinship 
groups, and/or had strong ties with any other powerful groups. The revolt of 
Canpolatoğlu Ali was one of the best examples of how tribal banditry can be serious. 
Canpolatoğlu got not only the support of Kurds, with whom he had kinship ties but 
also the support of Arabic and Turcoman tribes, even, levends. That is to say, in his 
case both vertical and horizontal ties were quite obvious.  
In politically motivated movements the leadership becomes more important 
than ever. Especially in long-lasting and serious movements the problem of 
leadership was generally solved by making it hereditary. At this point the family 
becomes important in banditry. Normally, family is not so important in banditry 
except for the blood feud between families. In serious political movements the 
leadership tends to be continued through the same familial lineage. For example, it is 
known that the Ottomans were established by the kayı tribe. However, they were 
known with their first most prominent political leader. After him the leadership 
became hereditary within inheritance in the same family until the end. This kind of 
leadership was true for almost all tribal powers and the states based on tribes. In that 
sense the political dimension of the rebellion of Canpolatoğlu is unquestionable. 
                                                 
111 I am not sure whether there is a specific terminological meaning of daği, so use the direct mean of 
it. Most probably it was used because of the functions of mountains in the political upheavals and 
banditry.     
112 Avcı, Osmanlı Hukukunda Suçlar ve Cezalar. pp.301 and 304 
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However in many cases the political motivation behind banditry cannot produce such 
leadership so the banditry cannot tear down the limit of the tribe in which it exists. 
For example, the Kurds of Kilis did not give up their political stance after the defeat 
of Canpolatoğlu. They refused the highest-ranking official, Voyvoda (the 
administrator of the land of the palace and the governor), in Kilis.113 Moreover, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, they killed Voyvodas two times, in Kilis, and, 
they attacked such an official (mutassarrıf) once more in 1737.114 However, their 
political banditry could not be as serious as the Canpolatoğlu affair. This is the point 
where I think tribes differentiate from sub-tribes. Tribes can be as serious as ethnic 
movements. However the sub-tribal movements are much weaker. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 ACR 63, p. 18. Kilis was a sanjaq at that time so there must have be a governor called sanjaqbeyi. 
But in noe of the records such a figure was mentioned. So I think the voyvoda at the same time was 
the governor.  
114 Güzelbey Cemil C. and Hulusi Yetkin, Gaziantep Şer’î Mahkeme Sicilleri (Cilt 81 141) Fasikül: 1, 
(Gaziantep: Gaziantep Kültür Derneği, 1970), p. 27. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Power elites left behind written materials, but ordinary people left almost 
nothing but some few words passed orally from generation to generation. Marxist 
historians and, especially, French Annales School, who claim to undertake ‘history 
from below’, began to concern with the later sort of sources as the base for the 
historical analysis of ordinary people. Hobsbawm, who was affected by Marxist 
methodology, is one of the distinguished historians of this kind. He produced an 
invaluable masterpiece in this filed with using ballads produced in the folk culture in 
his research on banditry. His aim was to draw the attentions on the social bandits 
who were reflected in folk culture as good bandits. His studies resulted in the 
emergence of studies on social movements, especially banditry. From Latin 
American historiography to European historiography, even, to Ottoman 
historiography many works have been done on the banditry, which were mainly 
affected by Hobsbawm’s thesis. However, many of these historians, instead of 
imitating his thesis, directed serious critiques to his approach. 
The one of the critiques is about reliability of the sources produced by ordinary 
people. The problem is whether they reflect the common feelings or they are myths. 
Another critique is about the narrow limits of Hobsbawm’s concept of banditry. 
These points are the main vulnerable points of Marxist methodology. In this 
approach, since the units of analysis are based on the relations of production, society 
mainly divided into two classes, the owners of means of production and non-owners. 
However, it is difficult to analyze, especially, the societies like the Ottoman society 
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by dividing into two ideal types; because, though this approach is consistent in itself, 
the role of subdivisions in the society based on socio-cultural and religious 
differentiations, which are indispensable for understanding some social phenomena, 
remains hazy.  
Such divisions create units whose social movements can sometimes be unique 
among their counterparts. The movements of people, like levends who united under a 
military identity or those who were joined under a tribal identity had some 
similarities but were mostly different. In this limited study we try to explain mainly 
banditry tribes that had a certain place in the Ottoman social organization. However, 
some other groups like military and economic groups have ony been partially 
mentioned.  
Another problem is about the sociality of banditry. Besides some mentioned 
critiques to this point we have handled the banditry as something changes through 
the lines of subdivisions and the mental process of the actor in action. In this sense, 
social dimension of banditry is not something static but changed from one group to 
another and differentiated depend on conjecture. The main reasons behind this 
dynamism are the differentiations in group interests, motivators and mentalities 
varied from one group to another through the course of time.  
Nevertheless, the reliability of this study is still open to dispute. Though I have 
offered an ideal type of the Ottoman social structure, due to the different limits 
related to myself and to the sources used in the study, it is not any easy task at all. 
The two methods that I followed to minimize the reliability problem were comparing 
different documents and even though we never can be sure whether the arguments in 
the disputes in the court records were true or not, we used them in their original 
form, since they are still invaluable in reflecting social and political conflicts. 
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Ragardless of whether the accused was innocent or guilty, the process of a dispute 
itself reflects the tension between people. In this sense, the events mentioned in this 
study could be true or merely just slandering of plaintiffs. 
Karen Barkey did a very valuable study on the Ottoman banditry in the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, which cogently criticizes the thesis of Hobsbawm. 
She rightly questions the social roots of the banditry, relations between bandits and 
society and those between bandits and the state. However, there are several 
vulnerable points in her study. Like Hobsbawm she also had an economic-centric 
perspective. She tends to see almost all bandits as economically deprived and as 
levends. Secondly, she draws a picture of bandits as if they totally depended on the 
state policies of centralization. That is, bandits, in their relations with the state, 
totally manipulated the process. The state created the bandits and eliminated them 
when the time was suitable. Because of that process, the state prevented a collective 
action against the state. Lastly, she claims that rather than creating a therat for the 
state, actually bandits aided in its centralization. 
In this study these assertive arguments have been criticized. Even if Barkey’s 
thesis can be seen as an anti-thesis of Hobsbawm with her emphasis on the anti-
social character of banditry-the positive relations between bandits and the state and 
elites; however, instead of reconceptualizing the issue, she builds her thesis on the 
Hobsbawm’s approach to banditry. In our understanding of the sociality of banditry, 
social groups’ alliances with other power groups, including the state power, against 
other factions does not make bandits anti-social. Therefore, if the state had relations 
with some groups it didn’t contribute only to the interests of the state; but rather the 
relations were based on mutual interests. Thus, the state was not the only dominant 
group in such relations. And it is too simple to say that the state created them and 
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eliminated them whenever it deemed neccessary. On the contrary, the state’s 
oppression of bandits was nothing but an illusion based on conclusive evidence that 
banditry in the Ottoman society survived for long and continious periods of time. 
The continuous banditry of a tribe supplied a ground for this argument of this study. 
If it so, then just picking up a period for analysis and concluding a quite assertive 
thesis, that banditry contributed the centrality of the state remains weak, since the 
banditry in its long history eroded the society thus leading to the weakening of the 
state power. Though the state used people, especially tribes, against bandits, both the 
high expenses created in the process of banditry and those created during the process 
of state action against bandits made the state undergo a serious loss both 
economically and politically. The mutual reinforcement of economical degradation 
and social corruption, which led to the rise of banditry, put a pressure on the relations 
of production. As a result the power of ayans (notables), who were generally 
considered as centrifugal powers (I prefer to substitue ‘highly politically-motivated 
bandits’ for them) rose from the late seventeenth century then on. 
Overall we have tried to redefine the Ottoman banditry mainly based on the 
usage of the term in the period under review. This point will maybe be criticized as a 
state centric definition. However, the main purpose behind this is not to accept what 
was called banditry as it was but the state’s usage of banditry for varied actions, 
which Hobsbawm denies, supplies a firm basis for this analysis of the interrelations 
between different types of social movements and reactions. Banditry is more than 
simply a phenomenon related to economical interests and drives, but rather a form of 
combinations of various external motivators and internal level consciousness. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Tribes and Resettlement 
 
A) Tribal Organization and Resettlement* 
 
Oymak Cemaat Aşiret Ethnie Resettlement 
    Berazi Kurd   
    Ceceli   Rakka 
    Hevidi Kurd   
    Reşi Kurd   
    Rışvan Kurd   
  Abalı   Turcoman Rakka, Hama, Humus 
Meş'al (?) Abalı     Hama 
  Abdallu     Rakka, Humus 
  Abdili   Turcoman Humus 
  Acurlu Boz Ulus Mandası   Rakka 
  Adil Hacılu     Çukurova 
  Afşarlu   Turcoman Rakka 
  Ağanlı     Humus 
  Ağcalu       
  Ahmed Hacılu       
  Ahmedli Rışvan     
  Ali Hacılu       
  Amiki   Kurd Harran 
  Anterli  Boz Ulus Mandası   Rakka 
  Arablı     Rakka 
  Atmalı   Kurd   
  Avşar Boz Ulus Mandası Turcoman Rakka, Humus 
  Aybasanlı       
  Aymaz Avşarı   Turcoman Humus 
  Ayranlık       
  Ayranlık     Haleb 
  Ayranlu (İranlu)       
  Badili Rışvan Kurd Rakka 
  Bahadırlı       
  Bahadırlı-i Zülfikar       
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  Barak  Beğdilli   Rakka 
  Bardiganlı Cihanbeyli     
  Barlu       
  Bayadlı       
  Bayadlı Ceridi       
  Bayezid Oğlu       
 Bayındır  Turcoman Rakka 
 Begelü  Turcoman Rakka 
 Begmişli Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka, Hama 
 Bektaşlı  Kurd  
 Belanlı    
 Belçin    
 Belkanlı Rışvan   
 Beni Huneyn  Arab  
 Beni Rebi'  Arab Hama 
 Berenki    
 Beyaltun (?)    
  Bezerli (?)       
 Beziki (Bazikli)  Kurd  
 Bickanlı (?)    
 Boynuinceli Danişmendli   
 Bozbeg    
  Bozdoğanlı   Turcoman   
 Bozgeyikli    
 Bozkoyunlu Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka 
 Bozlu   Rakka, Hama 
 Bozulusanlı   Rakka 
 Bucak Avşarı   Rakka 
 Bulasanlı    
 Burclu   Çukurova 
 Çağd    
  Çağırğanlı Boz Ulus Mandası Turcoman Rakka 
 Çağlayan  Turcoman  
 Çakallı  Kurd  
 Çakallu Dokuzu  Turcoman Hama 
 Camuslu    
 Çarıklı   Humus 
 Çatal Depelü    
 Cebeluler    
  Ceceli Mürsellü       
 Cecelü   Rakka 
 Çekanlı Okçu İzzettinli (?)   
 Çekerbelü (?)    
 142   
 Çepni    
 Çepni-i Zülfikar    
  Cerid   Turcoman Rakka 
 Cerikanlı Okçu İzzettinli Kurd  
 Cigerlü  Turcoman Rakka 
 Çobanbeyli    
 Çobanoğlu Kasım    
 Çobkanlı    
 Cobur    
 Çokşur (Çokşurucaklı) Barak   
 Com (Comlu)    
 Com Bahadırlısı    
  Com Kacalı       
 Com-u Şark (?)   Haleb 
 Dadalı  Turcoman  
 Dağ Bahadırlısı  Turcoman  
 Dalyanlı Rışvan   
 Da'seranlı (?)    
  Dedesli Gönderlü   Haleb 
  Delikanlı       
 Deliler    
 Dimlekli Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka 
 Doğanlı    
 Dögerlü  Turcoman Rakka, Hama 
 Dokuz Ceceli    
 Eksikli (?) İlbegli Turcoman ? 
 El Hemrah  Arab Hama 
  Elci   Turcoman Hama, Humus 
 Eminlikli  Turcoman Rakka 
 Esenceli    
  Esenli Elçisi       
 Estecelü    
 Ferhadoğlu Rışvan   
 Fettah Oğlu    
 Fıkıhlı Mihmanlı   
 Firuzlu  İlbegli   
 Gedikli  Turcoman  
 Genceli Afşarı  Turcoman Humus 
 Gencli   Humus 
 Gevune (?)  Turcoman Rakka 
 Geyikli  Turcoman Haleb 
 Göçer Kızık    
 Göçerlü    
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 Gönec  Turcoman Rakka 
  Gözü Kızıllı   Turcoman   
 Gözü Küçüklü İlbegli Turcoman ? 
 Günderlü (?)  Turcoman  
 Hacı Fakılı Oymağı İlbegli   
 Hacı İshak Uşağı    
Kaboğlu 
Dokuzu Hacı İvaz Oğlu   Rakka 
 Hacılar Rışvan Kurd Harran 
 Halıcalu (Halicelü)  Turcoman Rakka 
 Halidli  Kurd Harran 
 Halikanlı Rışvan   
 Hamidli Rışvan   
 Hamza Hacılu Boz Ulus Mandası  Rakka 
 Harar    
 Harbendeli  Turcoman Humus 
 Harmandalı   Rakka, Çukurova 
 Hasan   Çukurova 
 Hatal  Turcoman  
 Hemdanlı Rışvan   
  Heştvanlı   Kurd   
 Hevidi    
 Heybeli    
 Hodarlu (?)   Çukurova 
 Hüseyin Gazi    
 İlbasan   Haleb 
 İlbegli  Turcoman Rakka, Harran, Menbic 
 İnallu Boz Ulus Mandası Turcoman Rakka, Humus 
 İnenlü  Okçu İzzettinli Kurd  
 İzmir Karakoyunlu (?)  Turcoman Humus 
 İzzettin Boz Ulus Mandası  Rakka 
 Kabaklı  Turcoman  
 Kabalı   Humus 
 Kabuklu   Haleb 
 Kaçar Eymiri   Humus 
  Kaçar İsalı Kıllı     
 Kacelü (?)   Rakka, Hama 
 Kadmerli (?)  Kurd Harran 
 Kahirman    
 Kahtan    
 Kaletlu   Haleb 
 Kara Avşar  Turcoman Humus 
 Kara Bekirli (yer)  Turcoman  
 144   
 Kara Boyunlu    
 Kara Ceceli   Rakka 
 Kara Dede   Çukurova 
 Kara Develi  Turcoman  
 Kara Gündüzlü    
 Kara Hallı    
 Kara Kaşaklı Ağca Koyunlu   
 Kara Kocalu   Turcoman Rakka 
  Kara Mürsellü   Turcoman   
 Kara Musalu    
 Kara Sakallı  Turcoman  
 Kara Süleymanlı  Turcoman  
 Kara Yusuf Oturak Kızığı   
 Karaav (?) (Kara Avşar)   Hama 
 Karaboğalı    
 Karaburclu    
 Karaca Arablı   Rakka 
 Karacalı  Kurd Harran 
 Karagözlü   Humus 
 Karakeçili  Turcoman  
 Karakoyunlu    
  Karalu       
 Karaşeyhli  Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka, Resayf (?) 
 Karataşlı İlbegli   
 Karcılu   Hama 
  Karkın   Turcoman   
 Karlefceli (?)    
 Karnıklı  Kurd Harran 
 Katırcalı   Rakka 
 Katırlu  Turcoman Rakka 
 Kayalı  Turcoman Humus 
 Kayas  Turcoman Rakka 
 Kaygulu Dokuzu  Turcoman Harran 
 Kazlı   Rakka 
 Keçebeyli  Turcoman  
 Keher Selek (?)  Turcoman  
 Kepekli    
 Kestan Danişmendli  Hama 
 Kılıçbegli  Bozkoyunlu   
 Kılıçlı  Kurd Rakka 
  Kıllı   Turcoman   
 Kırıntılı  Kurd Harran 
 Kırlangaçlı    
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Süleyman 
Kethüda Kızık    
 Kızık   Rakka, Hama 
 Kızıl Koyunlu   Rakka 
 Kızılca Şarklu (?)   Haleb 
 Kızkapanlı    
 Kocanlu Okçu İzzettinli (?)   
 Koçlu (?)  Turcoman  
 Kösene Danişmendli  Hama 
 Koyunoğlu    
 Koz Habelü (?)  Turcoman Rakka 
 Küçüklü Boz Ulus Mandası Turcoman Rakka, Harran 
 Küçüklü Danişmendli  Hama 
 Kulak  Turcoman  
 Küpeli Hasan    
 Kurdcuali (?) Bozkoyunlu   
 Kürdlerin Depelisi (?)    
 Kurulu    
  Kuşçu Ceridi       
  Kuşlu       
 Kuyumcular    
  Lek (Yaycılar)       
 Lekvan  Kurd Harran 
 Lekvanlık   Rakka 
 Mahalle-i Küçük Şereflü Danişmendli   
 Mamalu  Turcoman Harran 
  Mamaş       
 Mamoli   Rakka 
 Maraşlı   Çukurova 
 Mehyanlı    
 Memaşeli (Memeşeli)  Turcoman  
 Mendoli Rışvan Kurd  
 Merdisi Ahbiye (?)   
 Merdisi (?) Cihanbeyli   
 Meskali (?) Rışvan   
 Meskenilü (?)    
 Mezmanlı (?)    
 Mihmanlı  Turcoman  
 Mihmanlı   Haleb 
 Mudlı   Rakka 
 Muhayanlı Rışvan   
 Mülükan Rışvan   
 Musa Şeyh Oğulları  Turcoman Rakka 
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 Musa Şeyhli   Rakka 
  Musabeyli   Kurd   
 Musacalu  Turcoman Rakka, Harran 
 Muykanlı Rışvan   
 Neferir (?) Hacı Ahmedlü Boynuinceli    
 Ocaklı   Rakka 
 Ödemişli Pehlivanlı   
 Okçu    
  Okçu İzzettinli   Kurd Harran 
Cerikanlı Okçu İzzettinli    
 Okçulu    
 Öksüzlü Kılıçlı   
 Ömeranlı Rışvan Kurd  
 Ömerli Boz Ulus Mandası  Rakka 
  Oturak Bahadırlı       
 Oturak Ceceli    
Kara Yusuflu Oturak Kızık    
Mihmanlı Oturak Kızık    
 Ovacıklı   Çukurova 
 Ovacıklı-i Elhac Mehmed    
 Oylarlu (?)    
 Papaltun (?)  Turcoman Harran 
  Pehlivanlı   Turcoman   
Yüreğir Pehlivanlı    
 Pehlivanoğlu Kuzugüdenli  Turcoman  
Elhac Mustafa Recebli  Turcoman Rakka 
  Recebli Afşarı   Turcoman Rakka, Harran 
 Reş-i Pir Oğulları İbrahim    
 Reyahanlı  Turcoman  
 Rışvan  Ulus   
 Rışvanoğlu Halil    
 Rumiyanlı Rışvan   
 Sakallı  Kurd  
 Sakkallı Ceridi   Hama 
  Şambayadı   Turcoman   
 Şarklı   Turcoman Hama, Humus 
 Saveceli Kızığı    
 Seherlü    
  Şekaki   Kurd   
  Selmanlı Gönderlü     
 Seluri   Humus 
 Sencarlu   Humus 
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 Şereflü Danişmendli   
 Serketanlu  Okçu İzzettinli    
 Şeyh Bilanlı Rışvan   
 Şeyh Hamzalu  Turcoman  
 Şeyhler  Kurd Harran 
 Şeyhli  Kurd Rakka, Harran 
Kavaklı Şeyhli    
Odunlu (?) Şeyhli    
 Şeyhli Ceridi    
 Silsüpür Ceridi  Turcoman Harran 
 Sipalkalu (?)  Turcoman Harran 
 Siphanlı Bölüğü    
 Sof Ceridi    
 Sofiler   Haleb 
 Soran  Kurd  
 Suhaşvaklı (?)  Turcoman  
 Tabanlı  Kurd  
 Tacir    
 Tacirli (Tecerlü)  Turcoman Rakka 
 Taklı    
 Taklı Karkını    
 Tarikli (Taraklı) İlbegli   
 Tatar İlyaslı Pehlivanlı   
 Tecer İsalı  Turcoman  
  Tohtemürlü   Turcoman Rakka, Hama 
 Topaklı   Çukurova 
 Türgeşli    
 Ufacıklı    
 Ulaşlu Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka 
 Ulus  Cihanbeyli   
 Vezbianlı (?) Cihanbeyli   
 Yalavac    
 Yapraklu  Turcoman Harran 
 Yuz  Turcoman  
    Ağcakoyunlu Turcoman   
  Arab-ı Süyuh (?) Arab Hama 
  Avşar Turcoman  
  Azberat Arab  
  Bahadırlı   
  Barak Turcoman Rakka 
  Bayezid   
  Baziki   
  Beğdilli Turcoman Rakka 
 148   
  Beni Cedid Arab Hama 
  Beni Kays Arab  
  Beni Kelib Arab  
  Boz Ulus Mandası Turcoman Rakka 
    Bozkoyunlu Turcoman Rakka 
  Çağırğanlı   
  Çakallu Kurd  
  Çepni   
  Cihanbeyli Kurd Rakka 
  Com Kurd  
  Danişmendli Turcoman  
  Delim Arab  
  Denyati (?)   
  El Bermedi Arab Hama 
  El Feza (?) Arab Hama 
  El Meşhur Arab Hama 
  Firuzlu   
    Gönderlü Turcoman   
  Hecvanlı Kurd  
  İlbegli Turcoman  
Tarikli  İlbegli   
  Karaşeyhli   
  Kılıçbeyli   
  Kılıçlı Kurd  
  Kılıçlı Bektaş   
  Kıllı  Haleb 
Mihmadlı  Kızık   
  Kürdan   
  Mamalu Turcoman  
    Merdisi Kurd   
  Mevali Arab  
  Milli   
Çepli (?) Ömer  Reşi   
Çorbalı  Reşi   
Fırati  Reşi   
Kara Mezra  Reşi   
Kızıl İn  Reşi   
Mendoli  Reşi   
Muhtin (?)  Reşi   
Mülukanlı  Reşi   
Pir Mir  Reşi   
Talaşık  Reşi   
Halikanlı  Rışvan   
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Hamidli  Rışvan   
Kametli  Rışvan   
Ömeranlı  Rışvan   
Şeyh Bilanlı  Rışvan   
  Şamiyan   
  Savi Arab Rakka 
  Şekaki   
  Şekeranlı (Şekranlı) Kurd  
  Semek Arab Rakka 
  Sevahil Arab  
  Şeyh Hamzalu Turcoman  
  Şeyhkanlı   
Canan  Süveydi   
  Ufacıklı   
  Zahveranlı (Za'feranlı) Kurd  
Berekatlı   Kurd  
Abalı   Turcoman  
Atmalı     
Bektaşlı     
Karoğlu (?)     
Pehlivanlı     
Şeyh Hamzalu     
 
 
* Notes: 
1) This table prepared based only the information grasped from Ayntab Court 
Records used in this study. 
2) This table may not show lineage sytem, since it can also reflect tribes’ 
economic and political organizations. 
3) Some names may not be tribal names but are personal and geographical 
names. 
4) The information in the right most columns are related only the left most 
columns. For example, look at the row written in italic. The cemaat of 
Küçüklü is a sub-tribe of the Boz Ulus Mandası. Here, Küçüklü is a 
Turcoman tribe and ressetled in Rakka and Harran. This doesn’t mean that 
Boz Ulus is also a Turcoman and resettled there.    
5) Here. Oymak, Cemaat and Aşiret are not actual identities of these tribes but it 
can be interpreted as a tribe in a left column is the sub-group of one in a right 
column in the same row. 
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B) Resettled Tribes 
 
ACR 41, p. 39: Suret ba-hatt-ı hümayun: Mucebince memur oldukları mahellerde 
iskan ettirilub işbu defterde ma’muliye olmak üzere mahallinde hıfz oluna. Zirde 
mustedi Türkman taifesinden iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir ki müfredatıyla zikr 
olunur Türkman-ı Haleb reayasından Hama ve Humus toprağına iskanı ferman 
buyrulan cemaatlerdir. 
 
Cemaat-i Kacılu tabi’ 
Hamza Kethuda 
Cemaat-i Köseoğlu Şarkılı 
tabi’ Durdu 
Cemaat-i Kara Afşar tabi’ 
Hamdi Kethüda 
Cemaat-i Duger oğlan-ı 
Hama tabı’ Mustafa. Boz Sam Çerkes oğulları 
Su’asaf (?) tabi’ Mehmed 
Kethüda 
İnallu tabi’ Derviş 
Kethüda 
Emir Ditrarlu (?) tabi 
Süleyman Ketüda 
Sam Begmişlu tabi’ 
Abdullah Kethüda 
Hama Dögeri tabi’ 
Derviş kethüda 
Kara Tohetmürlü tabi’ 
Muharrem Kethüda Mezbur tabi’ Köse Kethüda 
Kara Tohtemürlü 
Erdoğdu 
Tokurcun Harbendelusu 
tabi’ Murad Kethüda Abalu-i Muşa'lı Kethüda 
Abalu-i İdris Kethüda Asaf (?) tabi’ Mezbur Beşir oğulları 
Amher (?) Sancarlu tabi’ Amher (?) Çarık tabi’ Mezbur 
Amher (?) Tosun tabi’ İsa 
Kethüda 
Amher (?) Karagöz tabi’ 
İbarhim Kethüda Amher (?) Afan Kethüda Bozlu tabi’ Halil 
Bozlu tabi’ Ebudderva 
(?) 
Kızıl Ali Tohtemürlüsü 
tabi’ Halil 
Türkman-ı Selluriye tabi’ 
Trablus (?) 
Makarreş (?) oğlu ve 
tevabuha (?) tabi’ Trablus Yekun cemaat aded: 26 Yekun cemaat aded: 2 
 
Has-ı mezbur reayasından Rakka’ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir. 
 
Dimleklu kasım 
Şeyhlu an taife-i Begdilli 
be-nam-ı Uğurlu Şeyh 
oğulları 
Şeyhlu be-nâm-ı Hamis (?) 
Şeyh 
Tokalu benam-ı Musa 
Şeyh oğulları Duger Mirza Bayındır Rüstem Kethüda 
Bayındır Hacı Ahmet 
Ekthüda Bayındır Ramazan Seçmen (?) tabi’ Pir Ahmed 
Seçmen (?) tabi’ Emir 
Mec (?) 
Kara Şeyhlu Huramlu tabi’ 
Taban (?) oğulları 
Kara Şeyhlu Ceke tabi’ Kızıl 
Uris oğlu mermi (?) 
Döger-i Seyf Kara Şeyhlu-i Yadigar tabi’ Elkays (?) 
Kara Şeyhlu-i Yadigarlu 
tabi’ İsmail Kethüda 
A'aylar (?) tabi’ Kara 
Şeyhlu 
Kara Şeyhlu-i Torabeglu 
tabi’ Kurt 
Kadirlü tabi’ Hüseyin 
kethüda 
Bozkoyunlu tabi’ 
Seyfhan Beg 
Bilenlu-i Azaz Güherçile 
an Cemaat-i Bozkoyunlu 
Seyfhan Ahmed Fakih 
Uşağı mesela (?) 
 
 
Kayas (?) Veli Kethüda 
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Mehmedan beşdiye (?)    
 
Arablu Musa an taife-i 
Begdilli 
Arablu İbrahim an taife-i 
Begdilli Amar A'li (?) tabi’ Dimleklu 
Adiler tabi’ Ahmed 
Kethüda Begmişlü tabi’ Ganim 
Bozkoyunlu Tales tabi’ 
Elciyar (?) kethüda 
Bozkoyunlu tabi’ Mir 
Fariz (?) Kethüda Dimleklü-i Hacılar 
Dimleklu tabi’ Pir Budak 
Oğlu 
Yekun Cemaat aded: 30 
 
Yeni İl hasları reayasından Rakka’ya iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir. 
 
Musacalu tabi’ İsa 
Kethüda 
Musacalu tabi’ Ebu Sultan 
Kethüda 
Musacalu tabi’ Amru (?) 
kethüda 
Musacalu-i Tanburcalu 
Mülhem kethüda 
Musacalu tabi’ Ali 
Kethüda 
Musacalu tabi’ Bayazid 
Kethüda 
Taif Afşarı tabi’ Arab ali 
Kethüda Turyan Taif Afşarı 
Kanaatlu Dokuzu tabi’ Hacı 
İvaz (?) oğlu İbrahim 
Kethüda 
Kara Cecelu tabi’ Cecelu Yağmur oğlu Kethüda Barak tabi’ Arab Osman 
Güneş Kapaklu taife-i Begdilli Baynelu (?) an Taife-i Begdilli 
Cumalu an taife-i 
Begdilli Seçmen (?) Deli Aliler Kara Kocalu 
Yekun cemaat: 18   
 
Has-ı mezbur reayasından Hama ve Humus Toprağına iskanı ferman buyrulan 
cemaatlerdir. 
 
Abdallu Hacı Mehmed Kayalu tabi’ Haydar kethüda Elçi Ramazan  
Sağırlı elçisi tabi’ 
Mustafa Asplu Elçisi 
Boyulu Elçisi tabi’ Delice 
oğlu 
Ayluhanlı Elçisi Ekrad-i Kılıçlu tabi’ Asaf Kethüda Şarklı Sultan Kethüda 
Emir (?) Hacı Bayram 
tabi’ Dede Kethüda Halillü tabi’ Danişmendlu Genceli Avşarı 
Yekun Cemaat: 10 Yakun Cemaat: 2  
 
Mukataa-i Akra’nın ve tevabi cemaatlerinden Rakka’ya iskanı ferman buyrulan 
cemaatlerdir. 
 
Leger-i atik (?) ve 
tevabimuha Karanti (?) ve tevabimuha Hacılar ve tevabimuha 
Obaş (?) ve tevabimuha Kızıl koyunlu ve tevabimuha Yekun Cemaat aded: 5 
 
Manda-i Bozulus Türkmanından Rakka Eyaleti’nde Nehr-i Belenc üzere ve kenarından 
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olan nevahilerde iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatlerdir. 
 
İzzeddin ve tevabımuha Gerçeklu Avşar 
İnallu Anter (?) Ömerlü 
Çupu (?) Ömerler ve tevabımuha Şark Çağırğanlı 
Yekun cemaat aded: 9   
 
Keskin (?) ilinde sakin Bozulus Türkmanının Rakka’ya iskanı ferman buyrulan 
cemaatlerdir.  
 
Cerid Musa ve Ömer ve 
İsmail Kethüda ve 
gayruhum 
Gerçekler Ali Kethüda ve 
Zeynelabidin Beyaltun Ömer Kethüda 
Tacirli Birdal Oğulları ve 
İsmail ve Ali ve Mehmed 
ve gayruhum 
Hertebdelu (?) tabi’ Yakub 
Kethüda Karaca Arablar 
Cebeli (?) an sükanan-ı 
Recebli avşarı Acurlu Yekun cemaat aded: 8 
 
Mukaddeman Ergani nahiyesinde sakin Batılar (Badiler) aşiretinden Kangırı ve 
Ankara sancaklarında kışlayan cemaatlerden Rakka Eyaletinde Harran nam mahale 
iskanı ferman buyrulan cemaatler. 
 
Arşvanlı (?) tabi’ Badiler 
Mir-i (?) aşiret Abdullah 
Avestudganlı (?) mir-i 
aşiret Murad 
Çemganlu tabi’ Badiler mir 
aşiret 
Atmanlu tabi’ Badiler 
mir aşiret Mustafa ve 
kethüdaları şah Hüseyin 
Hacı Mirlü tabi’ Badiler 
mir aşiret İsmail Atmanlar tabi’ Badiler 
Kurdiganlı ve şedid tabi’ 
Diyarbekir mir aşiret 
Şedid  
Kurdiganlı tabi’ Badiler 
mir aşiret İsmail 
Memars (?) tabi’ Badiler 
Musaili kethüda oğlu 
Mudanlı tabi’ Badiler mir 
aşiret Abdal ve 
Kethüdaları ve Avaz  
Yekun Cemaat aded: 10  
 
Aydın ve Rum caniblerinde sakin Danişmendli Türkmanından Safle (?) sancağında 
Ayatluğ (?) nam-ı diger Viranşehir mahalinde Torbalı nam mevzi’ye (?) varınca tulen 
ve arzen tahminen 12 saat mikdarı hali ve harabe olan arazide Balıkesir sancağında su 
seferliği (?) ve kemer gölü karibinde Timur Kapudan Viranhane dimekle ma’ruf arazi-i 
haliyede iskan olunub şin ve abadan eylemek üzere ferman olunan cemaatlerdir.  
 
Karalu mir aşiret altı 
barmak zade Hüseyin 
Küçük sermayeli 
kethüdaları hacı Hasan  
Civanber (?) Musa ve Avaz 
kethüda 
Kaşıkçı Hüseyin ve 
Süleyman ve Osman 
Gülegir (?) sarı Bekir 
Kethüda 
Büyük sermayeli Kodal (?) 
Ömer ve Ferhi (?) kethüda 
Kürd Mihmanlı Veli 
Kethüda 
Büyük süleymanlı köse 
İbarahim ve Bali Kethüda 
Küçük Süleymanlı ali ve 
Keteş oğlu Bekir kethüda 
 
Kürdengüde (?) ali ve 
 
Berhan Hacı Mehmed 
 
Heregli (?) Bektaş ve Kara 
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Mehmed ve Osman ve 
Ali ve İbarhim kethüda 
kethüda Ömer kethüda 
Karaca Kürd ve Cafer 
Sırık Ali ve Oğlu Cüce 
kethüda 
Boynu inceli İbrahim 
Kethüda ve Hacı Ömer 
oğlu Mustafa 
Sarıca Mürsel kethüda oğlu 
Ömer ve Ali 
Şarklı Kürdü Hacı Bekir 
ve Halil 
Kuzi (?) Veli ve Kebir ve 
sağir ali ve elhac Avaz (?) 
Sıddıklı Mehmed kethüda ve 
Bali ve Bektaş oğlu mirzali 
(?) ve sekban oğlu ağca  
Büyük Selarlu ve küçük 
Bekir veyusuf oğlu 
İsmail ve Mustafa 
kethüda 
Durdu Hasanlı tabi’ İsmail Veliler duman Oğlu Ahmed Kethüda ve Köse Mehmed 
Diger Kaşıkçı 
Kethüdaları İbrahim ve 
Rahman oğlu Ahmed 
Kethüda Arab oğlu Hacı 
Bekir ve gayruhu 
Yekun cemaat: 22 
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ACR 41, p. 39 
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Appendix II: The Deserters from the Defence of Tımaşver in 1696 
 
A) Deserter Tımar Holders Who Lost Their Lands. 
 
Village1 
The amount 
of Tımar2 Deserters3 New Owners4 
Aynıfar ? Mehmed Yusuf 
Aynıfar 8,000 Mehmed Mustafa 
Barna 3,000 Şaban Mehmed 
Bostancık 9,000 Ahmed Mehmed 
Bostancık 3,000 Ahmed  
Bostancık 3,000 Ahmed Mehmed 
Bostancık ? Ahmed Yusuf 
Bostancık 9,000 Ahmed Mehmed 
Burucak 3,000 Mahmud  
Burucak 3,000 Mahmud İbrahim 
Burucak 3,000 Mahmud Osman 
Evliyacık (?) 2,500 Ali Seyyit Mehmed 
Güllüce ? Mehmed Ali 
Güllüce 10,000 Mehmed Selim 
Güllüce 4,500 Zülfikâr Mehmed Hanifi 
Han-ı Kirman 5,500 Hüseyin Hızır 
Han-ı Kirman 3,000 Mehmed Hüseyin 
Harnuba (?) 3,000 Selim Osman 
Harpuştil 5,200 Mehmed Mehmed 
Hezek 18,000 Bekir İsmail 
Hümeyri & Kızılca Kend 4,500 Ali Ali 
Kara Dinek 3,800 Ramazan Ahmed 
Kara Dinek 3,500 Ramazan Abdullah 
Karaca Viran 16,000 Ahmed Davud 
Karaca Viran 16,450 Ahmed Davud 
Karaca Viran 10,000 Süleyman Ahmed 
Karaca Viran 5,300 Yusuf Mehmed 
Kefer Bostan 3,000 Ali Mehmed 
Kefercebel ? Ömer Mehmed 
Kelbin 3,000 Ahmed Ali 
Kelbin ? Ahmed Ahmed 
Kelbin 3,000 Ahmed Ahmed 
Kelbin ? diğer Ahmed Ahmed 
Kelbin 3,000 Mehmed Ahmed 
Kered ? Ebubekir Ebubekir 
Kerer 3,700 Ahmed Ahmed 
Kilisecik 3,000 Ahmed Mahmud 
Kilisecik 2,900 Ahmed Mehmed 
Kilisecik 2,900 Ahmed Mahmud 
Kilisecik, Kızılcakend… 10,000 Mehmed Selim 
Merserc (?) ? Hızır Ebubekir 
Öyücek 4,250 ? Hızır 
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Pehlivan Çukuru 3,000 Mehmed Hasan 
Şağidin  7,537 Ali Seyyit Mehmed 
Şağidin (Çağdigin ?) 2,200 Musa Mehmed 
Savibönü 5,000 Ali Ali 
Savibönü 5,000 Ali Mehmed 
Savibönü 2,700 Mustafa Mehmed 
Savibönü ? Mustafa Hızır 
Savibönü 2,700 Mustafa Hüseyin 
Savibönü 2,697 Mustafa Mehmed 
Saramiyye 3,500 Mehmed Ömer 
Segerban (Seğer?) 7,500 Yusuf Mehmed 
Seğidin 1,500 Musa  
Seğidin 3,000 Mustafa Mustafa 
Sibge 3,998 Ebubekir Mustafa 
Sibge 4,000 Ebubekir Mustafa 
Şöhme 2,300 Ali Hüseyin 
Söndü 3,000 Mustafa Abdullah 
Torbalık 3,800 Hüseyin Mehmed 
Tozluburç 4,000 Mustafa Hüseyin 
Tucefe (?) 3,000 ? Mehmed 
Turnalık 3,800 Hüseyin Mehmed 
Ulu Ma’sara 3,000 Mehmed Halil 
Yona 3,000 Şaban Halil 
Zenbur ? 3,000 Ali Hüseyin 
Zügürd (?) ? Mehmed Ali 
Total 277,232   
 
Notes: 
1. The places where the tımar lands were located. 
2. The estimated income from the land per year. 
3. The tımar holders who were deserted from the battle. 
4. Men to whom the lands of desretrs were granted. They took part in the battle 
or accepted to be serdengeçti (troops selected for a desperate enterprise). 
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B) Taxes Levied On Desrter Zeamet Owners and Their Villages 
 
ACR 44, p. 90: Eyalet-i Maraş’da vaki züema ve erbab-ı tımarın 1106 senesinde 
sefere memur olub Tımaşver muhafazasından firar etmeleriyle sene-i merkumede 
zeamet karyelerinde hasıl olan mahsulat ve rüsumatları canib-i miriye zapt olunmak 
babında hala Maraş valisi olan Ahmed Paşa’ya hatt-ı emr-i ali sadır olunmağla paşa-i 
müşarunileyh tarafından buyruldu-i şerifle tahsile tayinine buyurdukları Mehmed 
Ağa’nın cem’ ve tahsil eylediği defterdir ki zikr olunur. 
Evasıt-ı Şevval 1107 (May, 1696) 
 
Name Tax (kuruş) Name Tax (kuruş) 
Kara Ahmed Bey 75 Demirci Hacı Yusuf 9.5 
Hacı Süleyman 15 İlyas Bey Oğlu 21.75 
Kılıç Bey 40 Köle Yusuf 13 
Kör Mahmud 10 Bedir (?) Ağa Oğlu 10 
Kefer Bistan (village) 30 Bedir (?) Ağa Oğlu Zukericoz 9 
Temerçuğe (?) 20 Hacı Osman 50 
Kuli Bey Oğlu 20 Halil Bey 19 
Boz Ali Oğlu 10 Akal Hüseyin 15 
Hacı Abdullah 10 Zebnurden 10 
Katırcı Ömer 14 Salih (?) 9 
Selim Bey 10 Osman Kefercebel 24 
Çavuş Oğlu 100 Burc Ömer 35 
Pekre Mustafa 12.5 Çolak Ali 9 
İskender Oğlu 10 Elvend Oğlu Mehmed 15 
Hızır Bey 16 Kara Dinek 15 
Uzun Ahmed Oğlu 15 Geneyikli Hacı Ali 5 
Deli Osman Oğlu 20 Kel Şaban 15 
Cuma (?)Bey 60 Deli Ali 22 
Hantemanlı Oğlu 35 Şahbaz 18 
Kürd Musa 23.75 Çeribaşı Oğlu 40 
Cebrail Bey 20 Siyağuş 20 
Ades Bey 20 Ali Bey Şöhme Eyyup 20 
Parmaksızzade 75 Abdullah Bey 30 
Zaim Ali Oğlu 24 Kedi Oğlu 13 
Elvend Oğlu 18 Şah Melik ve Söndü 12 
Hasan Çavuş Oğlu 43 Ahmed Beşe Oğlu 60 
Pekre Hüseyin 9 Körkün 18 
Kürd Ali 12 Ömer Bey Oğlu 5 
Kasaboğlu Ali 30 Deli Mustafa 20 
Ramazan 14 Gergeri Oğlu Ali Bey 40 
Ali Ağa Oğlu 30 Hasan Ağa 30 
Çeri Paşa 22 Gergeri Oğlu Hacı Mustafa 15 
Hacı Meşali (?) 40 ? ? Abdullah 10 
Kara Mehmed 24 Mizmiz 50 
Zülfikar 35 Cem’an 168(4) 
Mir-i için Mehmed Ağaya teslim: 1250 
Mübaşir Mehmed Ağaya Ücret-i Mübaşeret: 250 
Mübaşir-i merkum Mehmed Ağa’ya sarf olan mesarif-i yevmiye cem’an: 184. 
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ACR 44, p. 90 
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Appendix III: The Expenditure for Campaigns against Bandit Tribes 
ACR 54, p. 18: 1116 senesi saferü’l-hayr evailinden tarih-i deftere gelinceye değin 
medine-i Ayntab’da vaki olan mesarif ve medine-i mezbure beyi ekrad üzerine sefere 
gittik de piyade bayrağı için verilen akçe cümle ayan-ı vilayet marifetiyle tevzi’ ve 
salyane olunduk da kuradan 228 guruş ve nefs-i şehrin 188 hanesi olub beher haneye 
4.5 guruş isabet etmekle tahrir olunan mesarif defteridir ki ber vech-i ati zikr olunur.  
Evahir-i Cemaziyyelevvel 1116 (September, 1704)  
 
Bey Kürd seferine gittik de: 
 
 
The form of expenditure In cash (kr) In kind 
Piyade bayrağı için 335  
Beye virilen 250  
Ref-i piyade bayrağı için 120  
Bazarbaşı Sof'a gönderildikde 2  
Haleb Paşası ağasına 22.5  
Vezir ağasına 24  
Beye üzüm ve karpuz 1  
Beyin hazinedarına ve kethüdasına ve sair uşaklarına 21.75  
Mustafa-i Halebiye kira 1  
Hacı Hüseyine kira ve kahve 3  
Mütesellim Mehmed Ağa'ya 3  
Arpacıya 25  
Ceridlere kira 10  
Beyin keçisini ra’y iden çobana 3  
Mütesellim Arab Ahmed Ağaya kilim 4kr 1s  
? 0.25  
Mah-ı saferü'l-hayrda saraydara  2  
Ruha'ya Arab eşkiyası için giden ademe ücret 10  
Saray çeşmesi tathirine 0.75  
Yükçüye  1s  
Müzellef Hamza ağaya oda kirası 3  
Saray tamiri için on ev ve binaya 12kr 7sm  
Gelüb ve çeker (?) 0.5  
Felek Efendi odasına kira 1kr 1s  
Gözü büyük oğlu odasına kira 2  
Mah-ı rebiü'l-ahir ve cemaziyyelevvel'de olan saraydara 4  
Mustafa-i Halebi beye gittik de bahşiş verdiği 5  
Mukaddeman olan salyaneden baki 60  
Pirinç 5kr 2s  
Bağ 4 8 
Yoğurt 7sm 13.5 
Üzüm 0.5 12 
Asel 2s 22nugi 
Sebzevan 0.75  
Odun 0.5  
Bakkallar aldığı lehm 0.5 4 
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Etmek 1kr 2s 501 
Arpa 7.25 10keyl 
Lehm 3kr 10sm 30.5 
Saman 1 3haml 
Beye yorğan 16 7 
Döşek ma' çit 8  
Keçe 3.5  
Yün 3 25 
Beredi (?) Hasır 6  
Elhac Hüseyin'e ücret 6.5  
Bazarbaşıya ücret 20  
Cem’an 1064  
 
Kura’dan 228 guruş ve nefs-i şehirden 846 guruş ki cem’an 1074 guruş hasıl olub 
meblağı mezkurun 1064 guruşu mesarif-i mezkur için verildikten sonra 10 guruşu 
izdiyad kalmağla bu mahale şerh verildi. 
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ACR 54, p. 18 
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ACR 54, p. 46: 1116 senesi cemaziyyelevveli evahirinden tarih-i deftere gelinceye 
degin medine-i Ayntab’da vaki olan mesarif ve menzil cümle ayan-ı vilayet 
marifetiyle tevzi’ salyane olunduk da nefs-i şehrin 188.5 (ve) nısf rub’ hanesi olub 
beher haneye 4 guruş 10 sümün isabet itmekle tahrir olunan mesarif defteridir ki ber 
vech-i ati zikr olunur. 
Gurre-i Şaban 1116 (December, 1704).  
 
The form of expenditure In cash (kr) In kind 
Menzilciye  600  
Avarız kesri 40  
Bağdad'a hazineye gittik de üç davar kirası 3  
Müzellef Hamza odasına mah-ı Cemaziyyelahire’de kira 2  
Mah-ı cemaziyyelahire ve receb'de saraydara 4  
Bektaşlı'ya asker tenbihi için muhzıra ücret 0.5kr 1sm  
İki defa Haleb ve Kilise giden ra'iye ücret 5  
Boyacı mahallesinden kesr   2.25  
Yükçüye 0.5  
Çeşme tathirine 1  
Solak bey odasına Cemaziyyelahire ve Receb'de kira 3kr 2s  
Mah-ı receb'de Kabasakal oğlu odasına kira 5  
...Çırağa için şirugan 0.25  
Gözü Büyük odasına Cemaziyyelahire ve Receb'de kira 2  
Develik tımarına 4  
Yazıcı Ali sülbü Ruha'ya arz ve mahzar ile gönderildik de 10  
Yeni Han'da oda kirası 2  
Solak bey odası için iki kilim 4kr 0.5s  
Çırağa için balmumu 2.25  
Çırağa için bez 3.75  
Keçe 7 13 
Bey gittik de saray bekçilerine masraf 2s  
Etmek 1s  
Mıhcıya 2.5  
Tacirli ve Ekrad ve Levendat için İstanbul'a mahzar 
götürene ücret 120  
Mukkaddeman olan salyanden kesr 29  
Bey'e helva 1.25  
Beredi (?) Hasır 1.25  
Kamış hasır 1.5  
Bazarbaşıya ücret 10  
Şehir kethüdasına 5  
Kâtibe 2.5  
Uşaklara 25  
Cem’an 906.5  
 
Beher haneye 4 guruş 10 sümünden 911 guruş hasıl olmakla bu mahale şerh verildi.  
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ACR 54, p. 46 
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ACR 65, p. 220: Halâ Maraş Valisi semavetlü Ali Paşa hazretleri ba-emr-i ′ali Kilis 
Ekradı ve Kılıçlı taifesi ve sair eşkıya üzerlerine tayin olunmakla Ayntab’a nüzul 
buyurduklarında 3 günlük zevad ve zahire ve sair vilayet umuru için vaki olan maarif 
cümle ayan-ı vilayet ve mahallat ve...marifetiyle muhasebe olunduk da yalnız şehrin 
hanelerine salyane ve tevzi’ olunub beher haneye 24.5 kuruş ve 2 sümün isabet 
etmeğin vaki olan mesarif defteridir ki ber vech-i ati zikr olunur. 
Evasıt-ı Zilhicce 1126 (December, 1714) 
 
The form of expenditure In cash (kr) In kind 
Şehirden asker taleb olunduk da asker 
mukabelesinde paşaya verilen 800  
Kethüda beye ve divan efendisine verilen 200  
Asker için mübaşir İsmail Efendi ve Veli 
Ağa'ya 60  
Konakçı doğcuya"? 50  
Saman eminine 6  
Odun eminine 6.5  
Zahireci Veli Ağa'ya 120  
Veli Ağa'nın saman ve odun üzerinde olan 
adamına 2  
Zahireci Veli Ağa'ya ve üzerinde olan 
bölükbaşılara ... Masrafı 21  
Mezburlara etmek 5  
Veli ağa'ya şa'ir 25 25 
Mezbura Ali Beşe'den alınan arpa 2.75 2 kl, 6 sm 
Gergerizade İsmail Ağa'ya şa'ir 4 4 kl 
Mezbura lehm 5.5 41.5 
Veli Ağa'ya ve Bölükbaşıya ve Elhac Hasan 
Ağa'ya saman 10 16.5 haml 
Veli Ağa'ya kahve 2.5  
Mahkemede bekçilere üzüm peynir 0.5  
Mezburlara etmek 2s 12 
Paşa-i müşarünileyh mübaşiri Elhac Hasan 
Ağa'ya etmek  56ak 8 
Mazbura şa'ir 2.25 18 sm 
Bakkal zahiresi 1.5  
Lehm 7sm 4.5 
...Has 2  
Paşaya hediye kavun ve karpuz 2.5  
Haleb'e giden iki sa'iye  3  
Paşaya ...ve sebzevat 5  
Elhac Ahmed'den alınan saman  20  
Arpacıdan alınan şa'ir 800 800 kl 
Bazarbaşıdan alınan şa'ir  200 200 kl 
Paşa için şa'ir 200 200 kl 
Paşa için etmek 145 25 kn 
Lehm 177.5 13 kn, 33 bt 
Mumbar ve paca 2  
Berih 66kr 2s 3 kn, 33 bt 
Bulgur 100 10 kn 
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Revgan-ı sade 120 2 kn 
Mahlut yağ 83kr1s 2 kn 
Şem' revgan  3.75 10 bt 
Asel 14kr 1s 43 bt 
Şem' asel 2 3 okka 
Tuz 1  
Nohut 2.5  
Nişasta 1.5 8.5 bt 
Şeker 2kr 1s 21 nügi 
Soğan  1.5 50 bt 
Yoğurt 3kr 1s 50 bt 
Biber 2.5 10.5 nügi 
Keşenc? Ve badem ve sair hırdavat 8  
Yumurta 0.75  
Odun   2  
Bazarbaşının paşa matbahına aldığı odun 8  
Kürek ve zenbil 0.5  
Akçe tahsili için muhzırlara ve çavuşlara 20  
Kulavez 0.25  
Keçe 0.5  
Paşaya hediye için şerbet 5kr 1s  
Çizme-i mes ? Papuç 6kr 2sm 5 çift 
Adalet fermanı getiren ağaya ve uşaklarına 
hizmet 27  
Haleb'e giden hazine için bargir kirası 4  
Hediye için üç eyer 38  
Çerkez Mehmed Paşa için Basmacızade’den 
alınan  3kr 1sm  
Menkur sarfı ve akçe kesri 15  
Şehreküstü mahallesinin konağa arpası 3  
İbn Eyyüb mahallesinin arpası 2  
Nefir-i amm askeri ihracına gelen .... 
Hizmet 30  
...Mezkure .... 1  
Kılıçlı için Haleb'e ve Maraş'a giden iki 
sa'iye 3kr 1s  
Karye-i Sam'a giden iki sa'iye 1  
Saraya hasır  1.5 7 top 
Def' (?) hasır  2s 2 top 
Keçe 7 15 
Saraydarlara çizme 4 3 çift 
Saraydarlara aba 4  
1126 Recebinden 1127 Muharremine 
gelince 6 ayda saraydarlara ücret  24  
Mehkeme saraydarına ücret 9  
Abdülmuttalib efendiye Şarkıyan 
mahallesinin masrafı 5  
Mezbura Şehreküstü mahallesinin masrafı 7  
Vekil-i harca Makulat masrafı 55kr 50 ak  
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Vekil-i harca kahve 2.5  
Vekil-i harca hizmet 150  
Meblağ-mezkure... 5  
Mezbur için alınan etmek 4kr 48 ak 88 
Sairden alınan etmek 10kr 24 ak 2 kn, 4 bt 
Vekil-i harc Elhac ahmed'den alınan şa'ir 110 109 kl, 3sm 
Ahmed'den alınan şa'ir 34 34 kl 
Ömer'den alınan şa'ir 20 19.5 kl 
Paşaya giden yağ kirası 3.5  
....Paşa geldik de alınan şa'ir 165 165 kl 
Kasab Emir Hasan'dan alınan lehm 6 48 bt 
Emir Elhac Abdullah'dan alınan lehm  98 bt 
Samancı Mehmed'den alınan  30 67 yük 
Paşaya etmek 25 5 kn 
Etmekçi başıya hizmet 11sm  
Üç bayraka etmek 1.75 36 kn 
Cem’an 4516.5kr  
 
Yalnız dörtbin beşyüz onaltı buçuk kuruşdur.  
 
Districts of the city of Ayntab Household 
Mahalle-i Boyacı 2 
Mahalle-i Bey 3 
Mahalle-i Seng-i Taş 1.75 
Mahalle-i Kara Sakal 1 
Mahalle-i Cevizlice 3.25 
Mahalle-i İbn-i Kör 2.5 
Mahalle-i Ehl-i Cefa 3 
Mahalle-i Kürkçiyan 8 
Mahalle-i Şehreküstü 17 
Mahalle-i Çukur 8 
Mahalle-i Taşlaki 3.25 
Mahalle-i Kürtüncüyan 7 
Mahalle-i Şarkıyan 3 
Mahalle-i Kızılca Mescid 5 
Mahalle-i Ali Elnacar 10 
Mahalle-i İbn-i Eyyüb 13 
Mahalle-i Hayık Müslüman 8 
Mahalle-i Bostancı 3.75 
Mahalle-i Ammo 14 
Mahalle-i Kanalıcı 3.5 
Mahalle-i Tarla-i Atik 8.625 
Mahalle-i Seng-i Hoşkadem 3 
Mahalle-i Seng-i Tavil 3 
Mahalle-i ? 5.25 
Mahalle-i Cabi 4 
Mahalle-i Akyol 4.5 
Mahalle-i Hayık Zımmiyan 1.5 
Mahalle-i Kayser 3 
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Mahalle-i Tarla-i Cedid 3 
Mahalle-i Tevbe 5.5 
Mahalle-i Eblehan 2.5 
Mahalle-i Kayacık 3 
Mahalle-i Kastel 2 
Mahalle-i Hacı Baba 0.75 
Kurb-u Bostancı 1.5 
Kurb-u Zincirli 2.5 
Kurb-u Musullu Zade 0.5 
Kurb-u Mella Ahmed 1 
Kurb-u Kozanlı 2 
Kurb-u Hayık Baba 0.5 
Kurb-u Kozanlı 2.5 
Kurb-u Tarla-i Cedid 0.5 
Kurb-u Kayacık 0.5 
Kurb-u Bey 0.25 
Kurb-u Şehreküstü 1 
Kurb-u Cevizlice 0.5 
Kurb-u Hızır Çavuş 1 
Kurb-u Kanalcı 0.25 
Kurb-u Ali Elnacar 0.25 
Kurb-u Kılıç Oğlu Bağı 0.25 
Cem’an 183.625 (184.625) 
 
Beher haneye 24.5 kuruş ile 2 sümünden 4529 kuruş hasıl olub bilada zikr olunan 
4506.5 (4516.5) kuruş mesarif verildikten sonra 12.5 kuruş izdiyad kalmağla bu 
mahale şerh verildi. 
 
Notes: 
S= Sülas 
Sm=Sümün 
kr=kuruş 
bt=batman 
kl=keyl 
kn=kantar 
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ACR 65, p. 220 
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Appendix IV: Captives from Some Tribes 
 
ACR 65, p. 216: Daima şirret ve şekavet ve katl-i nüfus ve nehb u garet-i emval-i 
ibad adet-i müstemirreleri olduğundan Kılıçlı Ekradı nefir-i amm olmak üzere 
haklarında ferman-ı ali sadır olan taife-i mezburenin hâlâ Ayntab kala’sında Maraş 
muhafızı devletli vezir-i ruşen-zamir Ali Paşa hazretleri buyruldu-i şerif ile mahbus 
olan nisvan ve sıbyanları Kırbıs (Kıbrıs) ceziresine nakl (?) ve iclalü için sadır olan 
ferman-ı ali mucebince cezire-i mezbureye irsalleri için vezir-i müşarunileyh 
tarafından varid olan buyruldu-i şerifleri üzere kala’-i mezburede habs olunan Kılıçlı 
Ekradının nisvanları üzerine 71 nefer dahi Maraş’dan gelüp cümleyi acilen ve 
mahaline getirmek buyruldu-i şerif ile ve tarafından mübaşir İbrahim Ağa marifetiyle 
Kilis’e nakl olan nisvan ve etfal defteridir ki bervech-i ati zikr olunur.  
Evahir-i Zilhicce 1126 (December 1714-January 1715) 
 
Tohtemür Meryem Bint 
Hamza Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Senem Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Ayn Bint Süleyman Nefer 1 
Güher Bint Bektaş Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Elif Bint Bayram Nefer 1 Reho (?) Bint Resto (?)   
Senem Bint Koca Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Döne Bint Abdi Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Gündüz Nefer 1 Rıhan Bint Kanber Nefer 1 
Abalı Döne Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 Yusuf Bin Koca Sağir 1 
Kılıçlı Senem Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Reyhan Sağir 1 
Güllü Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Koyun (?) Nefer 1 
Veli Kızı Havva Nefer 1 Esma Bint Ali Sağir 1 
Ümmü Bint Hamza Nefer 1 Sultan Bint Sehulu (?) Nefer 1 
Hatice Bint Mazlum (?) Nefer 1 Gülşen Bint Ömer Nefer 1 
Veli Bin İsmail Sağir 1 Kızkarındaşı Mum Nefer 1 
Fakara (?) Fatma Nefer 1 Elif Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Sultan Bint Hacı Nefer 1 Merci (?) Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 
Nergis Bint Cündi Nefer 1 Meryem Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Menfeşe Bint Yusuf Nefer 1 Kızkarındaşı Altun Nefer 1 
Esma Bint Hacı Nefer 1 Meryem Bint Karaman Nefer 1 
Satı Bint Süleyman Nefer 1 Selur Bint Şeker Nefer 1 
Elif Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Sağir Kızkarındaşı Aşur Sağir 1 
Altun Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Allahvirdiyse Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Hacı Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Selim Nefer 1 
Mercan Bint Davud Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Hüseyin Sağir 1 Ayşe Sağir 1 
Şahin Bin Elmas (?) Sağir 1 Senem Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Sefer Nefer 1 Fatma Sağir 1 
Ayşe Bint Ali Nefer 1 Sultan Bint Hakverdi Nefer 1 
Geyik Bint Hüsyin Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Tanrıverdi Nefer 1 Emine Bint Halil Nefer 1 
Karındaşları Sağir Zan (?) Sağir 1 Emine Bint Ali Nefer 1 
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ve Güllü Nefer 1 Sağir Oğlu Hürmet (?) Sağir 1 
Ayşe Bint Derviş Nefer 1 Güllü Bin Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Sağire Kızı Fatma Sağir 1 Selur Bint Murad Nefer 1 
Hasan Bin Şuler (?) Sağir 1 Fatma Bint Kenan Nefer 1 
Peri Bint Halil Nefer 1 Kızkarındaşı Döndü Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Esma Bint Ismail Nefer 1 
Esma Bint İbrahim Nefer 1 Bahar Bint Tanrıverdi Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Musa Nefer 1 Arz Bint Bali Nefer 1 
Devlet Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Emine Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Hali Bint Ali Nefer 1 Hemze (?) Bint Yusuf Sağir 1 
Döne Bint Savğan (Soğan) Nefer 1 Senem Bint Ibrahim Sağir 1 
Güllü Bint Bektaş Nefer 1 Kızkarındaşı Zöhre Sağir 1 
Mereyem Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Cevher Bint Hüseyin Sağir 1 
Döne Bint Safer Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 
Güher (?) Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Mehmed Ibn Ibrahim Sağir 1 
Sultan Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 
Döne Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Medine Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 
Aşiret Bint Şahdil (?) Nefer 1 Sağir Oğlu Ali Sağir 1 
Zöhre Bint Ali Sağir 1 Hani Bint Receb Nefer 1 
Bayram Bint Abdi Nefer 1 Nazlı Bint Veli Nefer 1 
Döndü Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 
Mehmed Bin Şah Bali Sağir 1 Oğlu Ali Sağir 1 
Ayşe Bint Abdullah Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Mustafa   
Ayşe Bint Tanrıverdi Nefer 1 Peri Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 
Güher Bint Bali Nefer 1 Hanım Bint Kuma (?) Nefer 1 
Senem Bint Şahin Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Elhas (?) Nefer 1 
Sağir Oğlu Mustafa Sağir 1 Sağir Oğlu Hüseyin Sağir 1 
Zümrüt Bint Ali Sipah (?) Nefer 1 Receb Kalender Sağir 1 
Fatma Bint Ali Nefer 1 Senem Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Sağire Selur (?) Sağir Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Gülşen Bint Ali Nefer 1 Güzel (Bint) Hasan Nefer 1 
Muğal (?) Bint Ali Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 
Bektaşlı Selur Bint Kara 
Mehmed Nefer 1 Hanzed (?) Bint Yusuf Nefer 1 
Altun Bint Murtaza Nefer 1 Döne Bint Abdulkadir Nefer 1 
Sultan Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 Sanem Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Safiye Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 Satı Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Hüsna Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Hasan Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Bayram Bint Bekir Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Durmuş Nefer 1 Ibrahim Veled-i O Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Serid (?) Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Bekir Nefer 1 
Sultan  Sağir 1 Leyli Bint Hudaverdi Nefer 1 
Süleyman  Sağir 1 Güllü Bint Hudaverdi Nefer 1 
Şaban  Sağir 1 Döne Uht-i O Nefer 1 
Mehmed  Sağir 1 Veli Sağir Nefer 1 
Gülef (?) Bint Ali Nefer 1 Senem Bint Ağca Nefer 1 
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Bağdad Bint Süleyman Nefer 1 Ümmügülsüm Bint Ömer Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Cennet Bint ? Nefer 1 
Ali Bin Yusuf Sağir 1 Sultan Bint O Nefer 1 
Ali Bin Abdulhalim Sağir 1 Senem Bint O Nefer 1 
Kizkarındaşı Melike Sağir 1 Elhelub Arabından Safiye Bint Çerkes Nefer 1 
Senkur (?) Sağir Nefer 1 Fatma Bint O Sağir 1 
Hatice Bint Hakverdi Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Abbas Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Hüsyin Ibn O Nefer 1 
Musa Sağir 1 Ayşe Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Döne Bint Musa Nefer 1 Yusuf Ibn O Nefer 1 
Kar Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Safiye Bint O Nefer 1 
Güllü Bint Hatır (?) Nefer 1 Ali Ibn Süleyman Sağir 1 
Bayram Bint Musa Nefer 1 Meryem Bint Harneb (?) Nefer 1 
Kızkardeşi Ayşe Nefer 1 Çerkes Bin Ömer   
Cennet Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 Hatice (?) Bint Sultan Nefer 1 
Hasan Ibn Yusuf Nefer 1 Ramazan Bin Mehmed (?) Sağir 1 
Hatun Bint Abdi Nefer 1 Bera' (?) Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 
Kıyye (Kaya) Bint Yusuf Nefer 1 Tahir Bint Isamil Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Nefer 1 Tabanca Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 
Döndü Bint Ramazan Nefer 1 Fatma Bin Abdurrahman   
Hatice Bint Ibrahim Nefer 1 Yakub Bin Sağir 1 
Ebubekir Sağir 1 Beyza Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Döndü Bint Hıdır Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Süleyman Nefer 1 
Husna Bint Lek (?) Nefer 1 Elif Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Emine Bint Tohtemür Nefer 1 Sultan Bint O Nefer 1 
Abdullah Sağir 1 Cennet Bint Halil Nefer 1 
Hatice Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Gülizar Bint Osman Nefer 1 
Kızkarındaşı Fatma Sağir 1 Mehmed Veled-I O Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint O Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Elif Bint Imam Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Ibrahim Nefer 1 Meryem Bint Arab Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 Döne Bint Arab Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Bayo (?) Nefer 1 Elif Bint Veli Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Battal Nefer 1 Cennet Bint Tohtemür Nefer 1 
Elif Bint Kanber Sağir 1 Gelo (Kelo) ibn İmam Nefer 1 
Elif Sağir Sağir 1 Çukadar Hüseyin Avradı Fatma Nefer 1 
Raziye Bint Abdullah Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Nefer 1 
Ayşe Sağir 1 Havva Bint Murad Nefer 1 
Fatma Sağir 1 Fatma Bint Ismail Nefer 1 
Mehmed Sağir Nefer 1 Döndü Bint O Nefer 1 
Sultan Bint Şaban Nefer 1 Şahbaz Bint Nefer 1 
Safiye Bint Selim Nefer 1 Karkın (?) Senem Bint Mehdi Nefer 1 
Kızı Selur Sağir 1 Döne Bint Elhac Ali Nefer 1 
Safiye Bint Ali Nefer 1 Kılıçlı Besey Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Raziye Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 Reyhan Bint O Nefer 1 
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Safiye Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Koca Nefer 1 
Senem Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Hüseyin Veled-i O Sağir 1 
Döne Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Asle (Aslı) Bint Ali Nefer 1 Süleyman Veledi O Sağir 1 
Selur Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 Emine Bint Mustafa Nefer 1 
Elif Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Selur Bint O Nefer 1 
Ayşe Bint Şaban Nefer 1 Senem Bint Kubad Nefer 1 
Asiye Bint Musa Nefer 1 Kutlu Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 
Rışvan Elif Nefer 1 Hanzde Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Seyfi Nefer 1 Esma Bint Gelo Nefer 1 
Ümhani Bint Kamber Nefer 1 Lensey (Besey) Uht-i O Nefer 1 
Döne Bint Veli Nefer 1 Asi Nefer 1 
Ali Bin Mustafa Sağir 1 Mehmed Bin Bektaş Nefer 1 
Elif Bin Mustafa Nefer 1 Döne Bint Zalim Ali Nefer 1 
Elif Bint Osman Nefer 1 Selur Bint Ilyas Nefer 1 
 
Mariz olub ismini  
Edaya iktidarı olmayan nefer: 76 
Neferat-ı mezkurenin 71 neferi Maraş’tan gelmiştir. 
Nefer aded: 349 
 
 
 
 
ACR 65, p. 216 Continue: Ayntab kala’sı dizdarı ihbarı ile fevt olan nisvan ve 
sübyan ve defteridir ki zikr olunur. 
 
Koyunoğlu Taifesinden Yusuf 
Bin Mehmed Sağir Nefer 1 Seydi Bin Yusuf Sağir 1 
Hacılardan Hüseyin Bin 
Yusuf Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Mahmud Sağir 1 
Hüseyin Bin Bektaş Sağir 1 Mustafa Bin Kara Yusuf Sağir 1 
Elciden Musa Kızı Güllü Sağir 1 Hanım Bint Ali Sağir 1 
Dokuz Taifesinden Elif Nefer 1 Ali Bin Musa Sağir 1 
Kılıçlı Karamehmed Kızı 
Fatma Nefer 1 Döne Bint Ahmed Nefer 1 
Ulus Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Esma Bint Fayad Sağir Sağir 1 
Belyaf (?) Bint Osman Nefer 1 Mahmud Bin Kara Mehmed   
Bektaş’ın Kaynanası Nefer 1 Emine Bint Mustafa Sağir 1 
Mezburun Ümmütesi Nefer 1 Selman Bint Mikail Nefer 1 
Koyunoğlu Kızı Fatma Nefer 1 Havva Bint Mir Sağir 1 
Gülbahar Nefer 1 Ömer Bin Musa Sağir 1 
Mamalıdan Hatice Bint Yusuf Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Topal Mehmed Nefer 1 
Kılıçlıdan Arz Bint Mürsel Nefer 1 Hatun Bint Isamil Nefer 1 
Meryem Bint Hüdaverdi Sağir Nefer 1 Ali Bin Receb Sağir 1 
Elhalub Arabından Yusuf Nefer 1 Balke Bint Nefer 1 
Süleyman Bin Mehmed Sağir 1 Döndü Bint Osman Sağir 1 
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Sanem Bint Kasım Nefer 1 Fatma Bint Çerkes Nefer 1 
Bektaşlıdan Mehmed Bin 
Yusuf Nefer 1 Halime Kızı Fatma Sağir 1 
Döne Bint Hamza Nefer 1 Hasan Binr Mirzad Sağir 1 
Fatma Bint Hasan Nefer 1 Ali Bin Osman Sağir 1 
Manend (?) Bint Barak Nefer 1 Ismail Bin Başıbüyük   
Verdi Bint Mehmed Nefer 1 Döner Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Bektaşlı Kara Mehmed Kızı 
Selur Nefer 1 Meryem Bint Ali Nefer 1 
Mahmud Bin  Sağir 1 Ayşe Bint Sağir 1 
Kılıçlıdan Zemane (?) Bint 
Hüseyin Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Abdulhalim Nefer 1 
Elhalub Arabından Elif Nefer 1 Ahmed Bin Osman Sağir 1 
Elciden Temame (?) Bint 
Musa Sağir 1 Şahneşe (?) Bint Mir Sağir 1 
Mustafa Bin Sefer Sağir Nefer 1 Güllü Bint Bali Nefer 1 
Cihanbeyli Meryem Bint 
Ayna Sağir 1 Ali Sağir Nefer 1 
Hanım Bint İbrahim Nefer 1 Veli Sağir Nefer 1 
Hatice Bint Süleyman Nefer 1 Arz  Bint Kalender Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Hüseyin Sağir Nefer 1 Oruç (?) Bint Cafer   
Malike Bint Sağir 1 Hatun Bint Sener (?)   
Tabkıranlıdan Koca Sağir 1 Döne Bint Kalender Nefer 1 
Kılıçlıdan Mustafa Bin Kara 
Mehmed Sağir 1 Abbas Bin İbrahim Sağir 1 
Kayo Meciddden Fatma Nefer 1 Döne Bin Hasan Sağir Nefer 1 
Gülşen Bint Sağir 1 Esencan (?) Bint Bayezid Nefer 1 
Fatma Bint Hüseyin Nefer 1 Eymir Bin Ahmed Sağir Sağir 1 
Diğer Fatma Nefer 1 Ayşe Bint Hasan Sağir 1 
Ahmed Bin Hüseyin Sağir 1 Ahmed Bin Ali Sağir 1 
Cihanbegliden Hanım Sağir 1 Veli Bin Karaca Sağir 1 
Receb Bint Osman Sağir 1 Meryem Bint Ali Sağir 1 
Mercan Bint Sağir 1 Fatma Bint Yağmur Sağir 1 
Tacirliden Veli Bin Ismail Sağir 1 Sine Bint Ahmed Sağir 1 
Doğanlıdan Zalim Ali 
Validesi Nefer 1 Fatma Nefer 1 
Kenan Bin Cündi Sağir 1 Zemzem Bint Halil Nefer 1 
Elciden Ali Bin Kara Hüseyin Sağir 1 Hatun Bint Musa Nefer 1 
Cihanbegliden Ayşe Bint Ali Nefer 1 Fevt Olan Aded Cem’an 98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 176   
ACR 65, p. 216 
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Appendix V: The Auction for Properties of Killed Bandits 
 
ACR 68, p. 460: Bundan akdem kahr ve tedmir ve tertib-i cezaları için haklarında 
verilen fetva-i şerif ile hatt-ı hümayun şevket-makrun sadır olan levendat ve kutta-i 
tarik eşkiyasından olub hala Anadolu müfettişi veziri-i mükerrem devletlu saadetlu 
Ali Paşa hazretlerinin kethüdası Ali kararları ve vekalete Rakka muhafızı saadetlu 
Hüseyin Ağa ve vezir-i müşarunileyh hazretleri tarafından hala medine-i Ayntab 
mütesellimi fahirü’l-akran e’s-seyyid Ebubekir Ağa medine-i mezburede katl 
eylediği levendatın müft-u şer’ ile tahrir olunan eşyaları defteridir ki bervech-i ati 
zikr olunur. 
12 Zilhicce 1130 (November 5, 1718). 
 
Property # Value (guruş) 
Cedid Seccade 11 30 
Cedid ve köhne kilim 15 32 
Siyah bayence 18 19.50 
Köhne kürk 14 24 
Köhne ? 31 24 
Köhne kuşak ve puşi 33 21 
Köhne çuka şalvar 7 4.75 
Köhne entari 5 2.60 
Köhne çakşura (?) 4 4.60 
Köhne yağmurluk 13 23 
Sağir kahve ibriği 8 
Tas 3 5 
Köhne çuka kesme (?) 1 1 
Köhne sarık 15 3 
Köhne eyer ma’ besat 3 6 
Hurd u rest (?) - 14.50 
Boylu tüfenk 20 27 ? 
Kara bena kılıç (?) 13 52 
Kara bena pala 1 7.50 
Köhne eyer ma’ besat 22 45 
Kurdeh (?) kılıç 36 
Tabancalı tüfenk 35 
100 
At ma’ eyer ma’ besat  105 1200 
Nakde’l- ve zuleta ve para - 260 
Cem’an yekun  2331.50 
 
Füruht olmayub a’yni mevcud olan eşyadır 
At ma’ eyer 55  
Sim kemer raht ma’ başlık 1  
Sim sayserı (?) raht ma’ başlık 1  
Sim hançer 1  
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